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      Progress Toward Polio Eradication — Worldwide, January 2016–March 2018

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          In 1988, when an estimated 350,000 cases of poliomyelitis occurred in 125 countries, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate polio globally. Transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) continues uninterrupted in only three countries (Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan) ( 1 ), and among the three serotypes, WPV type 1 (WPV1) remains the only confirmed circulating type. This report describes global progress toward polio eradication during January 2016–March 2018, and updates previous reports ( 2 ). In 2017, 22 WPV1 cases were reported, a 41% decrease from the 37 WPV1 cases reported in 2016. As of April 24, 2018, eight WPV1 cases have been reported (seven in Afghanistan and one in Pakistan), compared with five cases during the same period in 2017. In Pakistan, continuing WPV1 transmission has been confirmed in multiple areas in 2018 by isolation from wastewater samples. In Nigeria, ongoing endemic WPV1 transmission was confirmed in 2016 ( 3 ); although WPV was not detected in 2017 or in 2018 to date, limitations in access for vaccination and surveillance in insurgent-held areas in northeastern Nigeria might permit continued undetected poliovirus transmission. Substantial progress toward polio eradication has continued in recent years; however, interruption of WPV transmission will require overcoming remaining challenges to reaching and vaccinating every missed child. Until poliovirus eradication is achieved, all countries must remain vigilant by maintaining high population immunity and sensitive poliovirus surveillance. Routine Poliovirus Vaccination Coverage Among infants aged 1 year, the estimated global coverage with 3 doses of poliovirus vaccines (Pol3, mostly oral poliovirus vaccine [OPV]) through routine immunization services was 85% in 2016 (the most recent year for which data are available). World Health Organization (WHO)/United Nations Children’s Fund estimates for Pol3 coverage in 2016 were 73% in the African Region, 92% in the Region of the Americas, 80% in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, 94% in the European Region, 87% in the South-East Asia Region, and 95% in the Western Pacific Region, with heterogeneity in coverage among countries in all regions.* National Pol3 coverage with the third dose of OPV (OPV3) in the three countries with endemic WPV transmission in 2016 was 60% in Afghanistan, 72% in Pakistan, and 49% in Nigeria. OPV3 coverage is substantially lower in areas of WPV transmission, where children in high-risk mobile populations or areas of conflict are repeatedly missed ( 4 , 5 ). Rarely, in areas with low vaccination coverage, Sabin-like viruses can spread and revert to neurovirulence, resulting in outbreaks of disease caused by circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV). Approximately 90% of cVPDV cases reported since 2006 have been caused by type 2 (cVDPV2). In countries with recent cVDPV detections, Pol3 coverage was 74% in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 48% in Syria, 47% in Somalia, and 83% in Laos ( 6 ). In these countries, OPV3 coverage was substantially lower in subnational areas with cVDPV emergence and transmission. Following certification of the eradication of WPV type 2 (WPV2) in 2015, a global, synchronized withdrawal of trivalent OPV (tOPV, containing types 1, 2, and 3 live, attenuated polioviruses), and switch to bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 only), was completed by the end of April 2016 ( 7 ). Starting in 2015, injectable trivalent inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) was introduced into routine immunization schedules in OPV-using countries, generally at 14 weeks of age. Some countries had to delay introduction of IPV until 2018 because of global shortages of the vaccine. Supplementary Immunization Activities In 2016, 186 supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) were conducted in five WHO regions, during which approximately two billion total OPV and IPV doses were administered (Table 1), including 1,264,552,301 (63%) doses administered during national immunization days, 710,995,110 (36%) during subnational immunization days, and 17,603,036 (1%) doses during focused SIAs in areas of known or suspected poliovirus circulation (“mop-up” activities). In the event of cVDPV2 outbreaks, on advice of the monovalent OPV type 2 (mOPV2) Global Advisory Group, the WHO Director-General releases mOPV2 for outbreak response immunization. Of the administered doses, more than half (51%) were tOPV and approximately half (47%) were bOPV; an additional 1.4% were mOPV2, 0.05% were IPV plus bOPV, 0.2% were IPV alone, and 0.15% were fractional IPV (0.1 mL administered intradermally). TABLE 1 Number of supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) conducted, and number of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) and inactivated poliovirus (IPV) doses administered, by World Health Organization (WHO) region — worldwide, 2016–2017 Year/SIAs/Vaccine doses administered Region Global AFR AMR EMR EUR SEAR WPR 2016 SIAs (no.) 186 97 0 67 2 14 6 Vaccine (no. of doses administered) mOPV2 28,357,599 28,357,599 0 0 0 0 0 bOPV 940,622,006 274,197,570 397,909,506 54,880,271 206,507,773 7,126,886 tOPV 1,017,074,205 407,366,635 0 103,470,392 1,097,605 496,401,815 8,737,758 IPV 3,293,021 1,943,763 134,9258 0 0 0 IPV + bOPV 904,050 0 0 904,050 0 0 0 fIPV 2,899,566 0 0 252,354 0 2,647,212 0 Total doses 1,993,150,447 711,865,567 0 503,885,560 55,977,876 705,556,800 15,864,644 2017 SIAs (no.) 172 82 0 79 2 8 1 Vaccine (no. of doses administered) mOPV2 70,356,186 65,067,196 0 5,288,990 0 0 0 bOPV 1,705,913,274 519,920,180 0 488,368,342 389,314 696,180,796 1,054,642 tOPV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IPV 3,522,237 558,897 0 2,963,340 0 0 0 IPV + bOPV 8,920,134 0 8,920,134 0 0 0 fIPV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total doses 1,788,711,831 585,546,273 0 505,540,806 389,314 696,180,796 1,054,642 Abbreviations: AFR = African Region, AMR = Region of the Americas; bOPV2 = bivalent oral poliovirus, types 1 and 3; EMR = Eastern Mediterranean Region; EUR = European Region; fIPV = fractional dose inactivated poliovirus vaccine (one fifth of a 0.5 mL intramuscular dose, given intradermally); IPV = inactivated poliovirus vaccine; mOPV2 = monovalent oral poliovirus, type 2; SEAR = South-East Asia Region; tOPV2 = trivalent oral poliovirus, types 1, 2, 3; WPR = Western Pacific Region. In 2017, 172 SIAs were conducted in five WHO regions, during which approximately 1.79 billion total OPV and IPV doses were administered, including 1,110,923,756 (62%) doses administered during national immunization days, 672,091,158 (38%) during subnational immunization days, and 5,696,917 (0.3%) during mop-up activities. Of the administered doses, 95% were bOPV, 3.9% were mOPV2, 0.5% were IPV plus bOPV, and 0.2% were IPV alone. Poliovirus Surveillance Surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) is the means of detecting polio cases caused by WPV or cVDPV, confirmed by stool specimen testing through the Global Polio Laboratory Network. The performance of AFP surveillance is assessed through two main indicators: sensitivity and completeness of case investigation. An annual nonpolio AFP rate of ≥1 case per 100,000 population aged <15 years for countries in the WHO regions certified as poliofree, or ≥2 for all other countries is considered sufficiently sensitive to detect a case of polio, should it occur. Case investigation is considered to be sufficiently complete if at least 80% of reported AFP cases have adequate stool specimens collected (i.e., two stool specimens collected ≥24 hours apart, within 14 days of paralysis onset, with arrival at a WHO-accredited laboratory in good condition). In 2016, among the four countries reporting polio cases, three (Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan) met both performance indicators and one (Laos) did not. Among the five countries reporting polio cases in 2017, four (Afghanistan, DRC, Nigeria, Pakistan) met both performance indicators and one (Syria) did not. Although Nigeria and DRC meet AFP surveillance indicators nationally and subnationally in most provinces, both countries are affected by substantial issues in population accessibility and other impediments to AFP surveillance ( 1 ). AFP surveillance has been supplemented by environmental surveillance through testing of sewage in many countries, including poliofree countries as well as those with endemic transmission ( 1 ). Reported Poliovirus Cases Countries reporting WPV cases. In 2016, 37 WPV cases were detected (Figure): 13 (35%) in Afghanistan, 20 (54%) in Pakistan, and four (11%) in Nigeria. In 2017, 22 WPV cases were identified: 14 (64%) in Afghanistan and eight (36%) in Pakistan. No WPV cases have been identified in countries outside of Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan since 2014. During January 1–March 30, 2018, as of April 24, the low poliovirus transmission season, eight WPV1 cases were reported (seven in Afghanistan; one in Pakistan) (Figure) (Table 2). FIGURE Number of cases of wild poliovirus, by month of onset — worldwide, January 2015–March 2018* * Data as of April 24, 2018. The figure above is a histogram showing the number of worldwide cases of wild poliovirus, by month of onset, during January 2015–March 2018. TABLE 2 Number of reported polio cases, by country — Worldwide, January 1, 2016–March 30, 2018* Classification/Country 2016 (Jan 1–Dec 31) 2017 (Jan 1–Dec 31) 2017 (Jan 1–Mar 30) 2018 (Jan 1–Mar 30) WPV cVDPV WPV cVDPV WPV cVDPV WPV cVDPV Countries with endemic polio Afghanistan 13 0 14 0 3 0 7 0 Pakistan 20 1 8 0 2 0 1 0 Nigeria 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total cases in endemic countries 37 2 22 0 5 0 8 0 Other countries with reported cVDPV cases Laos 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 3 Syria 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 0 Total cases in other countries 0 3 0 96 0 0 0 3 Total paralytic polio cases 37 5 22 96 5 0 8 3 Abbreviations: cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV = wild poliovirus. * Data as of April 24, 2018. Afghanistan reported 13 WPV1 cases in four districts in 2016, compared with 14 WPV1 cases in nine districts in 2017 (7.7% increase). In 2016, 54% of WPV1 cases in Afghanistan were reported from Paktika province in the southeastern region. In 2017, 50% of WPV1 cases were reported from Kandahar province in the southern region. During January 1–March 30, 2018, seven WPV1 cases were detected (four in Kandahar province, one in Nangahar province, and two in Kunar province; the latter two provinces are in the eastern region), compared with three WPV1 cases detected during the same period in 2017. Pakistan reported a 60% decrease in the number of WPV1 cases, from 20 cases in four districts in 2016 to eight cases in seven districts in 2017. During January 1–March 30, 2018, one WPV1 case was reported (in Balochistan province), compared with two reported during the same period in 2017. WPV1 continues to be isolated from environmental surveillance sites in five provinces of the country (Balochistan, Islamabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh). Nigeria reported four WPV1 cases in 2016. No WPV1 cases were reported in 2017 and none to date in 2018. Countries reporting cVDPV cases and isolations. In 2016, five cVDPV cases were reported from three countries ( 8 ). In Laos, an outbreak that began with eight cVDPV type 1 cases in 2015 continued into 2016 with three additional cases reported. One cVDVPV2 case was reported in 2016 in Nigeria and another in Pakistan. In 2017, a total of 96 cVDPV2 cases were reported, including 74 cases from Syria (most recent case in September 2017) and 22 from DRC. The outbreak in DRC has continued into 2018, with four cases to date, as of April 24, 2018 (the most recent case occurring in February) ( 9 ). Isolation of cVDVP2 from environmental samples in Mogadishu, Somalia, in late 2017 and early 2018, and related cVDPV2 from environmental samples in Nairobi, Kenya, in early 2018, has confirmed long-term cVDPV2 transmission, in a broad area, although no associated polio cases have been detected to date. cVDPV type 3 has been isolated in Mogadishu from sewage samples collected in March 2018, again, with no associated polio cases having been detected to date. In Nigeria, cVDPV2 has been recently detected by environmental surveillance in two states in early 2018; no associated polio cases having been detected to date. Response immunization is underway or planned for all these cVDPV cases and isolations. Discussion Although substantial progress was made toward polio eradication during 2016–2017, challenges remain in the countries with endemic transmission. Continued circulation of WPV1 has been confirmed in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 2018 low WPV season, and it remains uncertain if WPV circulation has been interrupted in Nigeria ( 3 ). The number of WPV cases in Afghanistan declined from 2015 to 2016, but the decrease did not continue in 2017. Although negotiations to obtain local access are constantly being undertaken, the number of children who were inaccessible to vaccination in the south and east because of insecurity increased during 2017 ( 5 ). In Pakistan, a decline in WPV1 cases since 2014 continued during 2016 and 2017. The detection of WPV in environmental surveillance samples in the absence of WPV-positive AFP cases in several provinces might indicate either surveillance gaps or waning in the intensity of transmission. Intensified SIA schedules and efforts to reach previously unvaccinated children, along with expansion of community-based initiatives employing local permanent vaccinators and ensuring worker safety have helped reduce the number of WPV cases. Large-scale movement of high-risk populations across Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan in both directions continues to pose a challenge to interrupting WPV transmission, and crossborder collaborative vaccination efforts made in 2017 are being enhanced in 2018 ( 4 ). In Nigeria, WPV1 circulation went undetected from mid-2014 to mid-2016, and the discovery of both endemic WPV1 and long-standing cVDVP2 transmission in 2016 in Borno State illuminated gaps in surveillance. Continued inaccessibility of insurgent-held areas hinders both immunization and surveillance efforts ( 3 ). Enhancement of initiatives for collaborating with the military to reach currently unvaccinated children will be helpful in ensuring interruption of WPV transmission. In the other countries of the Lake Chad basin bordering Borno State (Cameroon, Chad, and Niger), problems with inaccessibility related to insecurity and a large number of difficult-to-access islands have been addressed through progressive improvements in microplanning and implementation of SIAs, but uncertainties remain regarding SIA quality and success in interrupting undetected WPV transmission. Global WPV2 eradication was certified in 2015 after no detection since 1999 ( 2 ). WPV type 3 has not been detected since 2012 ( 2 ). A minimum of 3 years of sensitive AFP surveillance without detection of WPV is required to certify a WHO region as being poliofree ( 10 ). Four of six WHO regions (the Region of the Americas, European, South-East Asia, and Western Pacific regions) have been certified free of indigenous WPV. Improvements in AFP surveillance performance in critical subnational areas are required to achieve poliofree certification of the African and Eastern Mediterranean regions. Because efforts to increase immunity to poliovirus type 2 before the global tOPV to bOPV switch did not reach all persistently unvaccinated children in hard-to-reach areas, some cVDPV2 emergences have been detected following the switch. Reaching all children for vaccination in areas with cVDPV2 transmission is also an ongoing challenge. Although progress toward global polio eradication has continued, challenges in identifying and vaccinating every missed child remain. Much of the recent progress reaching previously missed children has been associated with recruitment of trusted community volunteers who are invested in their locality for vaccination and surveillance efforts. Intensification of efforts to improve the quality of immunization and surveillance activities and to develop additional innovations in addressing persisting challenges is necessary. Until poliovirus eradication is achieved, all countries must remain vigilant by maintaining high population immunity and sensitive poliovirus surveillance. Summary What is already known about this topic? Transmission of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) has not been interrupted in Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. A global, synchronized switch to bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV, types 1 and 3 only) was completed in April 2016. What is added by this report? Compared with 2016, the number of WPV1 cases overall decreased in 2017. Some transmission of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) has been identified more than 1 year following the switch to bOPV in 2016. What are the implications for public health practice? Interruption of transmission of WPV1 and of cVDPV2 will require addressing persistent challenges to vaccinating every missed child. Until poliovirus eradication is achieved, all countries must maintain high population immunity and sensitive poliovirus surveillance.

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          Progress Toward Polio Eradication - Worldwide, 2015-2016.

          In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate poliomyelitis. Wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission persists in only two countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan) after the removal of Nigeria from the list of countries with endemic polio in September 2015.* Indigenous WPV type 2 has not been detected since 1999 and was declared eradicated by the Global Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication in September 2015.(†) Since November 2012, when the last case of WPV type 3 was detected in Nigeria, WPV type 1 has been the sole circulating type of WPV (1). This report summarizes global progress toward polio eradication during 2015-2016 and updates previous reports (2). In 2015, 74 WPV cases were reported in two countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan), a decrease of 79% from the 359 WPV cases reported in 2014 in nine countries; 12 WPV cases have been reported in 2016 (to date), compared with 23 during the same period in 2015 (3). Paralytic polio caused by circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) remains a risk in areas with low oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) coverage. Seven countries, including Pakistan, reported 32 cVDPV cases in 2015 (4). In four of these countries, ≥6 months have passed since the most recent case or isolate. One country (Laos) with VDPV transmission in 2015 has reported three additional cVDPV cases in 2016 to date. Encouraging progress toward polio eradication has been made over the last year; however, interruption of WPV transmission will require focus on reaching and vaccinating every missed child through high quality supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) and cross-border coordination between Afghanistan and Pakistan (5,6).
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            The Biologic Principles of Poliovirus Eradication

            Abstract The biologic principles for the global eradication of poliomyelitis are as follows: Poliovirus causes acute, nonpersistent infections, virus is transmitted by infectious humans or their waste, survival of virus in the environment is finite, humans are the only reservoir, and immunization with polio vaccine interrupts virus transmission. These principles appear to be sound. The potential for prolonged virus excretion by immunocompromised patients requires further definition, although there is no epidemiologic evidence of a threat to eradication. Survival of poliovirus in the environment is highly variable, but viral inactivation is usually complete within months. Higher primates may be infected with poliovirus, but they are unlikely reservoirs in nature. The only poliovirus reservoir remaining after eradication will be laboratory stocks. Serious attention must be given to reducing this potential source of infection. Polio eradication through immunization is evidenced by the documented absence of poliomyelitis in an increasing number of countries and the progressive disappearance of poliovirus genotypes.
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              Update on Vaccine-Derived Polioviruses — Worldwide, January 2016–June 2017

              In 1988, the World Health Assembly launched the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) ( 1 ). Among the three wild poliovirus (WPV) serotypes, only type 1 (WPV1) has been detected since 2012. Since 2014, detection of WPV1 has been limited to three countries, with 37 cases in 2016 and 11 cases in 2017 as of September 27. The >99.99% decline worldwide in polio cases since the launch of the GPEI is attributable to the extensive use of the live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in mass vaccination campaigns and comprehensive national routine immunization programs. Despite its well-established safety record, OPV use can be associated with rare emergence of genetically divergent vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) whose genetic drift from the parental OPV strains indicates prolonged replication or circulation ( 2 ). VDPVs can also emerge among persons with primary immunodeficiencies (PIDs). Immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs) can replicate for years in some persons with PIDs. In addition, circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) can emerge very rarely among immunologically normal vaccine recipients and their contacts in areas with inadequate OPV coverage and can cause outbreaks of paralytic polio. This report updates previous summaries regarding VDPVs ( 3 ). During January 2016–June 2017, new cVDPV outbreaks were identified, including two in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (eight cases), and another in Syria (35 cases), whereas the circulation of cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) in Nigeria resulted in cVDPV2 detection linked to a previous emergence. The last confirmed case from the 2015–2016 cVDPV type 1 (cVDPV1) outbreak in Laos occurred in January 2016. Fourteen newly identified persons in 10 countries were found to excrete iVDPVs, and three previously reported patients in the United Kingdom and Iran ( 3 ) were still excreting type 2 iVDPV (iVDPV2) during the reporting period. Ambiguous VDPVs (aVDPVs), isolates that cannot be classified definitively, were found among immunocompetent persons and environmental samples in 10 countries. Cessation of all OPV use after certification of polio eradication will eliminate the risk for new VDPV infections. WPV type 2 (WPV2) was last detected in 1999 and global WPV2 eradication was declared in September 2015; WPV type 3 has not been detected since 2012. Since August 2014, residual endemic WPV1 transmission has been detected only in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria, mostly in inaccessible areas. In response to the emergence of multiple cVDPV2 outbreaks, the World Health Organization (WHO) coordinated the synchronized withdrawal of the type 2 component (OPV2; Sabin type 2) from trivalent OPV (tOPV; Sabin types 1, 2, and 3) ( 4 ). In April 2016, all OPV-using countries switched to bivalent OPV (bOPV; Sabin types 1 and 3). Since the switch, the number of isolated Sabin 2 strains from both acute flaccid paralysis and environmental surveillance systems has steadily declined ( 5 ). To monitor the disappearance of Sabin 2 strains and to ensure identification of type 2 VDPVs (VDPV2s), as of August 1, 2016, all poliovirus type 2 (PV2) isolates are referred for genetic sequencing. Properties and Virologic Characterization of VDPVs Poliovirus isolates are grouped into three categories: WPV, vaccine-related poliovirus (VRPV), and VDPV. VRPVs have limited divergence in the capsid protein (VP1) nucleotide sequences from the corresponding OPV strain (poliovirus type 1 and 3 [PV1 and PV3]: ≤1% divergent; poliovirus type 2: ≤0.6% divergent) ( 3 ). VDPVs are >1% divergent (for PV1 and PV3) or >0.6% divergent (for PV2) in VP1 nucleotide sequences from the corresponding OPV strain ( 3 ). VDPVs are further classified as 1) cVDPVs, when evidence of person-to-person transmission in the community exists; 2) iVDPVs, when they are isolated from persons with PIDs; and 3) aVDPVs, when they are clinical isolates from persons with no known immunodeficiency and no evidence of transmission, or they are sewage isolates that are unrelated to other known VDPVs and whose source is unknown ( 2 ). GPEI guidelines about reporting and classification of VDPVs were last updated in August 2016 (http://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Reporting-and-Classification-of-VDPVs_Aug2016_EN.pdf). All poliovirus isolates are characterized by laboratories of the Global Polio Laboratory Network. VDPV screening is conducted using real-time reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) nucleic acid amplification, targeted to nucleotide substitutions that frequently revert to the parental WPV sequence during replication of OPV in the human intestine ( 6 ). Starting August 1, 2016, the use of the VDPV2 screening assay was discontinued and all PV2 isolates are sequenced. Potential VDPVs identified by real-time RT-PCR screening are sequenced in the VP1 region for definitive analysis. Detection of cVDPVs During January 2016–June 2017, the number of countries with detected cVDPV circulation decreased from seven to five since the previous reporting period ( 3 ) (Figure 1); all except one (cVDPV1 in Laos) reported cVDPV2 circulation (Table). No additional cases have been identified from previously reported VDPV outbreaks in Guinea (cVDPV2), Madagascar (cVDPV1), Myanmar (cVDPV2), Ukraine (cVDPV1), Pakistan (cVDPV2) and Nigeria (cVDPV2). Cases continued to be identified from the previously reported distinct cVDPV2 outbreak in Nigeria ( 7 ) and the previously reported cVDPV1 outbreak in Laos ( 3 ). New outbreaks were reported in DRC (two cVDPV2 emergences; one with six cases and one with two cases), Nigeria (cVDPV2, one case), Pakistan (cVDPV2, one case), and Syria (cVDPV2, 35 cases) (Table). Detection of the new cVDPV2 outbreaks occurred after the global tOPV to bOPV switch (April 2016). During January 2016–June 2017, among 48 cVDPV cases, 45 (93%) were cVDPV2 (Table) (Figure 2). Selected cVDPVs from the reporting period are described below. FIGURE 1 Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) detected, by serotype and VDPV classification* — worldwide, January 2016–June 2017 Abbreviations: AFP = Acute flaccid paralysis; aVDPV = ambiguous VDPV; cVDPV = circulating VDPV; iVDPV = immunodeficiency-associated VDPV. * Spread of cVDPVs followed the elimination of the corresponding serotype of indigenous wild poliovirus, but with continued introduction of oral poliovirus vaccine into communities with growing immunity gaps. All of the cVDPV outbreaks were detected first by the laboratory, using sequence data and evolutionary analyses. The figure shown above shows a map depicting vaccine-derived polioviruses which are detected worldwide by serotype and VDPV classification during January 2016–June 2017. TABLE Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) detected, by classification and other selected characteristics — worldwide, January 2016–June 2017 Category Country Year(s) detected* Source† Serotype No. of isolates§ January 2016–June 2017 Capsid protein VP1 divergence from Sabin OPV strain (%) Coverage with 3 doses of OPV (%)** Estimated duration of VDPV replication†† (yrs) Current status (date of last outbreak case, patient isolate, or environmental sample) No. of cases No. of contacts Non-AFP source cVDPV Democratic Republic of the Congo 2017 Outbreak 2 6 0 0 2.1 74 1.9 06/26/17 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2017 Outbreak 2 2 1 0 0.7 74 0.6 04/18/17 Laos 2015–16 Outbreak 1 3 4 0 2.3–3.9 83 3.5 02/06/16 Nigeria 2016 Outbreak 2 1 1 0 1.3–1.8 49 1.6 11/24/16 Nigeria 2013–16 Outbreak– importation 2 0 1 1 3.5–4.1 49 3.7 08/26/16 Pakistan 2016 Outbreak 2 1 0 4 1.0–2.0 72 1.8 12/28/16 Syria 2017 Outbreak 2 35 27 0 2.3–3.1 48 2.8 06/30/17 Total cVDPV — §§ — §§ — §§ — §§ 48 34 5 — §§ — §§ — §§ — §§ iVDPV Argentina 2016 Non-AFP AGG 2 1 0 0 0.9 87 0.8 10/22/16 Egypt 2016 Non-AFP SCID 2 0 0 1 2.0 95 1.8 05/21/16 Egypt 2016 Non-AFP SCID 2 0 0 1 0.6 95 0.5 07/17/16 Egypt 2017 AFP patient 2 1 0 0 1.9 95 1.7 02/13/17 India 2016 AFP patient XLA 2 1 0 0 0.7 86 0.6 03/08/16 India 2015–2016 Non-AFP SCID 3 0 0 1 4.5–10.2 86 9 08/04/16 Iran 2016 AFP patient 2 1 0 0 0.6 99 0.5 11/26/16 Iran 2015–2016 Non-AFP PID 2 0 0 1 1.5 99 1.4 02/18/16 Iran 2015–2017 Non-AFP PID 2 0 0 1 2.5 99 2.3 02/12/17 Iran 2015–2016 Non-AFP PID 3 0 0 1 2.6 99 2.4 08/07/16 Iraq 2016 AFP patient 2 1 0 0 0.7 68 0.6 02/02/16 Israel 2017 Non-AFP PID 2 0 0 1 2.4 94 2.2 01/23/17 Nigeria 2016 AFP patient 2 1 0 0 0.9 49 0.8 05/14/16 Pakistan 2016 AFP patient 2 1 0 0 1.1 72 1 09/07/16 Tunisia 2016–2017 AFP patient XLA 3 1 0 0 1.2 98 1.1 01/11/17 United Kingdom 2015–2017 Non-AFP PID 2 0 0 1 17.94 94 >30 05/11/17 West Bank and Gaza Strip 2016–2017 Non-AFP SCID 2 0 0 1 1.0 94 0.9 02/08/17 Total iVDPV — §§ — §§ — §§ — §§ 8 0 9 — §§ — §§ — §§ — §§ aVDPV Afghanistan 2016 AFP patient 2 1 0 0 1.0 60 0.9 09/10/16 China 2016 AFP patient 3 1 0 0 1.2 99 1 08/16/16 China 2017 AFP patient 3 1 0 0 1.1 99 1 02/19/16 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2016 AFP patient 2 2 0 0 0.6–1.7 74 0.5–1.5 03/15/16 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2017 AFP patient 1 1 0 0 2.7 74 2.5 04/01/17 Egypt 2016 Environmental sample 2 0 0 1 0.6 95 0.5 03/15/16 India 2016–2017 Environmental sample 2 0 0 7 0.7–1.5 86 0.6–1.4 03/29/17 Mozambique 2016 AFP patient 2 1 1 0 1.3 80 1.1 11/30/16 Nigeria 2017 Non-AFP 2 0 1 0 0.7 49 0.7 03/02/17 Nigeria 2017 Environmental sample 2 0 0 11 0.6–1.1 49 0.5–1 04/17/17 Pakistan 2016–2017 Environmental sample 2 0 0 8 0.6–1.3 72 0.5–1.1 05/29/17 Russian Federation 2016 AFP patient 2 1 1 0 1.1–1.4 97 1–1.2 12/08/16 Somalia 2016 AFP patient 2 1 0 0 1.1 47 1 10/27/16 Yemen 2016 AFP patient 2 1¶¶ 1¶¶ 0 0.8–0.9 65 0.9 06/20/16 Total aVDPV — §§ — §§ — §§ — §§ 10 4 27 — §§ — §§ — §§ — §§ Abbreviations: AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; AGG = agammaglobulinemia; aVDPV = ambiguous VDPV; cVDPV = circulating VDPV; IPV = inactivated poliovirus vaccine; iVDPV = immunodeficiency-associated VDPV; OPV = oral poliovirus vaccine; PID = primary immunodeficiency; SCID = severe combined immunodeficiency; XLA = X-linked agammaglobulinemia. * Total years detected for previously reported cVDPV outbreaks (Nigeria). † Outbreaks list total cases clearly associated with cVDPVs. Some VDPV case isolates from outbreak periods might be listed as aVDPVs. § Total cases for VDPV-positive specimens from AFP cases and total VDPV-positive samples for environmental (sewage) samples. ¶ Percentage of divergence is estimated from the number of nucleotide differences in the VP1 region from the corresponding parental OPV strain. ** Coverage with 3 doses of OPV, based on 2016 data from the World Health Organization (WHO) Vaccine Preventable Diseases Monitoring System (2016 global summary) and WHO-United Nations Children’s Fund coverage estimates, http://www.who.int/gho/immunization/poliomyelitis/en/. National data might not reflect weaknesses at subnational levels. †† Duration of cVDPV circulation was estimated from extent of VP1 nucleotide divergence from the corresponding Sabin OPV strain; duration of iVDPV replication was estimated from clinical record by assuming that exposure was from initial receipt of OPV; duration of aVDPV replication was estimated from sequence data. §§ Not cumulative data. ¶¶ Two genetically linked isolates were classified as aVDPVs according to the VDPV guidelines (http://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Reporting-and-Classification-of-VDPVs_Aug2016_EN.pdf), which require detection for >2 months. FIGURE 2 Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) cases detected, by serotype — worldwide, January 2000–June 2017*, † Abbreviation: OPV= oral poliovirus vaccine. * Data available by August 25, 2017. † In April 2016, all OPV-using countries switched from trivalent OPV (types 1, 2, and 3) to bivalent OPV (types 1 and 3). The figure above is a histogram of the circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus cases detected by serotype worldwide during January 2000–June 2017. Democratic Republic of the Congo. Circulating VDPV2s were isolated from eight acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) patients and one contact during February–June 2017. cVDPV2s represented two distinct emergences (0.7%–2.1% VP1 nucleotide divergence from parental Sabin 2 strain): one circulating in Haut Lomami province (six cases; latest case onset June 26, 2017)* and one circulating in Maniema province (isolated from two patients and one contact; latest case onset April 18, 2017). Reported OPV coverage was low (74%); two monovalent OPV type 2 (mOPV2) mass vaccination campaigns were conducted during July 13–29, 2017 and mop-up vaccination campaigns were conducted during September 17–20, 2017. Nigeria. During the reporting period, cVDPV2s (with 3.5%–4.1% VP1 nucleotide divergence from a cVDPV2 emergence originating in Chad in 2012) were found only in the northern state of Borno. The cVDPV2s were isolated in districts of Borno proximal to inaccessible areas, one from an environmental sample collected on April 23, 2016 in Maiduguri, and one from a contact sample collected on August 26, 2016 in Monguno, after detection of a WPV1 case in the same area. An independent cVDPV2 emergence (with 1.3%–1.8% VP1 nucleotide divergence) was reported in Sokoto with virus detected from a patient with onset of AFP October 28, 2016 and a nonhousehold contact sample collected on November 24, 2016. Estimated divergence of the cVDPV2s in Sokoto from Sabin 2 indicate OPV2 origin at least 6 months before the tOPV to bOPV switch in April 2016. Pakistan. During October 2016–December 2016, a new cVDPV2 emergence was reported in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan. Five cVDPV2s (with 1.0%–2.0% VP1 nucleotide divergence) were detected, four from sewage samples collected in two distinct environmental sites during three consecutive months (most recent sample date December 28, 2016) and one from an AFP patient with paralysis onset on December 17, 2016. Syria. Syria is facing a humanitarian crisis because of armed conflict, and during March 2017–June 2017, cVDPV2s were isolated from 35 AFP patients and 27 contacts in two governorates (Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa). † The outbreak was associated with an emergence first observed in a child aged 22 months with onset of paralysis on March 3, 2017. Among 32 AFP cases, 29 (90%) were identified in the Mayadeen district of Deir Ez-Zor governorate. The extent of VP1 nucleotide divergence from the parental Sabin 2 strain among all cVDPV2s was 2.3%–3.1% VP1 nucleotide divergence. Reported OPV coverage was low (48%) and in response to the outbreak, mOPV2 mass vaccination campaigns were conducted during July (Deir Ez-Zor) and August (Raqqa), reaching an estimated 350,000 children. Detection of iVDPVs During January 2016–June 2017, 17 iVDPV infections were reported from 11 countries (Table), including 14 that were newly detected iVDPV infections. During this reporting period, with the exception of three type 3 iVDPVs (iVDPV3), all were type 2. Since introduction of OPV, the cumulative serotype distribution shows that iVDPV2 are the most common (69%), followed by type 3 (14%) type 1 (12%) and heterotypic mixtures (i.e., types 1 and 2 or types 2 and 3) (5%). Selected iVDPVs from the reporting period are described below. Egypt. A boy aged 11 months infected with iVDPV2 developed AFP in February 2017. In addition, three patients with PID who did not have AFP were newly identified as infected with iVDPV2s. India. A girl aged 65 months with agammaglobulinemia was infected with iVDPV2 and developed AFP in February 2016. An iVDPV3 infection in a patient with severe combined immunodeficiency without AFP was first detected in January 2015; the last sample from this patient that was positive for iVDPV3 was collected in August 2016. Samples collected since October 2016 were negative for type 3 VDPVs (VDPV3). Iran. A boy aged 14 months with PID, who received his fourth OPV dose in September 2016, and was infected with an iVDPV2, developed AFP in November 2016. Iraq. A girl aged 7 months with PID and infected with iVDPV2 developed AFP in February 2016. Pakistan. An iVDPV2 was isolated from a boy aged 7 months with PID after onset of AFP in February 2016. Tunisia. A girl aged 6 months with PID and infected with iVDPV3 developed AFP in November 2016. The last VDPV-positive specimen was collected in January 2017. Detection of aVDPVs During January 2016–June 2017, aVDPVs were isolated in 11 countries (Table). The most divergent aVDPV (2.7% VP1 divergence) was isolated from an AFP patient in DRC. This represented an emergence independent of cVDPV2 circulating in the country during the same period. Detection of aVDPVs in settings with 300,000 children aged 100,000 children aged 2–24 months, including populations at high risk in adjacent areas and countries. In April 2016, all 155 OPV-using countries and territories switched from tOPV to bOPV; the number of countries reporting PV2 detection decreased 83%, from 42 before the switch to seven after the switch (January–March 2017) ( 5 ). The GPEI and Global Polio Laboratory Network have continued to strengthen AFP and poliovirus surveillance. In addition, the increase in the number of environmental surveillance sites has enhanced PV detection ( 9 ). Routine immunization services also are being strengthened, and most countries incorporated at least 1 dose of IPV into routine childhood immunization schedules in 2016. Augmented surveillance for VDPV infections among patients with PID ( 10 ) has increased the number of known iVDPV excretors. Continued progress in development of antivirals is needed to eliminate virus shedding in persons with chronic iVDPV infections. During the last 5 years, the number of WPV cases (>400 in 2013; 12 in 2017) was lower than the estimated number (250–500) of global vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis cases. ¶ The ultimate goal of the polio endgame strategic plan is the global cessation of all OPV use after the end of all WPV circulation, which started with cessation of OPV with a type 2 component. Cessation of all OPV use after certification of polio eradication will eliminate the risk for cVDPV outbreaks, and new iVDPV and aVDPV infections. Summary What is already known about this topic? Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs), strains that are genetically divergent from the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) viruses, fall into three categories: 1) circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs) from outbreaks, 2) immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs) from patients with primary immunodeficiency diseases (PIDs), and 3) ambiguous VDPVs (aVDPVs), which cannot be more definitively identified. cVDPVs are biologically equivalent to wild polioviruses, emerge in settings of low population immunity, and can sustain long-term circulation. Because >94% of cVDPVs since 2006 and 69% of iVDPVs since OPV introduction are type 2, the World Health Organization coordinated worldwide replacement of trivalent OPV (tOPV, types 1, 2, and 3) with bivalent OPV (bOPV, types 1 and 3) in April 2016. What is added by this report? During 2017, new cVDPV outbreaks were detected in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (two emergences) and Syria (one emergence). Residual circulation of a previous cVDPV2 emergence in Nigeria was detected in 2016 and low-level detection of new emergences in Nigeria and Pakistan occurred during 2016. Fourteen newly identified persons in 10 countries were found to excrete iVDPVs. What are the implications for public health practice? The goal of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative is the cessation of all poliovirus circulation. The risk for VDPV emergence will continue as long as OPV is used. The switch from tOPV to bOPV in April 2016 was the first step toward phasing out the use of all OPV, setting the stage for a subsequent total worldwide shift from OPV to IPV.
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                Journal
                MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
                MMWR Morb. Mortal. Wkly. Rep
                WR
                Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
                Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
                0149-2195
                1545-861X
                11 May 2018
                11 May 2018
                : 67
                : 18
                : 524-528
                Affiliations
                Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, CDC; Polio Eradication Department, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland; Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.
                Author notes
                Corresponding author: Farrah Khan, fkhan@ 123456cdc.gov , 425-463-9473.
                Article
                mm6718a4
                10.15585/mmwr.mm6718a4
                5944975
                29746452
                35cdac77-5248-44ba-bf1d-9f918f3834ce

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