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      Sensitivity analysis of SARS-CoV-2 aerosol exposure Translated title: Sensitivitätsanalyse von SARS-CoV-2 Aerosol-Expositionen

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          Abstract

          As vaccination campaigns are in progress in most countries, hopes to win back more normality are rising. However, the exact path from a pandemic to an endemic virus remains uncertain. While in the pre-vaccination phase many critical indoor situations were avoided by strict control measures, for the transition phase a certain mitigation of the effect of indoor situations seems advisable.

          To better understand the mechanisms of indoor airborne transmissions, we present a new time-discrete model to calculate the level of exposure towards infectious SARS-CoV-2 aerosol and carry out a sensitivity analysis for the level of SARS-CoV-2 aerosol exposure in indoor settings. Time limitations and the use of any kind of masks were found to be strong mitigation measures, while how far the effort for a strict use of professional face pieces instead of simple masks can be justified by the additional reduction of the exposure dose remains unclear. Very good ventilation of indoor spaces is mandatory. The definition of sufficient ventilation in regard to airborne SARS-CoV-2 transmission follows other rules than the standards in ventilation design. This means that especially smaller rooms most likely require a significantly greater fresh air supply than usual. Further research on 50% group models in schools is suggested. The benefits of a model in which the students come to school every day, but for a limited time, should be investigated. In terms of window ventilation, it has been found that many short opening periods are not only thermally beneficial, they also reduce the exposure dose. The fresh air supply is driven by the temperature gradient and wind speed. However, the sensitivity towards these parameters is not very high and in times of low wind and temperature gradients, there are no arguments against keep windows open in order to make up for the reduced air flow rate. Long total opening periods and large window surfaces will strongly reduce the exposure. Additionally, the results underline the expectable fact that exposure doses will increase when hygiene and control measures are reduced. It seems advisable to investigate what this means for the infection rate and the fatality of infections in populations with partial immunity. Very basic considerations suggest that the value of aerosol reduction measures may be reduced with very infectious variants such as delta.

          Zusammenfassung

          In vielen Ländern schreiten die Impfkampagnen voran und die Hoffnungen auf eine Rückkehr zu mehr Normalität steigen. Trotzdem bleibt die Entwicklung von SARS-CoV-2 von einem pandemischen hin zu einem endemischen Virus weiter ungewiss. Während vor Beginn der Impfkampagnen viele kritische Situationen durch strickte Maßnahmen unterbunden wurden, scheinen in der Übergangsphase zumindest in Innenräumen abhelfende Maßnahmen angezeigt.

          Um die Mechanismen der Aerosolübertragung in Innenräumen besser zu verstehen, wird ein zeitdiskretes Modell zur Berechnung der Aerosol Exposition vorgestellt. Mit Hilfe des Modells wurde eine Sensitivitätsanalyse der Exposition in Innenräumen durchgeführt. Gesichtsmasken und eine zeitliche Limitierung von Ereignissen wurden als starke Kontrollmaßnahmen identifiziert. Ob der zusätzliche Aufwand eines obligatorischen Einsatzes von professionellen Masken in Alltagssituationen den Mehraufwand rechtfertigt, konnte nicht geklärt werden. Eine ausreichende Belüftung von Innenräumen ist zwingend notwendig. Die Definition einer ausreichenden Belüftung folgt in Hinblick auf SARS-CoV-2 Aerosol Infektionen jedoch anderen Regeln als sie sonst bei der Auslegung von Lüftungsanlagen angewendet werden. Das führt dazu, dass insbesondere kleine Räume unter Umständen eine signifikant höhere Frischluftzufuhr als sonst benötigen. Weitere Untersuchungen des Wechselunterrichts an Schulen werden vorgeschlagen. Die Vorteile eines Wechselmodells, bei dem beide Gruppen täglich aber für limitierte Zeit zum Unterricht kommen, sollten untersucht werden. Im Falle einer Fensterlüftung sind viele kurze Intervalle wenigen langen nicht nur aus thermischen Gründen vorzuziehen, sie reduzieren auch die Aerosolexposition. Die Frischluftzufuhr über Fenster wird von Wind und Temperaturunterschied angetrieben. Trotzdem ist die Sensitivität gegenüber diesen Parametern nicht extrem ausgeprägt. In Zeiten von schwachem Wind und geringen Temperaturunterschieden spricht nichts gegen eine dauerhafte Öffnung der Fenster. Lange Öffnungsperioden sowie große Fensterflächen führen jeweils zu einer starken Reduktion der Aerosolbelastung. Die Ergebnisse lassen erwartungsgemäß den Schluss zu, dass die Expositionsdosen zunehmen werden, wenn Kontroll- und Hygienemaßnahmen in der Breite reduziert werden. Welche Folgen das in einer Bevölkerung mit partieller Immunität hat, sollte weiter untersucht werden. Auf Basis rudimentärer Betrachtungen kann man, zumindest für moderate Aerosolreduktionsmaßnahmen, eine leichte Tendenz erkennen, dass die relative Wirkung solcher Maßnahmen bei der Verhinderung von Infektionen, für deutlich ansteckendere Varianten (wie z.B. Delta) etwas reduziert ist.

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          Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1

          To the Editor: A novel human coronavirus that is now named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (formerly called HCoV-19) emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019 and is now causing a pandemic. 1 We analyzed the aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 and compared it with SARS-CoV-1, the most closely related human coronavirus. 2 We evaluated the stability of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 in aerosols and on various surfaces and estimated their decay rates using a Bayesian regression model (see the Methods section in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org). SARS-CoV-2 nCoV-WA1-2020 (MN985325.1) and SARS-CoV-1 Tor2 (AY274119.3) were the strains used. Aerosols (<5 μm) containing SARS-CoV-2 (105.25 50% tissue-culture infectious dose [TCID50] per milliliter) or SARS-CoV-1 (106.75-7.00 TCID50 per milliliter) were generated with the use of a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum to create an aerosolized environment. The inoculum resulted in cycle-threshold values between 20 and 22, similar to those observed in samples obtained from the upper and lower respiratory tract in humans. Our data consisted of 10 experimental conditions involving two viruses (SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1) in five environmental conditions (aerosols, plastic, stainless steel, copper, and cardboard). All experimental measurements are reported as means across three replicates. SARS-CoV-2 remained viable in aerosols throughout the duration of our experiment (3 hours), with a reduction in infectious titer from 103.5 to 102.7 TCID50 per liter of air. This reduction was similar to that observed with SARS-CoV-1, from 104.3 to 103.5 TCID50 per milliliter (Figure 1A). SARS-CoV-2 was more stable on plastic and stainless steel than on copper and cardboard, and viable virus was detected up to 72 hours after application to these surfaces (Figure 1A), although the virus titer was greatly reduced (from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter of medium after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). The stability kinetics of SARS-CoV-1 were similar (from 103.4 to 100.7 TCID50 per milliliter after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.6 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). On copper, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 4 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours. On cardboard, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 24 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours (Figure 1A). Both viruses had an exponential decay in virus titer across all experimental conditions, as indicated by a linear decrease in the log10TCID50 per liter of air or milliliter of medium over time (Figure 1B). The half-lives of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 were similar in aerosols, with median estimates of approximately 1.1 to 1.2 hours and 95% credible intervals of 0.64 to 2.64 for SARS-CoV-2 and 0.78 to 2.43 for SARS-CoV-1 (Figure 1C, and Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix). The half-lives of the two viruses were also similar on copper. On cardboard, the half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was longer than that of SARS-CoV-1. The longest viability of both viruses was on stainless steel and plastic; the estimated median half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was approximately 5.6 hours on stainless steel and 6.8 hours on plastic (Figure 1C). Estimated differences in the half-lives of the two viruses were small except for those on cardboard (Figure 1C). Individual replicate data were noticeably “noisier” (i.e., there was more variation in the experiment, resulting in a larger standard error) for cardboard than for other surfaces (Fig. S1 through S5), so we advise caution in interpreting this result. We found that the stability of SARS-CoV-2 was similar to that of SARS-CoV-1 under the experimental circumstances tested. This indicates that differences in the epidemiologic characteristics of these viruses probably arise from other factors, including high viral loads in the upper respiratory tract and the potential for persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 to shed and transmit the virus while asymptomatic. 3,4 Our results indicate that aerosol and fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is plausible, since the virus can remain viable and infectious in aerosols for hours and on surfaces up to days (depending on the inoculum shed). These findings echo those with SARS-CoV-1, in which these forms of transmission were associated with nosocomial spread and super-spreading events, 5 and they provide information for pandemic mitigation efforts.
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            Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2: the world should face the reality

            Hand washing and maintaining social distance are the main measures recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) to avoid contracting COVID-19. Unfortunately, these measured do not prevent infection by inhalation of small droplets exhaled by an infected person that can travel distance of meters or tens of meters in the air and carry their viral content. Science explains the mechanisms of such transport and there is evidence that this is a significant route of infection in indoor environments. Despite this, no countries or authorities consider airborne spread of COVID-19 in their regulations to prevent infections transmission indoors. It is therefore extremely important, that the national authorities acknowledge the reality that the virus spreads through air, and recommend that adequate control measures be implemented to prevent further spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, in particularly removal of the virus-laden droplets from indoor air by ventilation.
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              Airborne or droplet precautions for health workers treating COVID-19?

              Abstract Cases of COVID-19 have been reported in over 200 countries. Thousands of health workers have been infected and outbreaks have occurred in hospitals, aged care facilities and prisons. World Health Organization (WHO) has issued guidelines for contact and droplet precautions for Healthcare Workers (HCWs) caring for suspected COVID-19 patients, whilst the US Centre for Disease Control (CDC) has recommended airborne precautions. The 1 – 2 m (≈3 – 6 ft) rule of spatial separation is central to droplet precautions and assumes large droplets do not travel further than 2 m (≈6 ft). We aimed to review the evidence for horizontal distance travelled by droplets and the guidelines issued by the World Health Organization (WHO), US Center for Diseases Control (CDC) and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) on respiratory protection for COVID-19. We found that the evidence base for current guidelines is sparse, and the available data do not support the 1 – 2 m (≈3 – 6 ft) rule of spatial separation. Of ten studies on horizontal droplet distance, eight showed droplets travel more than 2 m (≈6 ft), in some cases more than 8 meters (≈26 ft). Several studies of SARS-CoV-2 support aerosol transmission and one study documented virus at a distance of 4 meters (≈13 ft) from the patient. Moreover, evidence suggests infections cannot neatly be separated into the dichotomy of droplet versus airborne transmission routes. Available studies also show that SARS-CoV-2 can be detected in the air, 3 hours after aeroslisation. The weight of combined evidence supports airborne precautions for the occupational health and safety of health workers treating patients with COVID-19.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                GMS Hyg Infect Control
                GMS Hyg Infect Control
                GMS Hyg Infect Control
                GMS Hygiene and Infection Control
                German Medical Science GMS Publishing House
                2196-5226
                07 October 2021
                2021
                : 16
                : Doc28
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Delbag GmbH, Herne, Germany
                [2 ]Westphalian University of Applied Sciences, Gelsenkirchen, Germany
                Author notes
                *To whom correspondence should be addressed: Christian Redder, Delbag GmbH, Shamrockring 1, 44623 Herne, Germany, Phone: +49 2323 1476 021, E-mail: christian.redder@ 123456delbag.com
                Article
                dgkh000399 Doc28 urn:nbn:de:0183-dgkh0003993
                10.3205/dgkh000399
                8662744
                240060e8-4160-41ed-b02c-787f0f41df93
                Copyright © 2021 Redder et al.

                This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. See license information at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

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                aerosol,airborne iinfection,sars-cov-2,ventilation,face masks,air hygiene

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