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      SARS-CoV-2 strains bearing Omicron BA.1 spike replicate in C57BL/6 mice

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          Abstract

          Introduction

          SARS-CoV-2, the cause of the COVID pandemic, is an RNA virus with a high propensity to mutate. Successive virus variants, including variants of concern (VOC), have emerged with increased transmission or immune escape. The original pandemic virus and early variants replicated poorly, if at all, in mice at least partly due to a mismatch between the receptor binding domain on the viral spike protein and the murine angiotensin converting enzyme 2 (ACE2). Omicron VOC emerged in late 2021 harboring > 50 new mutations, 35 of them in the spike protein. This variant resulted in a very large wave of infections, even in the face of prior immunity, albeit being inherently less severe than earlier variants. Reflecting the lower severity reported in humans, Omicron displayed attenuated infection in hamsters and also in the K18- hACE2 mouse model. K18- hACE2 mice express both the human ACE2 as well as the endogenous mouse ACE2.

          Methods

          Here we infected hACE2 knock-in mice that express only human ACE2 and no murine ACE2, or C57BL/6 wildtype mice with SARS-CoV-2 D614G (first-wave isolate), Delta or Omicron BA.1 variants and assessed infectivity and downstream innate immune responses.

          Results

          While replication of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron was lower in the lungs of hACE2 knock-in mice compared with SARS-CoV-2 D614G and VOC Delta, it replicated more efficiently than the earlier variants in C57BL/6 wildtype mice. This opens the opportunity to test the effect of host genetics on SARS-CoV-2 infections in wildtype mice. As a proof of principle, we tested Omicron infection in mice lacking expression of the interferon-alpha receptor-1 (IFNAR1). In these mice we found that loss of type I IFN receptor signaling resulted in higher viral loads in the lungs were detected. Finally, using a chimeric virus of first wave SARS-CoV-2 harboring the Omicron spike protein, we show that Omicron spike increase infection of C57BL/6 wildtype mice, but non-spike genes of Omicron confer attenuation of viral replication.

          Discussion

          Since this chimeric virus efficiently infected C57BL/6 wildtype mice, and replicated in their lungs, our findings illustrate a pathway for genetic mapping of virushost interactions during SARS-CoV-2 infection.

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          Most cited references31

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          Structure of the SARS-CoV-2 spike receptor-binding domain bound to the ACE2 receptor

          A new and highly pathogenic coronavirus (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2, SARS-CoV-2) caused an outbreak in Wuhan city, Hubei province, China, starting from December 2019 that quickly spread nationwide and to other countries around the world1-3. Here, to better understand the initial step of infection at an atomic level, we determined the crystal structure of the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 bound to the cell receptor ACE2. The overall ACE2-binding mode of the SARS-CoV-2 RBD is nearly identical to that of the SARS-CoV RBD, which also uses ACE2 as the cell receptor4. Structural analysis identified residues in the SARS-CoV-2 RBD that are essential for ACE2 binding, the majority of which either are highly conserved or share similar side chain properties with those in the SARS-CoV RBD. Such similarity in structure and sequence strongly indicate convergent evolution between the SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV RBDs for improved binding to ACE2, although SARS-CoV-2 does not cluster within SARS and SARS-related coronaviruses1-3,5. The epitopes of two SARS-CoV antibodies that target the RBD are also analysed for binding to the SARS-CoV-2 RBD, providing insights into the future identification of cross-reactive antibodies.
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            Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England

            Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has the capacity to generate variants with major genomic changes. The UK variant B.1.1.7 (also known as VOC 202012/01) has many mutations that alter virus attachment and entry into human cells. Using a variety of statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, Davies et al. characterized the spread of the B.1.1.7 variant in the United Kingdom. The authors found that the variant is 43 to 90% more transmissible than the predecessor lineage but saw no clear evidence for a change in disease severity, although enhanced transmission will lead to higher incidence and more hospital admissions. Large resurgences of the virus are likely to occur after the easing of control measures, and it may be necessary to greatly accelerate vaccine roll-out to control the epidemic. Science , this issue p. eabg3055 The major coronavirus variant that emerged at the end of 2020 in the UK is more transmissible than its predecessors and could spark resurgences. INTRODUCTION Several novel variants of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus that causes COVID-19, emerged in late 2020. One of these, Variant of Concern (VOC) 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7), was first detected in southeast England in September 2020 and spread to become the dominant lineage in the United Kingdom in just a few months. B.1.1.7 has since spread to at least 114 countries worldwide. RATIONALE The rapid spread of VOC 202012/01 suggests that it transmits more efficiently from person to person than preexisting variants of SARS-CoV-2. This could lead to global surges in COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths, so there is an urgent need to estimate how much more quickly VOC 202012/01 spreads, whether it is associated with greater or lesser severity of disease, and what control measures might be effective in mitigating its impact. We used social contact and mobility data, as well as demographic indicators linked to SARS-CoV-2 community testing data in England, to assess whether the spread of the new variant may be an artifact of higher baseline transmission rates in certain geographical areas or among specific demographic subpopulations. We then used a series of complementary statistical analyses and mathematical models to estimate the transmissibility of VOC 202012/01 across multiple datasets from the UK, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States. Finally, we extended a mathematical model that has been extensively used to forecast COVID-19 dynamics in the UK to consider two competing SARS-CoV-2 lineages: VOC 202012/01 and preexisting variants. By fitting this model to a variety of data sources on infections, hospitalizations, and deaths across seven regions of England, we assessed different hypotheses for why the new variant appears to be spreading more quickly, estimated the severity of disease associated with the new variant, and evaluated control measures including vaccination and nonpharmaceutical interventions. Combining multiple lines of evidence allowed us to draw robust inferences. RESULTS The rapid spread of VOC 202012/01 is not an artifact of geographical differences in contact behavior and does not substantially differ by age, sex, or socioeconomic stratum. We estimate that the new variant has a 43 to 90% higher reproduction number (range of 95% credible intervals, 38 to 130%) than preexisting variants. Similar increases are observed in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States. The most parsimonious explanation for this increase in the reproduction number is that people infected with VOC 202012/01 are more infectious than people infected with a preexisting variant, although there is also reasonable support for a longer infectious period and multiple mechanisms may be operating. Our estimates of severity are uncertain and are consistent with anything from a moderate decrease to a moderate increase in severity (e.g., 32% lower to 20% higher odds of death given infection). Nonetheless, our mathematical model, fitted to data up to 24 December 2020, predicted a large surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths in 2021, which has been borne out so far by the observed burden in England up to the end of March 2021. In the absence of stringent nonpharmaceutical interventions and an accelerated vaccine rollout, COVID-19 deaths in the first 6 months of 2021 were projected to exceed those in 2020 in England. CONCLUSION More than 98% of positive SARS-CoV-2 infections in England are now due to VOC 202012/01, and the spread of this new variant has led to a surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths. Other countries should prepare for potentially similar outcomes. Impact of SARS-CoV-2 Variant of Concern 202012/01. ( A ) Spread of VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7) in England. ( B ) The estimated relative transmissibility of VOC 202012/01 (mean and 95% confidence interval) is similar across the United Kingdom as a whole, England, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States. ( C ) Projected COVID-19 deaths (median and 95% confidence interval) in England, 15 December 2020 to 30 June 2021. Vaccine rollout and control measures help to mitigate the burden of VOC 202012/01. A severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant, VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7), emerged in southeast England in September 2020 and is rapidly spreading toward fixation. Using a variety of statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, we estimate that this variant has a 43 to 90% (range of 95% credible intervals, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction number than preexisting variants. A fitted two-strain dynamic transmission model shows that VOC 202012/01 will lead to large resurgences of COVID-19 cases. Without stringent control measures, including limited closure of educational institutions and a greatly accelerated vaccine rollout, COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths across England in the first 6 months of 2021 were projected to exceed those in 2020. VOC 202012/01 has spread globally and exhibits a similar transmission increase (59 to 74%) in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States.
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              Omicron escapes the majority of existing SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies

              The SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant contains 15 mutations of the receptor-binding domain (RBD). How Omicron evades RBD-targeted neutralizing antibodies requires immediate investigation. Here we use high-throughput yeast display screening 1,2 to determine the profiles of RBD escaping mutations for 247 human anti-RBD neutralizing antibodies and show that the neutralizing antibodies can be classified by unsupervised clustering into six epitope groups (A–F)—a grouping that is highly concordant with knowledge-based structural classifications 3–5 . Various single mutations of Omicron can impair neutralizing antibodies of different epitope groups. Specifically, neutralizing antibodies in groups A–D, the epitopes of which overlap with the ACE2-binding motif, are largely escaped by K417N, G446S, E484A and Q493R. Antibodies in group E (for example, S309) 6 and group F (for example, CR3022) 7 , which often exhibit broad sarbecovirus neutralizing activity, are less affected by Omicron, but a subset of neutralizing antibodies are still escaped by G339D, N440K and S371L. Furthermore, Omicron pseudovirus neutralization showed that neutralizing antibodies that sustained single mutations could also be escaped, owing to multiple synergetic mutations on their epitopes. In total, over 85% of the tested neutralizing antibodies were escaped by Omicron. With regard to neutralizing-antibody-based drugs, the neutralization potency of LY-CoV016, LY-CoV555, REGN10933, REGN10987, AZD1061, AZD8895 and BRII-196 was greatly undermined by Omicron, whereas VIR-7831 and DXP-604 still functioned at a reduced efficacy. Together, our data suggest that infection with Omicron would result in considerable humoral immune evasion, and that neutralizing antibodies targeting the sarbecovirus conserved region will remain most effective. Our results inform the development of antibody-based drugs and vaccines against Omicron and future variants.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                URI : https://loop.frontiersin.org/people/2705817Role: Role: Role: Role: Role: Role: Role: Role:
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                Journal
                Front Immunol
                Front Immunol
                Front. Immunol.
                Frontiers in Immunology
                Frontiers Media S.A.
                1664-3224
                29 April 2024
                2024
                : 15
                : 1383612
                Affiliations
                [1] 1 Section of Respiratory Infections, National Heart and Lung Institute, Imperial College London , London, United Kingdom
                [2] 2 Department of Infectious Disease, Imperial College London , London, United Kingdom
                [3] 3 MRC-University of Glasgow Centre for Virus Research , Glasgow, United Kingdom
                Author notes

                Edited by: Xulin Chen, Jinan University, China

                Reviewed by: Nathaniel Roy Landau, New York University, United States

                Blandine Monel, INCIT (Immunology and New Concepts in Immunotherpy)-INSERM UMR 1302, France

                *Correspondence: Cecilia Johansson, c.johansson@ 123456imperial.ac.uk
                Article
                10.3389/fimmu.2024.1383612
                11089223
                38742107
                7d39b152-d4f3-45ce-9047-eb82e44c9b6a
                Copyright © 2024 Ogger, Martín, Jang, Zhou, Brown, Sukhova, Furnon, Patel, Cowton, Palmarini, Barclay and Johansson

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

                History
                : 07 February 2024
                : 08 April 2024
                Page count
                Figures: 4, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 31, Pages: 10, Words: 4977
                Funding
                Funded by: Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council , doi 10.13039/501100000268;
                Award ID: (BB/V013831/1
                Funded by: Rosetrees Trust , doi 10.13039/501100000833;
                Award ID: M370-F1, M370, M956
                Funded by: Medical Research Council , doi 10.13039/501100000265;
                Award ID: MR/W005611/1.
                The author(s) declare financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. CJ is supported by grants from UKRI-BBSRC (BB/V013831/1), Rosetrees Trust and Stoneygate Trust (M370 and M370-F1), Rosetrees Trust and The John Black Charitable Foundation (M956), the Jameel fund for infectious disease research and innovation and the Imperial College COVID-19 research fund. WB, JZ, WF, MP, and AP are supported by the G2P-UK National Virology consortium funded by MRC/UKRI (grant ref.: MR/W005611/1.).
                Categories
                Immunology
                Original Research
                Custom metadata
                Viral Immunology

                Immunology
                sars-cov-2,variant,respiratory infection,spike protein,knockout mice
                Immunology
                sars-cov-2, variant, respiratory infection, spike protein, knockout mice

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