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      Do direct-democratic procedures lead to higher acceptance than political representation? : Experimental survey evidence from Germany

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          Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy

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            Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives

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              Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty

              The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Public Choice
                Public Choice
                Springer Nature America, Inc
                0048-5829
                1573-7101
                April 2016
                May 11 2016
                April 2016
                : 167
                : 1-2
                : 47-65
                Article
                10.1007/s11127-016-0330-y
                75651ba3-435d-4238-9440-ab04d1704a35
                © 2016

                http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

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