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      Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication — Worldwide, January 2021–March 2023

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          Since the World Health Assembly established the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988, two of the three wild poliovirus (WPV) serotypes (types 2 and 3) have been eradicated, and global WPV cases have decreased by more than 99.9%. Afghanistan and Pakistan remain the only countries where indigenous WPV type 1 (WPV1) transmission has not been interrupted. This report summarizes progress toward global polio eradication during January 1, 2021–March 31, 2023, and updates previous reports ( 1 , 2 ). In 2022, Afghanistan and Pakistan reported 22 WPV1 cases, compared with five in 2021; as of May 5, 2023, a single WPV1 case was reported in Pakistan in 2023. A WPV1 case was reported on the African continent for the first time since 2016, when officials in Malawi confirmed a WPV1 case in a child with paralysis onset in November 2021; neighboring Mozambique subsequently reported eight genetically linked cases. Outbreaks of polio caused by circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) can occur when oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) strains circulate for a prolonged time in underimmunized populations, allowing reversion to neurovirulence ( 3 ). A total of 859 cVDPV cases occurred during 2022, an increase of 23% from 698 cases in 2021. cVDPVs were detected in areas where poliovirus transmission had long been eliminated (including in Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States). In addition, cocirculation of multiple poliovirus types occurred in multiple countries globally (including Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Israel, Malawi, Mozambique, Republic of the Congo, and Yemen). The 2022–2026 GPEI strategic plan targeted the goal of detecting the last cases of WPV1 and cVDPV in 2023 ( 4 ). The current global epidemiology of poliovirus transmission makes the likelihood of meeting this target date unlikely. The detections of poliovirus (WPV1 and cVDPVs) in areas where it had been previously eliminated underscore the threat of continued poliovirus spread to any area where there is insufficient vaccination to poliovirus ( 3 ). Mass vaccination and surveillance should be further enhanced in areas of transmission to interrupt poliovirus transmission and to end the global threat of paralytic polio in children. Poliovirus Vaccination In April 2016, trivalent OPV (tOPV), consisting of Sabin strain types 1, 2, and 3, was withdrawn from routine immunization programs and supplementary immunization activities (SIAs)* worldwide and replaced with bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing Sabin-strain types 1 and 3). Routine immunization programs worldwide provide either 3 doses of bOPV and 1–2 doses of injectable inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) or IPV alone. Seroconversion after IPV vaccination protects against disease caused by all three polio serotypes but does not protect against poliovirus transmission. Because of cocirculation of cVDPV2 and other poliovirus serotypes, GPEI authorized administration of tOPV during SIAs in Afghanistan and Pakistan during 2017–2020, in Yemen during 2021–2022, and in areas of Somalia during 2022–2023. In response to cVDPV2 outbreaks, monovalent OPV Sabin type 2 (mOPV2) is approved for outbreak response use in SIAs and has been used most recently in Somalia. Because of the risks for reversion to neurovirulence associated with Sabin-strain OPV2 in areas with low immunity, the World Health Organization (WHO) granted emergency use listing of novel OPV2 (nOPV2) in November 2020 ( 5 ); nOPV2 is more genetically stable than the Sabin strain ( 6 ) and has been used in SIAs since March 2021. Challenges of nOPV2 supply during the time of this report have resulted in delayed SIAs in response to cVDPV2 outbreaks ( 3 ). In 2021, the estimated global coverage with ≥3 doses of IPV or OPV (Pol3) among infants by age 1 year during routine immunization was 80% † ; estimated coverage with 1 full dose or 2 fractional doses § of IPV (IPV1) in OPV-using countries was 79%. Global coverage with Pol3 and IPV1 declined from 2019 values of 85% and 83%, respectively, when the COVID-19 pandemic severely disrupted health services. In Afghanistan, 2021 national Pol3 coverage was 71% and IPV1 coverage was 67%. Pakistan’s 2021 national coverage estimates were 83% for both Pol3 and IPV1. In Malawi, 2021 Pol3 and IPV1 coverage was 89% and 92%, respectively, and in Mozambique, 2021 coverage estimates for Pol3 and IPV1 were 67% and 70%, respectively ( 7 ). Immunization coverage estimates in subnational levels of these countries are often substantially lower. During January 1, 2021–March 31, 2023, GPEI supported 48 countries in implementing 219 SIAs, during which approximately 988 million bOPV, 616,000 IPV, 960,000 fractional IPV, 90 million mOPV2, 595 million nOPV2, and 100 million tOPV doses were administered. In 2022, lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS) ¶ surveys after SIAs indicated performance gaps in high-risk districts in Afghanistan, Malawi, Mozambique, and Pakistan ( 8 – 10 ). Poliovirus Surveillance Poliovirus transmission is primarily detected through case-based syndromic surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) in persons aged <15 years, with confirmation of poliovirus by testing stool specimens at one of the 144 WHO-accredited laboratories in the Global Polio Laboratory Network in 91 countries (Table 1). In 2022, AFP surveillance reviews in 34 countries at high risk for poliovirus spread indicated that 26 (76%) countries met targets for the two primary surveillance indicators at the national level.** Because of the high proportion of asymptomatic infections, environmental surveillance (ES), the systematic sampling and testing of sewage for poliovirus, can supplement AFP surveillance to detect poliovirus transmission and improve overall surveillance sensitivity. The total number of ES samples collected in countries with poliovirus transmission increased from 8,945 samples from 36 countries in 2021 to 12,259 samples from 40 countries in 2022 (Table 2). TABLE 1 Number of poliovirus cases, by country — worldwide, January 1, 2021–March 31, 2023* Country No. of cases 2021 2022 Jan–Mar 2022 Jan–Mar 2023 WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV Countries with WPV1 detections (cVDPV type) Afghanistan (2) 4 43 2 0 1 0 0 0 Pakistan (2) 1 8 20 0 0 0 1 0 Malawi (1) 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 Mozambique (1,2) 0 2 8 26 1 4 0 3 Countries with reported cVDPV cases (cVDPV type) Algeria (2) 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 Benin (2) 0 3 0 11 0 0 0 2 Burkina Faso (2) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Burundi (2) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Cameroon (2) 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 Central African Republic (2) 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 Chad (2) 0 0 0 44 0 5 0 5 Côte d'Ivoire (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (1,2) 0 28 0 504 0 58 0 31 Eritrea (2) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 Ethiopia (2) 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 Ghana (2) 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 Guinea (2) 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 Guinea-Bissau (2) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 Indonesia (2) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 Israel (1,3) 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 Liberia (2) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 Madagascar (1) 0 13 0 14 0 5 0 9 Mali (2) 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Niger (2) 0 18 0 15 0 2 0 0 Nigeria (2) 0 415 0 48 0 26 0 1 Republic of the Congo (2) 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 Senegal (2) 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sierra Leone (2) 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 Somalia (2) 0 1 0 5 0 2 0 1 South Sudan (2) 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sudan (2) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Tajikistan (2) 0 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 Togo (2) 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 Ukraine (2) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 United States (2) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Yemen (1,2) 0 69 0 162 0 83 0 0 Total 6 698 30 859 2 188 1 62 Abbreviations: cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV1 = wild poliovirus type 1. * Data are current as of May 5, 2023. TABLE 2 Number of circulating wild polioviruses and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses detected through environmental surveillance — worldwide, January 1, 2021–March 31, 2023* Country Reporting period Jan 1–Dec 31, 2021 Jan 1–Dec 31, 2022 Jan 1–Mar 30, 2022 Jan 1–Mar 30, 2023 No. of samples No. of positives (%) No. of samples No. of positives (%) No. of samples No. of positives (%) No. of samples No. of positives (%) Countries with reported WPV1-positive samples (no. and % of isolates refer to WPV1) Afghanistan 481 1 (0.2) 702 22 (3.1) 164 0 (—) 172 17 (9.9) Pakistan 887 65 (7.3) 1220 37 (3.0) 275 0 (—) 362 3 (0.8) Countries with reported cVDPV-positive samples (cVDPV type) (no. and % of isolates refer to cVDPVs) Afghanistan (2) 481 40 (8.3) 702 0 (—) 164 0 (—) 172 0 (—) Algeria (2) 52 0 (—) 76 18 (23.7) 14 0 (—) 33 8 (24.2) Benin (2) 143 1 (0.7) 109 8 (7.4) 36 0 (—) 39 3 (7.7) Botswana (2) 0 0 (—) 22 4 (18.2) 0 0 (—) 25 1 (4.0) Burkina Faso (2) 110 1 (0.9) 151 0 (—) 38 0 (—) 36 0 (—) Burundi (2) 40 0 (—) 34 6 (17.6) 7 0 (—) 11 6 (54.5) Canada (2) 0 0 (—) 58 2 (3.4) 0 0 (—) 12 0 (—) Cameroon (2) 376 1 (0.3) 410 0 (—) 76 0 (—) 145 0 (—) Central African Republic (2) 142 1 (0.7) 212 8 (3.7) 39 0 (—) 42 0 (—) Chad (2) 64 1 (1.6) 86 5 (5.8) 14 0 (—) 14 0 (—) China (3) 2 1 (50.0) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) Côte d'Ivoire (2) 85 0 (—) 157 3 (1.9) 41 2 (4.9) 45 0 (—) Democratic Republic of the Congo (2) 464 3 (0.6) 327 9 (2.8) 76 0 (—) 81 1 (1.2) Djibouti (2) 71 7 (9.9) 46 12 (26.1) 10 9 (90.0) 12 0 (—) Egypt (2) 906 12 (1.3) 645 6 (0.9) 201 4 (2.0) 139 0 (—) The Gambia (2) 39 9 (23.1) 55 0 (—) 11 0 (—) 3 0 (—) Ghana (2) 189 0 (—) 197 19 (9.6) 70 0 (—) 41 0 (—) Guinea (2) 143 2 (1.4) 123 0 (—) 30 0 (—) 33 0 (—) Iran (2) 71 1 (1.4) 68 0 (—) 17 0 (—) 10 0 (—) Israel (2,3) 9 5 (55.6) 82 80 (97.6) 25 25 (100.0) 0 0 (—) Kenya (2) 198 1 (0.5) 200 0 (—) 50 0 (—) 51 0 (—) Liberia (2) 91 14 (15.4) 43 0 (—) 28 0 (—) 6 0 (—) Madagascar (1) 393 31 (87.9) 668 96 (14.4) 158 19 (12.0) 169 24 (14.2) Malawi (2) 0 0 (—) 353 0 (—) 54 0 (—) 56 1 (1.8) Mauritania (2) 72 7 (9.7) 82 0 (—) 24 0 (—) 12 0 (—) Niger (2) 204 0 (—) 301 14 (4.7) 79 2 (2.5) 66 1 (1.5) Nigeria (2) 2,453 303 (12.4) 2218 82 (3.7) 913 46 (5.0) 294 10 (3.4) Pakistan (2) 887 35 (3.9) 1220 0 (—) 275 0 (—) 362 0 (—) Palestinian territories (3) 7 7 (100.0) 9 9 (100.0) 9 9 (100.0) 0 0 (—) Senegal (2) 23 14 (60.9) 286 1 (0.3) 92 0 (—) 77 0 (—) Republic of the Congo (2) 461 3 (1.0) 238 0 (—) 57 0 (—) 63 0 (—) Sierra Leone (2) 214 9 (4.9) 204 0 (—) 62 0 (—) 24 0 (—) Somalia (2) 141 1 (0.7) 231 6 (2.6) 54 1 (1.9) 67 0 (—) Sudan (2) 103 0 (—) 160 1 (0.6) 40 0 (—) 55 0 (—) Tajikistan (2) 27 17 (63.0) 1 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) Togo (2) 66 0 (—) 87 2 (2.3) 30 1 (3.3) 24 0 (—) Uganda (2) 100 2 (2.0) 148 0 (—) 33 0 (—) 74 0 (—) United Kingdom (2) 0 0 (—) 26 6 (23.1) 1 0 (—) 0 0 (—) United States (2) 0 0 (—) 2068 47 (2.3) 81 0 (—) 952 0 (—) Yemen (2) 37 13 (35.1) 39 25 (64.1) 15 7 (46.7) 5 0 (—) Zambia (2) 81 0 (—) 117 3 (2.6) 27 0 (—) 40 0 (—) Total 8,945 608 (6.8) 12,259 531 (4.3) 2,951 125 (4.2) 3,290 75 (2.3) Abbreviations: cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV1 = wild poliovirus type 1. * Data are current as of May 5, 2023. Reported Polio Cases and Isolations Countries reporting WPV cases and isolations. In 2022, the two remaining countries with endemic WPV1 transmission, Afghanistan and Pakistan, reported two and 20 WPV1 cases, respectively (Figure) (Table 1). In Afghanistan, two cases were reported from two provinces, representing a 50% decrease from the four cases reported from two provinces in 2021 ( 8 ). The 20 cases reported in Pakistan in 2022 were all from security-compromised districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, representing a nineteenfold increase over the single case reported in 2021 ( 9 ). As of May 5, a single case of WPV1 was reported in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan in 2023. The paralysis onset dates of the latest reported WPV1 case in Afghanistan was August 29, 2022, and in Pakistan was February 20, 2023. FIGURE Number of wild poliovirus type 1 cases, by country and month of paralysis onset — worldwide, January 2021–March 2023* Abbreviation: WPV1 = wild poliovirus type 1. * Data are current as of May 5, 2023. Figure is a histogram indicating the number of worldwide wild poliovirus type 1 cases, by country and month of paralysis onset, during January 2021–March 2023. In Afghanistan, among 702 sewage samples collected in 2022, 22 (3%) yielded a WPV1 isolate, representing a 14-fold increase in the percentage of isolates from 0.2% (one WPV1 isolate detected in 473 samples) collected during 2021 (Table 2). In Pakistan, among 1,220 sewage samples collected during 2022, 37 (3%) WPV1-positive isolates were detected, a 57% decrease in the percentage of isolates from 7% (65 WPV1 isolates from 887 samples) in 2021. As of May 5, 2023, the latest WPV1 detections by ES were from samples taken on April 3, 2023, in Afghanistan and on February 21, 2023, in Pakistan. In 2021, a single paralytic WPV1 case in Malawi was genetically linked to virus circulating in Pakistan and was confirmed in February 2022. In 2022, eight WPV1 cases were detected in Mozambique, genetically linked to the Malawi case, with the latest date of paralysis in August 2022 ( 10 ). Countries reporting cVDPV cases and isolations. During January 2021–March 2023, a total of 1,619 cVDPV cases were reported from 36 countries. Six countries reported 225 cVDPV1 cases, 34 countries reported 1,393 cVDPV2 cases, and one country (Israel) reported one cVDPV3 case. DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Republic of the Congo, and Yemen reported co-circulation of cVDPV1 and cVDPV2, and Israel reported co-circulation of cVDPV2 and cVDPV3. Global cVDPV2 cases decreased by 1.3% in 2022 (673 cases in 20 countries) compared with 2021 (682 cases in 22 countries); the 504 cVDPV cases detected in DRC represent 59% of all globally reported cVDPV cases in 2022. No cVDPV2 cases or ES detections in Afghanistan or Pakistan were reported after July 2021 ( 7 , 8 ). Global cVDPV1 cases increased by 1,056% (185 cases in five countries) in 2022 compared with 16 cases in two countries in 2021. Discussion The 2022 increase in WPV1 cases in Pakistan’s security-challenged subdistricts of southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the ongoing circulation in contiguous districts of eastern Afghanistan form a narrow geographic band of indigenous WPV1 transmission. One major, ongoing challenge to reaching children with OPV in these reservoir districts is the substantial movement of a subpopulation at high risk between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, an intensive schedule of SIAs conducted by local authorities during November 2021–September 2022 reached many previously inaccessible, unvaccinated children ( 8 ). However, 188,447 children residing in Afghanistan’s South Region could not be vaccinated during November 2021–September 2022 because of a regional ban on community polio SIAs. In early 2023, authorities in Afghanistan banned women from working outside the home; the ban has not substantially affected the polio program to date. In Pakistan, AFP surveillance gaps and insufficient SIA implementation quality in the areas with security issues pose substantial challenges ( 9 ). The successful interruption of cVDPV2 transmission in both countries in 2021 following outbreak response SIAs with tOPV and mOPV2 offers optimism that WPV1 transmission can be stopped in the near future. In 2022, both countries resumed cross-border coordination and synchronization of campaigns; intensifying and strengthening these efforts could help to mitigate cross-border WPV1 spread. The WHO African Region detected its first WPV1 case in >5 years in 2021 in Malawi, with subsequent limited spread in Mozambique. Genomic sequence analyses for both the isolated WPV1 and cVDPV1, which cocirculated in both countries, highlight critical surveillance gaps in the region ( 10 ). Delays in specimen transport time, as well as some ineffective ES systems and increases in sample processing time have delayed polio detection and the subsequent response. In Mozambique, suboptimal SIA performance and decreased Pol3 coverage leave children vulnerable to further WPV1 and cVDPV transmission. Simultaneous health emergencies resulting from cholera and measles outbreaks, as well as cyclone response, in both countries have challenged the poliovirus outbreak responses. Improved SIA quality is needed to reach chronically missed children, and more sensitive surveillance will be essential in confirming the interruption of poliovirus transmission. The 2022–2026 GPEI Strategic Plan ( 4 ) named the end of 2023 as the target for the last detection of both WPV1 and cVDPV2. ES detections of WPV1 transmission in Afghanistan and Pakistan and AFP detection in Pakistan in early 2023 clearly jeopardize achieving the WPV1 target. Similarly, with extensive transmission of cVDPV1 and cVDPV2 in 2023, the cVDPV detection goal is unlikely to be met by the target date. In addition, as of May 5, 2023, emergences of cVDPV2 linked to nOPV2 use had been detected in AFP cases in African countries. †† Although this finding was expected even with a vaccine with increased genetic stability, considering the number of doses administered, the finding indicates the need to implement high-quality response SIAs to raise immunity in all children, independent of the vaccine type used. The major hurdles to reaching the cVDPV2 GPEI goals in the near future are remaining gaps in surveillance, suboptimal SIA quality in many areas, and a highly limited nOPV2 vaccine supply, resulting in delayed campaigns for a number of countries ( 5 ). The detection of cVDPV transmission in regions where poliovirus transmission has long been eliminated (e.g., genetically linked cVDPV2 in Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States) together with the importation of WPV1 genetically related to a Pakistan strain into southeastern Africa underscore the threat of continued global poliovirus spread to any area, given global migration and travel ( 3 ). Further, this risk is growing because of increased postpandemic vaccine hesitancy and pandemic disruptions in immunization services, with decreased Pol3 coverage globally. Progress toward polio eradication requires continued international commitment to strengthening routine immunization, enhancing global surveillance activities, increasing SIA quality, and implementing preventive bOPV SIAs with or without IPV in areas with chronically low routine immunization coverage. Summary What is already known about this topic? Endemic transmission of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) continues only in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What is added by this report? In 2022, Malawi and Mozambique reported WPV1 cases linked to a Pakistan strain, the first WPV1 cases in the African region since 2016. During 2022 and 2023, Afghanistan and Pakistan reported WPV1 cases. Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses were detected in areas of the world where poliovirus had been eliminated. Cocirculation of more than one poliovirus type occurred in multiple countries. What are the implications for public health practice? The detections of poliovirus in areas where it had been previously eliminated underscore the threat of continued poliovirus spread to any area where the population is insufficiently vaccinated against poliovirus.

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          Progress Toward Polio Eradication — Worldwide, January 2020–April 2022

          In 1988, the World Health Assembly established the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). Since then, wild poliovirus (WPV) cases have decreased approximately 99.99%, and WPV types 2 and 3 have been declared eradicated. Only Afghanistan and Pakistan have never interrupted WPV type 1 (WPV1) transmission. This report describes global progress toward polio eradication during January 1, 2020–April 30, 2022, and updates previous reports ( 1 , 2 ). This activity was reviewed by CDC and was conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.* Five WPV1 cases were reported from Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2021, compared with 140 in 2020. In 2022 (as of May 5), three WPV1 cases had been reported: one from Afghanistan and two from Pakistan. WPV1 genetically linked to virus circulating in Pakistan was identified in Malawi in a child with paralysis onset in November 2021. Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs), with neurovirulence and transmissibility similar to that of WPV, emerge in populations with low immunity following prolonged circulation of Sabin strain oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) ( 3 ). During January 2020–April 30, 2022, a total of 1,856 paralytic cVDPV cases were reported globally: 1,113 in 2020 and 688 in 2021, including cases in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2022 (as of May 5), 55 cVDPV cases had been reported. Intensified programmatic actions leading to more effective outbreak responses are needed to stop cVDPV transmission. The 2022–2026 GPEI Strategic Plan objective of ending WPV1 transmission by the end of 2023 is attainable ( 4 ). However, the risk for children being paralyzed by polio remains until all polioviruses, including WPV and cVDPV, are eradicated. Poliovirus Vaccination Since the 2016 withdrawal of Sabin polio vaccine virus type 2 and the globally synchronized switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV, including Sabin types 1, 2, and 3) to bivalent OPV (bOPV, including Sabin types 1 and 3) in all OPV-using countries, bOPV and injectable inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) (including all three serotypes) have been used in routine immunization programs worldwide. cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) has been the predominant cause of cVDPV outbreaks since 2006 and informed the rationale for the switch to bOPV. Monovalent OPV Sabin type 2 (mOPV2) is reserved for cVDPV2 outbreak response campaigns ( 3 ). In 2020, † the estimated global coverage with ≥3 doses of oral or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (Pol3) in infants aged ≤1 year received during routine childhood immunization (essential health services) was 83%, with 80% of children receiving ≥1 full dose or 2 fractional doses § of IPV (IPV1). In Afghanistan, the national estimates of coverage with Pol3 and IPV1 were 75% and 65%, respectively, and in Pakistan, were 83% and 85%, respectively ( 5 ); however, coverage estimates at many subnational levels were considerably lower. In 2020, GPEI supported the administration of approximately 665 million bOPV, 6 million IPV, 4 million monovalent OPV type 1 (mOPV1), 201 million mOPV2, and 51 million tOPV doses through 145 supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) ¶ in 30 countries. For Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of which have simultaneous circulation of WPV1 and cVDPV2, GPEI approved the release of tOPV stocks to interrupt the transmission of both virus types. In 2021, approximately 726 million bOPV, 17 million IPV, 628 million mOPV2, and 51 million tOPV doses were distributed to 30 countries for use during 94 SIAs. In November 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) granted Emergency Use Listing** for novel OPV2 (nOPV2), designed to be more genetically stable than the Sabin strain and less likely to revert to neurovirulence ( 6 ). nOPV2 was first used during outbreak response SIAs in March 2021. Since that time, approximately 525 million nOPV2 doses have been released for use in 21 countries (as of May 5, 2022). Poliovirus Surveillance The primary system for detecting poliovirus is case-based syndromic surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), with confirmation by stool specimen testing done at one of 146 WHO-accredited laboratories across 92 countries, comprising the Global Polio Laboratory Network. The two primary indicators used to assess surveillance performance include the nonpolio AFP (NPAFP) rate †† and adequacy of collected stool specimens. §§ AFP surveillance indicators for 43 priority countries ¶¶ experiencing or at high risk for poliovirus transmission were reported for 2020–2021 ( 7 ). Among the 43 priority countries, 32 (74%) met both surveillance indicator targets nationally in 2021. Subnational performance was highly variable ( 7 ). Whether or not AFP surveillance performance indicator targets are met, gaps often exist in poliovirus detection subnationally. These gaps can be addressed through environmental surveillance (ES), the systematic collection and testing of sewage samples for poliovirus ( 7 ). In 2021, the total number of ES samples collected in countries with reported poliovirus circulation was 8,878 samples in 35 countries compared with 5,756 samples in 28 countries in 2020 (Table 1). TABLE 1 Number and proportion of sewage samples with circulating wild polioviruses and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses in environmental surveillance — worldwide, January 1, 2020–April 30, 2022* Country Jan 1–Dec 31, 2020 Jan 1–Dec 31, 2021 Jan 1–Apr 30, 2021 Jan 1–Apr 30, 2022 No. of samples No. (%) with isolates No. of samples No. (%) with isolates No. of samples No. (%) with isolates No. of samples No. (%) with isolates Countries with reported WPV1-positive samples (no. and % of isolates refer to WPV1) Afghanistan 418 35 (8) 474 1 (0) 153 1 (1) 151 0 (—) Pakistan 830 434 (52) 851 65 (8) 284 55 (19) 253 1 (0) Countries with reported cVDPV-positive samples (cVDPV type) (no. and % of isolates refer to cVDPVs) Afghanistan (2) 418 175 (42) 474 40 (9) 153 39 (26) 151 0 (—) Benin (2) 70 5 (7) 143 1 (1) 31 1 (3) 20 0 (—) Cameroon (2) 273 9 (3) 368 1 (0) 116 0 (—) 81 0 (—) Central African Republic (2) 88 2 (2) 138 1 (1) 28 0 (—) 29 0 (—) Chad (2) 77 3 (4) 64 1 (2) 17 0 (—) 13 0 (—) China (3) 0 0 (—) 2 1 (50) 1 1 (100) 0 0 (—) Côte d'Ivoire (2) 130 95 (77) 85 0 (—) 28 0 (—) 31 2 (6) Democratic Republic of the Congo (2) 170 1 (1) 447 3 (1) 92 0 (—) 78 0 (—) Djibouti (2) 0 0 (—) 71 5 (7) 0 0 (—) 10 0 (—) Egypt (2) 557 1 (0) 916 12 (1) 228 9 (4) 205 2 (1) Ethiopia (2) 51 4 (8) 32 0 (—) 9 0 (—) 9 0 (—) Gambia (2) 0 0 (—) 39 9 (23) 0 0 (—) 11 0 (—) Ghana (2) 184 20 (11) 189 0 (—) 68 0 (—) 40 0 (—) Guinea (2) 67 1 (1) 143 2 (1) 42 0 (—) 2 0 (—) Iran (2) 43 3 (7) 71 1 (1) 15 1 (10) 15 0 (—) Israel (3) 2 1 (50) 9 5 (55) 0 0 (—) 25 25 (100) Kenya (2) 170 1 (1) 176 1 (1) 59 1 (2) 39 0 (—) Liberia (2) 34 7 (21) 86 14 (16) 27 12 (44) 14 0 (—) Madagascar (1) 351 0 (—) 390 31 (8) 81 6 (7) 136 2 (1) Malaysia (1,2) 201 14 (5) 122 0 (—) 49 0 (—) 11 0 (—) Mali (2) 44 4 (9) 51 0 (—) 19 0 (—) 7 0 (—) Mauritania (2) 0 0 (—) 72 7 (10) 0 0 (—) 22 0 (—) Niger (2) 157 9 (6) 208 0 (—) 42 0 (—) 36 0 (—) Nigeria (2) 1,294 5 (0) 2,427 300 (12) 541 6 (1) 755 29 (4) Pakistan (2) 830 135 (16) 851 35 (4) 284 31 (11) 253 0 (—) Palestinian Territory (3) 0 0 (—) 7 7 (100) 1 1 (100) 9 9 (100) Philippines (2) 227 4 (2) 211 0 (—) 80 0 (—) 19 0 (—) Republic of the Congo (2) 12 1 (8) 437 3 (1) 99 1 (1) 50 0 (—) Senegal (2) 27 1 (4) 23 14 (61) 7 2 (29) 28 0 (—) Sierra Leone (2) 0 0 (—) 208 9 (4) 60 8 (13) 44 0 (—) Somalia (2) 87 26 (30) 134 1 (1) 37 0 (—) 41 0 (—) South Sudan (2) 84 6 (7) 83 0 (—) 32 0 (—) 1 0 (—) Sudan (2) 50 14 (28) 90 0 (—) 20 0 (—) 25 0 (—) Tajikistan (2) 0 0 (—) 18 17 (94) 12 11 (92) 0 0 (—) Uganda (2) 58 0 (—) 93 2 (2) 24 0 (—) 28 0 (—) Total 5,756 1,016 (14.5) 8,878 589 (6.6) 2,302 197 (8.6) 2,238 68 (3) Abbreviations: cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV1 = wild poliovirus type 1. * Data as of May 5, 2022. Reported Poliovirus Cases and Isolations Countries reporting WPV cases and isolations. In 2021, five WPV1 cases were reported from the two remaining countries with endemic polio: four from Afghanistan and one from Pakistan (Figure) (Table 2). The four WPV1 cases from two provinces in Afghanistan represent an 82% decrease from the 56 cases in 14 provinces reported in 2020. The single case reported from Balochistan province in Pakistan in 2021 represents a 99% decrease from 84 WPV1 cases in five provinces during 2020 ( 8 ). In 2022 to date, one WPV1 case has been reported in Afghanistan, from Paktika province on the eastern border near Pakistan, with paralysis onset on January 14. In Pakistan, two WPV1 cases have been reported in 2022, both from North Waziristan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, with paralysis onset on April 9 and April 14.*** ES surveillance in Afghanistan detected one WPV1-positive sample from 474 (0.2%) in 2021, a 97% decrease from the 35 (8%) of 418 samples collected during 2020 (Table 1). The most recent positive sample was collected on February 23, 2021. In Pakistan in 2021, 65 WPV1 isolates were detected from 851 (8%) sewage samples, a 44% decrease from the same period in 2020 when 52% (434 of 830) of samples were WPV1-positive. A recently reported WPV1-positive ES sample was collected on April 5, 2022, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. FIGURE Number of wild poliovirus type 1 cases, by country and month of paralysis onset — worldwide, January 2020–April 2022* Abbreviation: WPV1 = wild poliovirus type 1. * Data as of May 5, 2022. The figure is a bar graph indicating the number of wild poliovirus type 1 cases worldwide, by country and month of paralysis onset during January 2020–April 2022. TABLE 2 Number of poliovirus cases, by country — worldwide, January 1, 2020–April 30, 2022* Country Reporting period 2020 2021 Jan–Apr 2021 Jan–Apr 2022 WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV With reported WPV1 cases (cVDPV type) Afghanistan (2) 56 308 4 43 1 40 1 0 Malawi 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Pakistan (2) 84 135 1 8 1 8 2 0 With reported cVDPV cases (cVDPV type) Angola (2) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 Benin (2) 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 0 Burkina Faso (2) 0 65 0 2 0 1 0 0 Cameroon (2) 0 7 0 3 0 0 0 0 Central African Republic (2) 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chad (2) 0 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 Côte d’Ivoire (2) 0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 Democratic Republic of the Congo (2) 0 81 0 28 0 10 0 26 Ethiopia (2) 0 36 0 10 0 6 0 0 Ghana (2) 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 Guinea (2) 0 44 0 6 0 6 0 0 Guinea-Bissau (2) 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 Israel (3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Liberia (2) 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 Madagascar (1) 0 2 0 13 0 5 0 1 Malaysia (1) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mali (2) 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mozambique (2) 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 Niger (2) 0 10 0 17 0 0 0 0 Nigeria (2) 0 8 0 415 0 14 0 20 Philippines (2) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Republic of the Congo (2) 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 Senegal (2) 0 0 0 17 0 7 0 0 Sierra Leone (2) 0 10 0 5 0 5 0 0 Somalia (2) 0 14 0 1 0 0 0 2 South Sudan (2) 0 50 0 9 0 9 0 0 Sudan (2) 0 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tajikistan (2) 0 1 0 32 0 14 0 0 Togo (2) 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ukraine (2) 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Yemen (1,2) 0 31 0 64 0 3 0 5 Total 140 1,113 6 688 2 135 3 55 Abbreviations: cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV1 = wild poliovirus type 1. * Data as of May 5, 2022 WPV1 was detected in specimens from a girl aged 3.5 years living in Lilongwe, Malawi, who had paralysis onset in November 2021. WPV1 was confirmed in February 2022. Genomic sequencing analysis showed the strain detected in Malawi was genetically linked to poliovirus circulating in Sindh province, Pakistan during 2019–2020. On the basis of the number of nucleotide changes from the closest type 1 virus from Pakistan, the Malawi strain was assumed to have circulated in unknown locations for approximately 18 months before its detection. Countries reporting cVDPV cases and isolations. During January 2020–April 2022, a total of 1,856 cVDPV cases were identified in 33 countries. Three countries reported 51 cVDPV1 cases, and 30 countries reported 1,804 cVDPV2 cases. Israel reported one cVDPV3 case and one country, Yemen, reported cases of both cVDPV1 and cVDPV2. The number of global cVDPV2 cases fell by 37.7% in 2021 (672 cases in 21 countries) compared with 2020 (1,079 cases in 24 countries) (Table 2). Thirty-four different active poliovirus emergence groups (lineages) were reported through AFP surveillance or ES in 2021: four cVDPV1, 27 cVDPV2, and three cVDPV3. Of the 27 cVDPV2 emergence groups reported in 2021, eight were newly detected emergences. In 2022, to date, isolations of 14 cVDPV emergence groups have been reported from all three serotypes. Discussion After the last identified indigenous WPV1 case in Nigeria in 2016, the WHO African Region was certified WPV-free in August 2020. In 2021, the region reported its first case of WPV1 in approximately 5 years. In the absence of sustained transmission, this single case does not change the Africa Region’s WPV-free status. Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to have endemic WPV1 circulation; thus, only one WHO region (the Eastern Mediterranean Region) is not certified WPV-free. Although substantial improvements in eradication activities have been made in both countries, insecurity, instability, mass population movements, and vaccine refusal continue to pose challenges. COVID-19 pandemic prevention efforts have affected AFP surveillance sensitivity and the administration of routine childhood immunizations globally ( 4 , 7 – 9 ). Despite these setbacks, a marked reduction in WPV1 transmission occurred in 2021, possibly linked to improvements in SIA quality, decreased population movement at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, and renewed national commitments to the program ( 8 ). While recovery of sensitive AFP surveillance has been limited in 2021 and 2022, the observed reduction in the proportion of WPV1-positive ES samples reported during this period is consistent with a genuine decline in poliovirus transmission. In Afghanistan, restrictions on house-to-house vaccination campaigns that have been in place in many areas since 2018 have further limited eradication progress. After the shift in political power in Afghanistan in August 2021, mosque-to-mosque polio vaccination campaigns resumed in certain regions of the country, reaching approximately 2 million children who had not been accessible for nearly 3 years, and a coordinated campaign with Pakistan took place in December 2021 ( 9 ). If these vaccination efforts continue and are extended to include house-to-house campaigns, additional progress toward interrupting WPV1 transmission is feasible during 2022–2023. To end cVDPV2 transmission by the end of 2023, the 2022–2026 GPEI Strategic Plan ( 4 ) aims to improve the timeliness of case detection, streamline emergency response structures, and improve cross-border coordination to facilitate prompt outbreak response mobilization. The plan also aims to support the scale-up of nOPV2 availability ( 6 ). However, given currently limited nOPV2 supply replenishment, higher than expected demand has depleted nOPV2 stock ( 3 , 4 ). The risk for international spread of polioviruses was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern in 2014; in 2021, the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization and other advisory bodies ††† , §§§ recommended that any country experiencing a cVDPV2 outbreak should begin prompt outbreak response with available OPV2 vaccine, whether it be a Sabin strain mOPV2 or nOPV2 ( 10 ). Current progress toward polio eradication needs to be sustained in countries experiencing endemic transmission and outbreaks, and multiple efforts to immunize all children must be enhanced. Ongoing circulation of WPV1 in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2022 continues to pose a risk for poliovirus exportation globally, further highlighted by detection of WPV1 from Malawi genetically linked to the region. Until WPV1 is eradicated and cVDPV transmission is interrupted, the risk for poliovirus exportation to polio-free areas of the world remains. Strong global efforts are needed to sustain and increase routine immunization coverage and maintain sensitive poliovirus surveillance. Summary What is already known about this topic? Wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) transmission remains endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Outbreaks of paralysis due to circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) occur in populations with low immunity following prolonged circulation of Sabin strain oral poliovirus vaccine. What is added by this report? In 2021, Afghanistan and Pakistan reported a sharp decline in WPV1 cases from previous years. A WPV1 case genetically linked to these countries occurred in Malawi in November 2021. What are the implications for public health practice? Current progress toward polio eradication must be sustained in countries experiencing endemic transmission and outbreaks. Intensified programmatic actions leading to more effective outbreak responses and enhanced efforts to immunize all children are essential. Until WPV1 is eradicated and cVDPV transmission is interrupted, the risk for children being paralyzed by polio remains.
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            Progress Toward Polio Eradication — Worldwide, January 2019–June 2021

            In 1988, when the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) began, polio paralyzed >350,000 children across 125 countries. Today, only one of three wild poliovirus serotypes, type 1 (WPV1), remains in circulation in only two countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This report summarizes progress toward global polio eradication during January 1, 2019–June 30, 2021 and updates previous reports ( 1 , 2 ). In 2020, 140 cases of WPV1 were reported, including 56 in Afghanistan (a 93% increase from 29 cases in 2019) and 84 in Pakistan (a 43% decrease from 147 cases in 2019). As GPEI focuses on the last endemic WPV reservoirs, poliomyelitis outbreaks caused by circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) have emerged as a result of attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) virus regaining neurovirulence after prolonged circulation in underimmunized populations ( 3 ). In 2020, 32 countries reported cVDPV outbreaks (four type 1 [cVDPV1], 26 type 2 [cVDPV2] and two with outbreaks of both); 13 of these countries reported new outbreaks. The updated GPEI Polio Eradication Strategy 2022–2026 ( 4 ) includes expanded use of the type 2 novel oral poliovirus vaccine (nOPV2) to avoid new emergences of cVDPV2 during outbreak responses ( 3 ). The new strategy deploys other tactics, such as increased national accountability, and focused investments for overcoming the remaining barriers to eradication, including program disruptions and setbacks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Polio Vaccination In worldwide immunization programs, OPV and at least 1 dose of injectable, inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) are routinely used. Because IPV contains all three poliovirus serotypes, it protects against disease in children who seroconvert after vaccination; however, it does not prevent poliovirus transmission. In 2016, a global coordinated switch occurred from trivalent OPV (tOPV), which contains Sabin strain types 1, 2, and 3 to bivalent OPV (bOPV), which contains Sabin strain types 1 and 3. WPV2 was declared eradicated in 2015, and cVDPV2 was the predominant cause of cVDPV outbreaks after the last WPV2 case was detected in 1999. The use of monovalent OPV Sabin strain type 2 (mOPV2) is reserved for cVDPV2 outbreak responses. In November 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) granted Emergency Use Listing (EUL) for genetically stabilized nOPV2 to be used in a limited number of countries that have met readiness criteria for initial use* of nOPV2 ( 5 ) in response to outbreaks. In 2020, the estimated global infant coverage with 3 doses of poliovirus vaccine (Pol3) by age 1 year was 83% ( 6 ). However, substantial variation in coverage exists by WHO region, nationally, and subnationally. In the two countries with endemic WPV (Afghanistan and Pakistan), 2020 POL3 coverage was 75% and 83%, respectively ( 6 ); estimated coverage in subnational areas with transmission is much lower. In 2019, GPEI supported 199 supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) † in 42 countries with approximately 1 billion bOPV, 20 million IPV, 32 million monovalent OPV type 1 (mOPV1), and 142 million mOPV2 doses administered. In 2020, 149 SIAs were conducted in 30 countries with approximately 696 million bOPV, 6 million IPV, 4 million mOPV1, 228 million mOPV2, and 51 million tOPV doses administered; tOPV was used during four SIAs in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where cocirculation of WPV1 and cVDPV2 requires tOPV for efficiency in scheduling and implementing SIAs; GPEI authorized restarting filling of tOPV stocks for this purpose. In 2021, approximately 136 million nOPV2 doses have been released in eight countries approved for initial use (Benin, Chad, Congo, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan). SIAs continue to be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic § in 2021. Poliovirus Surveillance WPV and cVDPV transmission are detected primarily through surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) among children aged <15 years with testing of stool specimens at one of 145 WHO-accredited laboratories of the Global Polio Laboratory Network ( 7 ). During January–September 2020, the number of reported AFP cases declined 33% compared with the same period in 2019 ( 8 ). Environmental surveillance (testing of sewage for poliovirus) can supplement AFP surveillance; however, environmental sampling also declined somewhat during this period. Current data indicate that the COVID-19 pandemic has continued to limit AFP surveillance sensitivity. The continued strengthening of both surveillance systems, particularly in priority countries, ¶ is critical to tracking progress and documenting the absence of poliovirus transmission. Reported Poliovirus Cases and Isolations Countries reporting WPV cases and isolations. Since 2016, no WPV cases have been identified outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of the 176 WPV1 cases reported in 2019, 29 (16%) occurred in Afghanistan and 147 (84%) in Pakistan (Figure) (Table 1). FIGURE Number of wild poliovirus type 1 cases, by country and month of paralysis onset — worldwide, January 2019—June 2021* Abbreviation: WPV1 = wild poliovirus type 1. * Data are current as of August 3, 2021. The figure is a bar chart showing the number of wild poliovirus type 1 cases that occurred worldwide during January 2019–June 2021, by country and month of paralysis onset. TABLE 1 Number of poliovirus cases, by country — worldwide, January 1, 2019–June 30, 2021* Country (cVDPV type) Reporting period 2019 2020 Jan–Jun 2020 Jan–Jun 2021 WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV WPV1 cVDPV Countries with endemic WPV1 transmission Afghanistan (2)† 29 0 56 308 34 54 1 43 Pakistan (2) 147 22 84 135 60 52 1 8 Countries with reported cVDPV cases Angola (2) 0 138 0 3 0 3 0 0 Benin (2) 0 8 0 3 0 2 0 2 Burkina Faso (2) 0 1 0 65 0 26 0 1 Burma (Myanmar)(2)§ 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cameroon (2)† 0 0 0 7 0 4 0 0 Central African Republic (2) 0 21 0 4 0 1 0 0 Chad (2) 0 11 0 99 0 57 0 0 China (2) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Republic of the Congo (2)† 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 Côte d’Ivoire (2)† 0 0 0 61 0 39 0 0 Democratic Republic of the Congo (2) 0 88 0 81 0 54 0 10 Ethiopia (2) 0 14 0 36 0 17 0 6 Ghana (2) 0 18 0 12 0 12 0 0 Guinea (2)† 0 0 0 44 0 23 0 6 Liberia (2)† 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 Madagascar (1)† 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6 Malaysia (1) 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 Mali (2)† 0 0 0 48 0 6 0 0 Niger (2) 0 1 0 10 0 6 0 0 Nigeria (2) 0 18 0 8 0 2 0 65 Philippines (1,2)¶ 0 14 0 1 0 1 0 0 Senegal (2)† 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 Sierra Leone (2)† 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 4 Somalia (2) 0 3 0 14 0 2 0 0 South Sudan (2)† 0 0 0 50 0 2 0 9 Sudan (2)† 0 0 0 58 0 10 0 0 Tajikistan (2)† 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23 Togo (2) 0 8 0 9 0 9 0 0 Yemen (1) 0 1 0 31 0 22 0 3 Zambia (2) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Abbreviations: cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV1 = Wild poliovirus type 1. * Data are current as of August 3, 2021. † New cVDPV cases reported after December 31, 2019. § For this country, MMWR uses the U.S. State Department short-form name “Burma”; the World Health Organization uses “Myanmar.” ¶ Reported two cVDPV type 1 cases and 12 cVDPV type 2 cases in 2019, one cVDPV type 2 case in 2020. In 2020, Afghanistan reported 56 WPV1 cases representing a 93% increase from cases reported in the previous year; cases were found across 38 districts compared with 20 districts in 2019. As of August 3, 2021, one WPV1 case was reported in Afghanistan in 2021, a 97% decrease compared with the first 6 months of 2020. Pakistan reported 84 WPV1 cases from 39 districts in 2020, representing a 43% decrease from the 147 cases reported in 43 districts during 2019. One WPV1 case has been reported during January–June 2021, from Balochistan province, a 98% decrease from the 60 WPV1 cases from five provinces during the same 2020 period. This period accounted for 71% of all Pakistan WPV1 cases in 2020. In both countries, the number of orphan WPV1 isolates (those with ≤98.5% genetic identity with other isolates) from AFP cases increased from five of 176 (3%) in 2019 to 18 of 140 (13%) in 2020, signifying an increase in AFP surveillance gaps in 2020 ( 7 ). Environmental surveillance in Afghanistan detected WPV1 in 35 (8%) of 418 sewage samples collected during 2020 and in 57 (22%) of 264 samples in 2019 (Table 2). In Pakistan, WPV1 was detected in 434 (52%) of 830 sewage samples collected in 2020, and 44% (379/854) of sewage samples were WPV1-positive in 2019. In 2019, three (4%) of the 71 sewage samples collected in Iran contained WPV1 isolates; no positive environmental samples or cases have been reported since then. TABLE 2 Number of circulating wild polioviruses and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses detected through environmental surveillance — worldwide, January 1, 2019–June 30, 2021* Country Jan 1–Dec 31, 2019 Jan 1–Dec 31, 2020 Jan 1–Jun 30, 2020 Jan 1–Jun 30, 2021 No. of samples No. (%) with isolates No. of samples No. (%) with isolates No. of samples No. (%) with isolates No. of samples No. (%) with isolates Countries with reported WPV1-positive samples (no. and percentage of isolates refer to WPV1) Afghanistan 264 57 (22) 418 35 (8) 172 22 (13) 213 1 (1) Iran 71 3 (4) 43 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) Pakistan 854 379 (44) 830 434 (52) 414 238 (57) 444 59 (13) Countries with reported cVDPV-positive samples (cVDPV type) (no. and percentage of isolates refer to cVDPVs) Afghanistan (2) 264 0 (—) 418 175 (42) 172 46 (27) 213 40 (19) Angola (2) 106 17 (16) 98 0 (—) 47 0 (—) 15 0 (—) Benin (2) 37 0 (—) 70 5 (7) 31 0 (—) 52 1 (2) Cameroon (2) 602 4 (1) 273 9 (3) 134 4 (3) 187 0 (—) Central African Republic (2) 149 10 (7) 97 2 (2) 43 2 (5) 48 0 (—) Chad (2) 198 10 (5) 77 3 (4) 55 3 (5) 26 0 (—) China (3) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 1 1 (100) Republic of the Congo (2) 0 0 (—) 12 1 (8) 0 0 (—) 213 1 (1) Cote d’Ivoire (2) 154 7 (5) 130 91 (70) 88 62 (70) 42 0 (—) Democratic Republic of the Congo (2) 294 0 (—) 170 1 (1) 78 1 (1) 145 0 (—) Egypt (2) 703 0 (—) 550 1 (0) 267 0 (—) 313 10 (3) Ethiopia (2) 159 3 (2) 51 2 (4) 33 0 (—) 15 0 (—) Gambia (2) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 9 2 (22) Ghana (2) 202 17 (8) 184 20 (11) 100 19 (19) 99 0 (—) Guinea (2) 103 0 (—) 67 1 (1) 38 0 (—) 61 0 (—) Iran (2) 74 0 (—) 43 3 (7) 12 0 (—) 25 1 (4) Kenya (2) 317 0 (—) 193 1 (1) 92 0 (—) 101 1 (1) Liberia (2) 0 0 (—) 34 6 (18) 15 0 (—) 47 12 (26) Madagascar (1) 520 0 (—) 351 0 (—) 232 0 (—) 134 12(9) Malaysia (1, 2) 13 12 (92) 76 12 (16) 50 12 (24) 22 0 (—) Mali (2) 48 0 (—) 44 4 (9) 22 2 (9) 27 0 (—) Niger (2) 293 0 (—) 157 7 (4) 93 1 (1) 73 0 (—) Nigeria (2) 2071 60 (3) 1294 5 (0) 625 0 (—) 868 34 (4) Pakistan (2) 855 36 (4) 830 135 (16) 414 35 (8) 444 32 (7) Philippines (1, 2) 67 32 (48) 80 4 (5) 50 4 (8) 18 0 (—) Senegal (2) 56 0 (—) 27 1 (4) 14 0 (—) 10 4 (40) Somalia (2) 92 5 (5) 88 26 (30) 52 18 (35) 52 1 (2) South Sudan (2) 111 0 (—) 85 6 (7) 57 0 (—) 24 0 (—) Sudan (2) 65 0 (—) 50 14 (28) 20 3 (15) 30 0 (—) Tajikistan (2) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 0 0 (—) 14 13 (93) Uganda (2) 56 0 (—) 58 0 (—) 24 0 (—) 36 2 (6) Abbreviations: cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV1 = Wild poliovirus type 1. * Data are current as of August 3, 2021. Countries reporting cVDPV cases and isolations. During January 2019–June 2021, cVDPV transmission was identified in 32 countries; 13 countries were affected by new cVDPV outbreaks in 2020. Afghanistan reported 308 cVDPV2 cases in 2020 compared with no cases in 2019. Pakistan reported 135 cVDPV2 cases in 2020, more than a fivefold increase from the 22 reported in 2019. To date in 2021, 195 cVDPV2 cases have been identified globally, including 43 in Afghanistan and eight in Pakistan. Discussion With the August 2020 certification of the African Region as WPV-free,** five of the six WHO regions, representing over 90% of the world’s population, are now free of wild polioviruses. Given this achievement, GPEI is focusing efforts on two goals: interrupting persistent WPV1 transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan and stopping all current outbreaks of cVDPV2. To reach these goals, in June 2021, GPEI released a revised 5-year strategy for polio eradication that aims to address persistent challenges and recover from setbacks exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic ( 4 ). Guided by the Polio Eradication Strategy 2022–2026, GPEI partners and in-country stakeholders are to adopt a full emergency posture and assume more accountability for eradication at every level of the program ( 4 ). The strategy elevates efforts in the highest-risk countries and promotes health service integration, surveillance improvement, and community engagement to enhance campaign quality through increased political advocacy to ensure timely and effective emergency outbreak SIA responses through improved government support of implementation. Although Pakistan and Afghanistan face distinct challenges, they are linked epidemiologically because of high rates of cross-border population movement. Transit-point vaccination must be maintained as emigration from Afghanistan potentially increases in 2021. The beginning of each year is typically the low season for WPV1 transmission in both countries, and AFP surveillance sensitivity has decreased. During 2019, the Pakistan polio program suffered from increased vaccine resistance fed by social media misinformation and faced continued operational problems in some localities. The program changed its management oversight and enhanced efforts to overcome community mistrust to decrease vaccine hesitancy ( 9 ). Inroads to improving the effectiveness of the SIAs have also been made in 2020 ( 4 ). Although the proportion of Pakistan environmental samples that are WPV-positive remains high in 2021 to date, the decrease from the same period in 2020 is worth noting. In Afghanistan, the main challenges to ending poliovirus transmission are the inability to reach all children in critical areas near reservoirs in Pakistan and increasing political instability. The polio program in Afghanistan has continued to operate for many years, even during periods of insecurity and escalating conflict. Although negotiations with local leaders in Afghanistan facilitated vaccination efforts at one time, restrictions on vaccinations have persisted in areas controlled by insurgent groups since the October 2018 ban on house-to-house campaigns, which has since expanded geographically ( 10 ). WHO is anticipating that some negotiated access will again be possible. Other challenges include current mass population movements, clusters of vaccine refusals, and suboptimal SIA quality in some areas previously under government control ( 10 ). Globally, cVDPV2 outbreaks increased in number and geographic extent during 2019–2020 because of delays in mOPV2 response SIAs, which were frequently of low quality. Since the switch in 2016 from tOPV to bOPV, 1,755 cases of paralytic polio have been reported from 64 cVDPV2 outbreaks in 30 countries across four WHO regions ( 4 ). †† GPEI has outlined a strategy for stopping cVDPV transmission and reducing the risk of seeding new outbreaks by expanding use of nOPV2 ( 4 ). Continued monitoring will be needed to ensure safety and effectiveness while nOPV2 is brought into wider use and to ascertain whether it can replace mOPV2 ( 5 ). The findings in this report are subject to at least one limitation. SIAs, field surveillance, and investigation activities were curtailed in 2020 because of COVID-19 pandemic mitigation measures, and laboratory testing suffered delays ( 8 ); limitations on SIA quality and surveillance sensitivity continue in 2021. On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic has presented opportunities to jointly increase the effectiveness of polio eradication activities and promote health services integration. For example, the global rollout of COVID-19 vaccines presents an opportunity to strengthen demand for vaccination against both COVID-19 and polio. Thousands of polio eradication workers worldwide continue to play a critical role in implementing countries’ COVID-19 responses. Maintaining these partnerships will be important in eradicating WPV and stopping cVDPV transmission while simultaneously addressing other health priorities. Summary What is already known about this topic? Wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) remains endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks have increased since 2017. What is added by this report? From 2019 to 2020, the number of WPV1 cases increased in Afghanistan and decreased in Pakistan and the number of cVDPV2 cases increased and cVDPV2 outbreak countries increased to 32. In Afghanistan, the polio program faces challenges including an inability to reach children in critical areas and increasing political instability. The COVID-19 pandemic continues to limit the quality of immunization activities and poliovirus surveillance. What are the implications for public health practice? The Polio Eradication Strategy for 2022–2026 outlines measures including increased government accountability and wider use of novel, oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 that are needed to eradicate polio.
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              Enabling accelerated vaccine roll-out for Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEICs): Novel Oral Polio Vaccine type 2 (nOPV2) experience

              To address the evolving risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2), Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners are working closely with countries to deploy an additional innovative tool for outbreak response – novel oral polio vaccine type 2 (nOPV2). The World Health Organization’s (WHO) Prequalification program issued an Emergency Use Listing (EUL) recommendation for nOPV2 on 13 November 2020. The WHO’s EUL procedure was created to assess and list unlicensed vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics to enable their use in response to a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). nOPV2 was the first vaccine to receive an EUL, paving the way for other emergency vaccines. In this report, we summarise the pathway for nOPV2 roll-out under EUL.
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                Journal
                MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
                MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
                WR
                Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
                Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
                0149-2195
                1545-861X
                12 May 2023
                12 May 2023
                : 72
                : 19
                : 517-522
                Affiliations
                Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC; Global Immunization Division, Global Health Center, CDC; Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC; Polio Eradication Department, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
                Author notes
                Corresponding author: Scarlett E. Lee; tqz9@ 123456cdc.gov .
                Article
                mm7219a3
                10.15585/mmwr.mm7219a3
                10208367
                37167156
                bad90dda-1f12-4fa1-98a7-e186ea265d75

                All material in the MMWR Series is in the public domain and may be used and reprinted without permission; citation as to source, however, is appreciated.

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