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      Female cleaner fish cooperate more with unfamiliar males

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          Abstract

          Joint group membership is of major importance for cooperation in humans, and close ties or familiarity with a partner are also thought to promote cooperation in other animals. Here, we present the opposite pattern: female cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, behave more cooperatively (by feeding more against their preference) when paired with an unfamiliar male rather than with their social partner. We propose that cooperation based on asymmetric punishment causes this reversed pattern. Males are larger than and dominant to female partners and are more aggressive to unfamiliar than to familiar female partners. In response, females behave more cooperatively with unfamiliar male partners. Our data suggest that in asymmetric interactions, weaker players might behave more cooperatively with out-group members than with in-group members to avoid harsher punishment.

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          The coevolution of parochial altruism and war.

          Altruism-benefiting fellow group members at a cost to oneself-and parochialism-hostility toward individuals not of one's own ethnic, racial, or other group-are common human behaviors. The intersection of the two-which we term "parochial altruism"-is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective because altruistic or parochial behavior reduces one's payoffs by comparison to what one would gain by eschewing these behaviors. But parochial altruism could have evolved if parochialism promoted intergroup hostilities and the combination of altruism and parochialism contributed to success in these conflicts. Our game-theoretic analysis and agent-based simulations show that under conditions likely to have been experienced by late Pleistocene and early Holocene humans, neither parochialism nor altruism would have been viable singly, but by promoting group conflict, they could have evolved jointly.
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            Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors?

            Since Darwin, intergroup hostilities have figured prominently in explanations of the evolution of human social behavior. Yet whether ancestral humans were largely "peaceful" or "warlike" remains controversial. I ask a more precise question: If more cooperative groups were more likely to prevail in conflicts with other groups, was the level of intergroup violence sufficient to influence the evolution of human social behavior? Using a model of the evolutionary impact of between-group competition and a new data set that combines archaeological evidence on causes of death during the Late Pleistocene and early Holocene with ethnographic and historical reports on hunter-gatherer populations, I find that the estimated level of mortality in intergroup conflicts would have had substantial effects, allowing the proliferation of group-beneficial behaviors that were quite costly to the individual altruist.
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              Parochial altruism in humans.

              Social norms and the associated altruistic behaviours are decisive for the evolution of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order, and they affect family life, politics and economic interactions. However, as altruistic norm compliance and norm enforcement often emerge in the context of inter-group conflicts, they are likely to be shaped by parochialism--a preference for favouring the members of one's ethnic, racial or language group. We have conducted punishment experiments, which allow 'impartial' observers to punish norm violators, with indigenous groups in Papua New Guinea. Here we show that these experiments confirm the prediction of parochialism. We found that punishers protect ingroup victims--who suffer from a norm violation--much more than they do outgroup victims, regardless of the norm violator's group affiliation. Norm violators also expect that punishers will be lenient if the latter belong to their social group. As a consequence, norm violations occur more often if the punisher and the norm violator belong to the same group. Our results are puzzling for evolutionary multi-level selection theories based on selective group extinction as well as for theories of individual selection; they also indicate the need to explicitly examine the interactions between individuals stemming from different groups in evolutionary models.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Proc Biol Sci
                Proc. Biol. Sci
                RSPB
                royprsb
                Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
                The Royal Society
                0962-8452
                1471-2954
                22 June 2012
                22 February 2012
                22 February 2012
                : 279
                : 1737
                : 2479-2486
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Genetics, Evolution and Environment, simpleUniversity College London , Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK
                [2 ]Institute of Zoology, simpleZoological Society London , Regent's Park, London, NW1 4RY, UK
                [3 ]School of Biological Sciences, simpleThe University of Queensland , Queensland 4072, Australia
                [4 ]Department of Zoology, simpleUniversité de Neuchâtel , Rue Emilie Argand 11, 2007 Neuchâtel, Switzerland
                Author notes
                [* ]Author for correspondence ( n.raihani@ 123456ucl.ac.uk ).
                Article
                rspb20120063
                10.1098/rspb.2012.0063
                3350686
                22357262
                72bc1eba-1e93-433c-b55f-3f9616c3582b
                This journal is © 2012 The Royal Society

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

                History
                : 10 January 2012
                : 30 January 2012
                Categories
                1001
                14
                70
                60
                Research Articles

                Life sciences
                punishment,prisoner's dilemma,cleaning behaviour,cooperation,mutualism
                Life sciences
                punishment, prisoner's dilemma, cleaning behaviour, cooperation, mutualism

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