“Every battle is won or lost before it is even fought.” This statement is attributed
to Sun Tzu in the Art of War [1], an ancient Chinese military treatise dated from
the fifth century BC. It highlights the importance of preparation, positioning and
planning before engaging in battle. The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic painfully
revealed how many countries had embarked on a battle that was lost even long before
the new coronavirus had reached their borders. More strikingly, most have persisted
in this defeatist attitude as the crisis deepened, failing to re-direct their strategy.
Living with SARS-CoV-2 by returning as closely as possible to “business as usual”
is far from winning the battle. It rather looks like “giving in to the enemy”, while
vaccine and drug development efforts only feed the dearest hope for a successful way
out.
Preparation
The emergence of a new viral pandemic was, is and remains a matter of when, rather
than if, even today amidst a raging pandemic. Among the prime candidates are those
caused by influenza viruses that originate from animals. The SARS and MERS outbreaks
in the past two decades highlighted the threat posed by animal coronaviruses before
the unprecedented COVID-19 assault started. But we should not forget that members
of other virus families affecting the animal kingdom can also be quite successful
at jumping host species, like paramyxoviruses, hantaviruses, filoviruses, bunyaviruses,
flaviviruses, and more. The number of newly emerging viruses in the human population,
most of which originate from animals, has dramatically increased in the past decades.
However, this exchange of pathogens at the human-animal interface is not new [2].
Childhood diseases, such as smallpox, mumps and measles, have been acquired up to
thousands of years ago by transmission of their ancestral viruses from domesticated
livestock. In the past centuries, influenza- and metapneumoviruses have been transmitted
from birds to humans and have become established as recurring seasonal scourges. More
recently, countless reports of novel viral disease emergence events have made the
news, revealing a most worrying trend. These include the AIDS pandemic caused by HIV,
hemorrhagic fever outbreaks caused by arena-, hanta- flavi- and filoviruses, pneumonia
and viral encephalitis caused by Nipah and Hendra viruses, debilitating arthralgia
in people with Chikungunya, or even more unexpected ailments such as microencephaly
in newborns with Zika. This trend is mirrored by a similar increase in viral outbreaks
among wild and domestic animal species worldwide, threatening and often decimating
their populations. It is fueled by dramatically accumulating anthropogenic changes
of our planet, including relentless urbanization and industrialization, natural habitat
destruction, global trade and travel, collectively making the current geological epoch,
the “Anthropocene” [3]. These global changes lead to increased human-to-human contacts
even across large geographical distances and to increased human-animal contacts, involving
both domestic and wild species, in often mixing populations. As these anthropogenic
changes are largely determined by human behavior and therefore generally hard to influence,
new viral threats will continue to emerge, ever more frequently. This warning has
been raised for many decades now, and re-iterated upon each novel emergence, like
Nipah, avian and pandemic influenza, SARS, MERS, Ebola, Zika, all calling for epidemic
and pandemic preparedness. Were we prepared for a pandemic like that of COVID-19?
No, we were not.
Positioning
The new coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, causing COVID-19, emerged in Wuhan, China in late
2019 [4]. Within a few weeks, it demonstrated efficient human-to-human transmission
with a basic reproduction number (R0) initially estimated between 1.4 and 3.8 [5–8].
On 26 January 2020, China’s National Health Commission Minister Ma Xiaowei informed
the public and the world in a press conference that infected individuals can spread
the virus before they develop symptoms [9]. Control measures against a transmissible
virus that can be spread ‘pre-symptoms’ are bound to be different from those against
a transmissible virus that spreads ‘post-symptoms’. Screening for fever and other
signs of disease in order to identify, test and quarantine infected individuals will
be sufficient to interrupt chains of transmission of a ‘post-symptom-spreading’ virus
(as with the SARS coronavirus) but will unlikely be sufficient for a ‘pre-symptom-spreading’
virus [10]. Likewise, control measures against a highly transmissible virus are bound
to be different during the phase of importation of the virus from its source outbreak
than upon widespread regional community transmission. While closing borders to all
travelers coming from epicenters of infection or quarantining them may be of little
practicality upon widespread community transmission, it is an essential defense to
prevent virus introduction during the phase of importation. Interestingly, upon introduction
of an emerging foreign animal disease in a previously naïve country, the widely accepted
control strategy is containment and elimination [11]. The early phase of importation
characterized by limited local transmission offers a short window of opportunity for
successful control, provided strict and not half-hearted containment measures are
applied to hit the emerging pathogen hard. These measures are successfully applied
in well-defined control and surveillance zones with firm restrictions of contact and
movement of animals independent of their infection status. Was a similar strategy
adopted by most governments during the initial importation phase of the COVID-19 pandemic?
No, it was not.
Elimination vs mitigation
Mitigation or damage control was the preferred position of most governments. Such
a position may seem alluring since less strict and less aggressive measures are applied,
limiting their associated costs. However, this perceived advantage is malignantly
deceiving as the applied control measures carry a non-negligible risk to be insufficient
at preventing widespread regional community transmission. It eventually calls for
increasingly more resources as the virus continues to circulate, further spreads,
and imposes rising morbidity and mortality burdens. This approach resulted in the
first waves of the COVID-19 pandemic and necessitated extensive lockdowns in many
countries. The largely successful elimination strategy practiced by some Asian countries
that had experienced SARS and/or MERS outbreaks in the past, sharply contrast with
the shortcomings of mitigation strategies. Even today, the welcome decreasing trends
in the number of new cases in most countries hit by a first wave entice both governments
and the public to relax control measures relying on limited evidenced-based criteria
and fueled by short-term economic and societal concerns. However, a most likely consequence
will be the spark of new chains of transmission and new epidemic flares or waves.
This will result in lengthening the outbreak, further increasing economic and societal
costs, let alone human suffering. In this light, it is interesting to note that socio-economic
analyses of the impact of emerging foreign animal disease control clearly show that
the most (cost-)effective strategies aim at reducing the length of the outbreak, which
is achieved through elimination and not mitigation [12].
Models have hinted at the need for implementing an on-and-off lock-down strategy against
COVID-19 until vaccines are available for the world population [13, 14]. Here also,
the apparent alluring advantages of imposing and lifting mitigating measures to mainly
avoid overwhelming healthcare needs while keeping life disruption to the minimum possible
are most deceiving. Such a proposal is likewise fueled by blind-folded short-term
economic and societal concerns, while insensitive to long-term human health and socio-economic
costs. As currently experienced in many countries, lifting mitigation measures without
experiencing an epidemic rebound, calls for a delicate implementation strategy that
requires costly adjustments of common practice in many sectors. For example, public
transport, shops and restaurants should function at dramatically reduced capacity,
for an as yet unknown period of time. The most vulnerable population, i.e., people
over 70 and people with underlying chronic conditions, will need to remain isolated,
with substantial health and psychological consequences. In the meantime, all hopes
are channeled towards future COVID-19 vaccines. However, the road to safe and effective
vaccines is fraught with multiple developmental and regulatory hurdles and uncertain
timelines, while their equitable distribution among those who need them most is not
guaranteed. Be it as it may, the expected advent of a vaccine cannot serve as an escape
route from taking all necessary measures to resolve the crisis today. Most countries
are increasingly entangled in largely unsustainable mitigation strategies. In view
of their inherent pitfalls, is pursuing mitigation rather than embarking on elimination
a rational position to emerge from this crisis? No, it is not.
Planning
Planning supports both preparation and positioning efforts. It is done preferably
in ‘peace time’, for example by stockpiling essential assets, implementing platform
technologies that can rapidly provide specific diagnostics, therapeutic and vaccine
leads upon a viral disease emergence, and elaborating comprehensive outbreak response
plans. Although planning in ‘peace time’ may seem expensive, the investment is manifestly
justified as an insurance policy for pandemic events with draconic economic and societal
consequences that rapidly will dwarf these costs. The blatant revelation of the limited
capacity of healthcare systems to cope with an epidemic surge of severe cases demonstrated
tragic planning deficits. The capacity for rapidly producing and deploying diagnostic
tests and critical materials, well trained personnel, and infrastructure, remains
a challenge. Even today, while lifting strategies are being outlined and planned,
the most effective test-trace-quarantine strategy is erroneously considered secondary
at best by many governments. Lifting mitigation measures with poor and non-evidenced-based
planning appears to be politically driven by economic and societal pressures, bordering
a lack of courage and determination. Can this battle be won without a thorough tactical
response built on scientific and public health intelligence? No, it cannot.
Winning the war
The positioning of most governmental strategies needs to be resolutely realigned with
elimination and not mitigation goals, while continuing to support all efforts aiming
at vaccine and drug development. The lockdown and restraint measures put in place
in most countries will eventually flatten the epidemic curve to sufficiently low levels
that create a new opportunity for successful elimination. The effective coordination
of diagnostic testing, contact tracing, and strict quarantining of all contacts of
confirmed cases must be ramped up during lockdown, before measures are lifted, and
movement and contact have increased and intensified. Only a strategic coordination
of this three-step approach (test, trace, quarantine) as maximal social distancing
measures are in place, in combination with fast, efficient and scaled-up digital contact
tracing [15], will fully leverage all the costly efforts that have been made to decrease
SARS-CoV-2 spread. This will enable governments to outpace rather than chase the virus,
towards its successful elimination. It will allow transitioning from countrywide lockdowns
to targeted quarantines. Unless governments maintain travel restrictions from and
to countries with continued circulation of SARS-CoV-2, an international cooperative
and coordinated response aligned on a shared elimination goal is imperative. Beyond
COVID-19, pandemic preparedness against future emerging viral threats must be genuinely
and purposefully addressed, likewise within an international cooperative and coordinated
framework, engaging all sectors concerned. Lastly, major societal changes are unavoidable
to drastically limit the impact of mankind on the global environment and ecosystems,
to promote the safeguarding and restoration of natural habitats while striving at
global equalities to all human fundamental rights. Unrestrained economic growth must
be reconsidered to build on more balanced and sustainable socio-economic principles.
This pandemic is giving us a wake-up call to unambiguously fight to interrupt its
spread and to conscientiously prepare for future pandemics, while offering a truly
unique opportunity to alter the course of mankind’s ecological footprint on the planet.
Let’s not waste it.