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Abstract
In New South Wales (NSW), Australia, the public health response was highly effective
in controlling the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic.
1
During this time, clinicians reported fewer than expected presentations and admissions
with acute respiratory illness to the Sydney Children's Hospitals Network (SCHN).
Respiratory syncytial virus is among the most common viruses that cause hospitalisation
in children and has predictable winter seasonality.
2
We aimed to quantify the change in frequency and burden of acute respiratory syncytial
virus-associated illness presenting to SCHN, the largest provider of tertiary paediatric
services in Australia, in 2020 compared with previous years.
We analysed three separate datasets from the SCHN electronic records from Jan 1, 2015,
to June 30, 2020, in children younger than 16 years: (1) laboratory tests for respiratory
syncytial virus by PCR; (2) hospital admissions for bronchiolitis coded by the ICD-10
Australian Modification (J21.0, J21.1, J21.8, and J21.9); and (3) emergency department
attendances for acute respiratory illness coded by the Systematised Nomenclature of
Medicine Clinical Terminology (appendix p 4). For each dataset, we plotted counts
by month and did a time series analysis comparing the frequencies in the peak respiratory
syncytial virus epidemic months (April–June) in 2020 with those in 2015–19.
We observed concurrent lower frequencies of respiratory syncytial virus (A and B)
detection, admission to hospital for bronchiolitis, and emergency department attendance
for acute respiratory illnesses (appendix p 1) in 2020 compared with preceding years.
The observed mean frequency of respiratory syncytial virus detections from April to
June, 2020, was 94·3% (SE 22·8) lower than predicted on the basis of the underlying
trend of 2015–19 data (absolute reduced frequency per epidemic month [ARF] 99 [SE
24]; p=0·026). The observed mean frequency of bronchiolitis admissions was 85·9% (SE
15·2) lower than predicted (ARF 130 [SE 23]; p=0·011), and that of emergency department
attendance was 70·8% (SE 16·3) lower than predicted (ARF 915 [SE 211]; p=0·023; appendix
p 2, 3). We also observed an 89·1% (SE 32·7) reduction in bronchiolitis admissions
to the intensive care unit (ARF 16 [SE 6]; p=0·074). The reduction in respiratory
syncytial virus detections cannot be accounted for by reduced testing because the
number of tests done in 2020 was double the number done in previous years (data not
shown).
The aggressive public health interventions aimed at preventing severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission has created a natural experiment
of their effect on respiratory syncytial virus-associated illness and other communicable
diseases. Here, we show a strong association between the implementation of these measures
and the burden of respiratory syncytial virus disease among children in Sydney, NSW.
Given that handwashing and isolation are known to affect nosocomial respiratory syncytial
virus transmission, some effect might have been expected,
3
but the size of the apparent impact at a population level is startling. Respiratory
syncytial virus is one of the most burdensome viruses globally, and bronchiolitis
(up to 80% of which is caused by respiratory syncytial virus) is a leading cause of
hospital admission in young children.4, 5 Efforts to develop vaccines and other preventive
measures to address this considerable burden remain unfulfilled. Australians reported
a very high uptake (>84%) of enhanced hygiene and physical distancing measures in
March, 2020.
6
Handwashing damages the lipid envelope that surrounds respiratory syncytial virus,
thereby impairing its ability to infect host cells.
Population lockdowns are justifiable to contain transmission of high lethality pandemics
but are undesirable due to their wider negative impacts on society. The observation
we report here should prompt deeper analysis to identify which components of the public
health intervention were most effective for preventing respiratory syncytial virus
infection in 2020, and prompt a discussion about which interventions, such as those
described by Dalton and colleagues,
7
might be sustainable for future primary prevention of seasonal respiratory disease
in children. School closures in NSW occurred for a brief period (March 23–April 29,
2020; appendix p 1), and early childhood education centres remained open throughout
this period, although attendance rates decreased. Mask wearing was neither recommended,
nor practised widely in the community before July, 2020.
Our findings might be limited by idiosyncrasies in both the social and pandemic contexts
in NSW. Furthermore, the relative effects of hygiene measures, physical distancing,
and reduced population movement could not be directly assessed. An important caveat
is that the period we studied was brief, and it remains to be seen whether community
transmission of respiratory syncytial virus has been averted in 2020 or merely delayed,
especially as restrictions are relaxed. The small uptick in emergency department attendances
and bronchiolitis admissions in June, 2020 (appendix p 1) was not associated with
increased respiratory syncytial virus detections. Our laboratory reported almost exclusively
rhinovirus detections in June, 2020 (results not shown). Rhinoviruses are easily transmitted
between children in close contact and are non-enveloped so might be inherently less
susceptible to inactivation by handwashing.
There are legitimate concerns about a range of potential negative effects of lockdowns;
it will be crucial to assess and quantify these consequences, and we support efforts
to actively mitigate them.
8
Nonetheless, our results suggest that the beneficial effect of lockdown on transmission
of respiratory syncytial virus in NSW has been impressive.
Background Since the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in late 2019, communities have been required to rapidly adopt community mitigation strategies rarely used before, or only in limited settings. This study aimed to examine the attitudes and beliefs of Australian adults towards the COVID-19 pandemic, and willingness and capacity to engage with these mitigation measures. In addition, we aimed to explore the psychosocial and demographic factors that are associated with adoption of recommended hygiene-related and avoidance-related behaviors. Methods A national cross-sectional online survey of 1420 Australian adults (18 years and older) was undertaken between the 18 and 24 March 2020. The statistical analysis of the data included univariate and multivariate logistic regression analysis. Findings The survey of 1420 respondents found 50% (710) of respondents felt COVID-19 would ‘somewhat’ affect their health if infected and 19% perceived their level of risk as high or very high. 84·9% had performed ≥1 of the three recommended hygiene-related behaviors and 93·4% performed ≥1 of six avoidance-related behaviors over the last one month. Adopting avoidance behaviors was associated with trust in government/authorities (aOR: 6.0, 95% CI 2.6–11·0), higher perceived rating of effectiveness of behaviors (aOR: 4·0, 95% CI: 1·8–8·7), higher levels of perceived ability to adopt social distancing strategies (aOR: 5.0, 95% CI: 1·5–9.3), higher trust in government (aOR: 6.0, 95% CI: 2.6–11.0) and higher level of concern if self-isolated (aOR: 1.8, 95% CI: 1.1–3.0). Interpretation In the last two months, members of the public have been inundated with messages about hygiene and social (physical) distancing. However, our results indicate that a continued focus on supporting community understanding of the rationale for these strategies, as well as instilling community confidence in their ability to adopt or sustain the recommendations is needed.
Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) causes a significant public health burden, and outbreaks among vulnerable patients in hospital settings are of particular concern. We reviewed published and unpublished literature from hospital settings to assess: (i) nosocomial RSV transmission risk (attack rate) during outbreaks, (ii) effectiveness of infection control measures. We searched the following databases: MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, Cochrane Library, together with key websites, journals and grey literature, to end of 2012. Risk of bias was assessed using the Cochrane risk of bias tool or Newcastle–Ottawa scale. A narrative synthesis was conducted. Forty studies were included (19 addressing research question one, 21 addressing question two). RSV transmission risk varied by hospital setting; 6–56% (median: 28·5%) in neonatal/paediatric settings (n = 14), 6–12% (median: 7%) in adult haematology and transplant units (n = 3), and 30–32% in other adult settings (n = 2). For question two, most studies (n = 13) employed multi‐component interventions (e.g. cohort nursing, personal protective equipment (PPE), isolation), and these were largely reported to be effective in reducing nosocomial transmission. Four studies examined staff PPE; eye protection appeared more effective than gowns and masks. One study reported on RSV prophylaxis for patients (RSV‐Ig/palivizumab); there was no statistical evidence of effectiveness although the sample size was small. Overall, risk of bias for included studies tended to be high. We conclude that RSV transmission risk varies widely during hospital outbreaks. Although multi‐component control strategies appear broadly successful, further research is required to disaggregate the effectiveness of individual components including the potential role of palivizumab prophylaxis.
To rapidly communicate short reports of innovative responses to Covid-19 around the world, along with a range of current thinking on policy and strategy relevant to the pandemic, the Journal has initiated the Covid-19 Notes series. Facing the coronavirus pandemic, Australia has achieved national consensus on policies that were unprecedented for the past century. New South Wales (which has 8 million residents) and other jurisdictions appear to have successfully suppressed Covid-19 transmission after a rapid escalation of cases in March 2020. The first four cases, all linked to the Wuhan outbreak, were identified in Sydney in late January. The New South Wales Ministry of Health (NSW Health) followed its new Covid-19 protocols to isolate infected people and quarantine their contacts. No transmission resulting from these cases was detected. The Australian government restricted entry for travelers from China on February 1. No further cases were identified in New South Wales until late February, when several travelers from Iran and their contacts tested positive. As Covid-19 continued its international spread, people who had traveled overseas, particularly those returning from the United States and Western Europe, accounted for most Australian cases. In late March, there was another upswing in new cases, this time resulting from infections acquired on cruise ships. Images from Europe of coffins and overflowing intensive care units made things look grim. The New South Wales government’s response built on previous pandemic planning that was informed by lessons from severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and H1N1 influenza. On January 21, NSW Health opened its Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (which was previously used during the H1N1 influenza pandemic and for subsequent exercises) to coordinate case finding, contact tracing, outbreak control, communications, and other preventive actions. It drew staff from health services, government agencies, universities, and former employees. More than 150 contact tracers were hired, and the State Health Emergency Operations Centre was opened at the Rural Fire Services headquarters to help the state’s 17 local health districts build critical care and emergency department capacity, establish Covid-19 testing clinics, and coordinate the supply of personal protective equipment. NSW Health regularly produced online content and webinars for physicians, health administrators, and other stakeholders. Expert committees, led by the Communicable Disease Network Australia and its parent organization, the Australian Health Protection Principle Committee (AHPPC) — both of which include jurisdictional health department staff and academic experts — meet daily to review surveillance data and models of projected disease spread and to develop recommendations. The AHPPC advises the newly formed national cabinet (composed of the prime minister and the first minister from each state and territory), which then creates policies, recommends legislation, and implements laws related to Covid-19. Since February 1, the Australian government has increasingly tightened its border-control policies, and by March 15 it restricted entry for all foreigners. Mandatory 14-day quarantine in hotels for residents returning from overseas, closing of borders between some jurisdictions, and bans on gatherings and nonessential travel, all of which are enforced by police, followed. Most office work and studying is now done from home, and food outlets are restricted to offering take-away services. Anzac Day ceremonies to commemorate defense personnel on April 25 were cancelled in favor of private remembrance. To identify as many cases as possible and thereby avert further disease transmission, special attention has been given to increasing testing capacity and broadening access to testing for people with mild symptoms. New South Wales now has among the highest testing rates in the world. To strengthen traditional contact-tracing methods, the Australian government launched COVIDSafe, a mobile app that uses Bluetooth to identify close contacts of people with Covid-19, on April 26. Like the rest of Australia, New South Wales is currently in a lull — new diagnoses have fallen from a peak of 212 on March 27 to 1 on May 3. This success may be attributable to Australia’s near-unique ability to close its borders as well as to consistent national Covid-19 policies, regular communication with an engaged community, effective identification and isolation of infected people, quarantine of those who have been exposed, and the public’s high degree of compliance with social-distancing guidelines. Without high rates of population immunity, New South Wales remains susceptible to Covid-19. We might be winning the battle, but the social and economic costs are high. The question now is whether robust identification of new cases and contact tracing can limit transmission sufficiently to permit relaxation of some social measures before a vaccine is available.
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