

ARMED OR BURNT BY FIRE? THE LEBANESE MARONITE CHURCH NAVIGATES FRENCH COLONIAL POLICIES, 1935

Malek Abisaab

Abstract: This article sheds light on the development in the relationship between the Lebanese Maronite church and the French colonial authorities during the mid-1930s. It focuses on the confrontational stance of the church toward the French under the leadership of Patriarch Antoine 'Arida (1863-1955). I delineate 'Arida's resistance to the imposition of the tobacco monopoly, the Régie, and his diplomatic and political maneuvers, culminating with the 1935 popular uprising against the French, which cut across Muslim and Christian lines. Through the analysis of French archival documents and reports, I argue that the deterioration in Maronite-French relations was primarily caused by the colonial mapping of Grand Liban and its disruptive consequences for Mount Lebanon's leadership and economy. With the French imposition of the tobacco monopoly, the conflict took the form of a nationalist resistance against the French. Ultimately, the Maronite Church pursued a delicate balance between the interests of its parish and commitments to the French. The crisis sparked a critique of the French colonial logic, pushing the Maronite Church and the nationalist Lebanese elite to struggle for independence from the French.

Keywords: orientalism, colonialism, nationalism, economic monopoly, the Maronite Church, uprising

In 1935, the French authorities in Grand Liban (1920-43) re-imposed the Régie tobacco monopoly on Syria and Lebanon unleashing a wave of labor demonstrations by tobacco farmers and workers that turned into a wide national and anticolonial opposition to the French Mandate and its economic policies in the region. This article examines the role played by Patriarch Antoine 'Arida (1863-1955), the head of the Lebanese Maronite Church and a former ally of the French in the national political resistance to the French. 'Arida's leading role in this national movement was met by diverse French responses in Grand Liban and France starting with a dismissal of the economic setback to Lebanese entrepreneurs and businessmen caused by the Régie monopoly and ending with the dismantling of 'Arida's power base and tarnishing his clerical reputation. A close examination of the conflict reveals new layers about the Maronite elite's relationship to the French colonial

Malek Abisaab is a Professor of modern history of the Middle East at McGill University, Montréal, QC, Canada.

officers and to their own national partners, namely, the Lebanese Muslims. Against the prevalent emphasis on the harmonious and stable bonds between the French architects of Grand Liban and the Maronite community, the article brings to the fore the growing differences and disagreements between an important segment of the Maronite elite represented by 'Arida and the French colonial powers.¹ It also discloses the increasing restlessness of a group of Maronite entrepreneurs and clerical leaders due to decline in their economic profits following their integration into Grand Liban, thus expressing “nostalgia” for Petit Liban or the *mutasarrifiyya* (Règlement Organique, 1864-1918). The conflict between 'Arida and the French captured the uncertainties facing the Maronite elite in the transition from one historical reality to another. The first one was defined by the *mutasarrifiyya*, which led to the hegemony of a commercial Christian elite in Mount Lebanon and Beirut. This elite enjoyed exclusive socio-political privileges and was nurtured and protected by a conglomerate of European capitalists. The second historical reality was a broader configuration of power that went beyond Mount Lebanon and involved the annexation of several geographical areas with their diverse Muslim populations to Grand Liban. The new national entity, namely, Grand Liban, shared central political experiences with the Arab world and depended on the economic needs of Arab markets, especially Arab Muslim businessmen and consumers. The national ideology of Grand Liban thus depended in no small way on reconciling a local Christian vision of Lebanon to a multi-local Arab Muslim one. 'Arida's confrontation with the French throws light on all these complex features that marked the experiences of the Maronite elites.

France and Lebanon: The Historical Narrative

The prevalent scholarship on the French colonial period in Lebanon, known as the Mandate (1920-43), stresses Maronite loyalty to the French, and the clergy's conformity to French economic and political plans. Libanist discourse itself had emphasized the view that the Maronites relied on the French for “protection” as Christian minorities in the Arab Middle East. Deep “cultural” and “historical” ties compelled France to preserve the integrity of Grand Liban (and earlier Mount Lebanon) as a haven for Christians.² A multifaceted and nuanced account of the interests and sensibilities of Maronite leaders at the time reveals the tensions and ambiguities in their relations with the French. French colonial strategy and economic investments were significant in shaping these relations. Their role, however, has to be gauged in connection to internal factors in the Lebanese context and local responses.³

Albert Hourani writes of France's “special interests in the Levant,” which culminated in its Mandate over Syria and Lebanon.⁴ These interests included

curbing Arab nationalism, solidifying traditional or “potential” ties with “Francophile elements” and “strengthening the position of Lebanon vis-à-vis the interior,” that is, the Muslim countries.⁵ As this study shows, these “Francophile elements” had their distinct set of priorities and were under pressure to build mutual interest and national ties with local Muslim communities. The French were also bent on accommodating shifts in the relationship between Maronite leaders and their counterparts in the Druze, Shiite, and Sunni communities. Kamal Salibi also argued that, “France came to Lebanon to protect its Maronite friends and their interests.”⁶ There was no clear agreement, however, between the French and Maronite leaders over the details and scope of these interests. Salibi suggested that the French administration, through what was called the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was determined to help the Lebanese nationalists achieve their goal—an independent Lebanon. The interests of France he noted concurred with those of “her Maronite friends” because the French needed a friendly Lebanon with a Christian majority as the base for their foreign policy in Syria, and the “Maronites” wanted French protection for the new country against Arabism and the Muslim majority.⁷ Stephen Hemsley Longrigg argues that the French were not merely seeking imperial domination and profit from their rule in Grand Liban but were nurturing a “trusteeship” and a “civilizing mission” in order to produce “a regime which they and the world could approve [of] and admire.”⁸ Indeed, the Orientalist and colonial elements of French rule are evident in the Libanist discourse. Yet the strained relationship between segments of the Maronite elite and the French authorities revealed the problems and ambiguities facing the above “trusteeship” and the “civilizing mission” which devolved primarily to this elite. Members of the Maronite community and the Church came to pursue a delicate balance between their local interests, their commitments to the French, and the “co-existence” with the Muslims. Mas’ud Dahir argued that Patriarch ’Arida’s opposition to the Régie was part of a “national project” for Lebanon demanding “complete independence of Lebanon; alliance with Syria and the Arab world without severance of cultural, political and economic ties with the West, especially France.”⁹ This assessment, however, is hardly supported by the evidence and the context of ’Arida’s confrontation with the French, which I will examine here.

The fortunes of the Maronite leaders—particularly the clergy—were closely associated with the special political status and unique administrative qualities given to Mount Lebanon under the *mutasarrifiyya*. The latter was established when the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia promulgated the Règlement Organique in 1864, which granted Mount Lebanon “self-rule.” The Règlement Organique agreement ended the civil war between the Maronite Christians and the Muslim Druze. At the same time, it exempted the warring factions from paying to the Ottoman government taxes on mail-stamps,

salt, liquor, fishing, silk, and planting tobacco. The people of Mount Lebanon were also exempt from military service. A non-Lebanese Christian Ottoman ruler assisted by an administrative council of local dignitaries presided over the affairs of Mount Lebanon. These favorable economic and social conditions, however, did not wipe out the memory of communal fear and violence, which emerged from the civil wars. Rather, they encouraged the Maronite elite to hold fast to their privileges all the while as they became preoccupied if not obsessed with “security” and “guarantees” against the Muslims in general and the Druze in particular.¹⁰ To protect their important place in this “balance” of communities or “sects,” the Maronite elite cultivated religious bonds with the French and political ties as well.

Lebanon, the French, and the Maronite Clergy

The French paid close attention to the leanings and politics of the Maronite clergy. The prevalent sentiment among the Christian clergy was that Lebanon should remain a Christian country, not a country with Christians living in it. They expected the French to help them achieve this goal, but instead they found themselves reluctantly supporting the new Lebanese polity with its heterogeneous demographic composition. In 1923, the Maronite bourgeoisie and landed elite feared that Grand Liban too would become part of a greater national entity. They dreaded that Henri Gouraud, the French General and High Commissioner, might compromise the country’s territorial and economic integrity. Patriarch Ilyas Peter Huwayyik, the head of the Maronite Church from 1899 to 1931, delivered a speech in the presence of Gouraud, expressing his outrage at Gouraud’s alleged preference for a federation joining Syria and Lebanon. Huwayyik threatened rebellion if the French were to pursue this plan. The Patriarch’s speech and its harsh tone infuriated Gouraud, who considered himself no less than “the father” of Lebanon and an advocate of its integrity. In reaction, Gouraud denounced Yusuf Sawda and accused him of spreading this presumably false information about French aims.¹¹

In the 1930s, the tensions built up between the French and the Maronite clergy over the former’s geographical and economic organization of Grand Liban. Prominent leaders argued that the formation of Grand Liban undermined the economic and political privileges which the Maronites enjoyed under the *mutasarrifiyya*.¹² Apparently, even the special privileges accorded to the Maronites and inscribed in the constitution did not match the rewards from the *mutasarrifiyya*. Maronite unease with Grand Liban continued, and new challenges surfaced. One such challenge was the attachment of Sidon and Jabal ’Amil (south Lebanon), with their Muslim majority, to the new polity.¹³ The Maronites feared that such a demographic diversity would jeopardize their political representation and control. Maronite President Emile Eddé (1936-41) for one encouraged the

administrative breakup of Syria into small sectarian states similar to the states created by the French in 1920-21. Eddé was referring to the states of Grand Liban or modern Lebanon, the 'Alawite, the Jabal al-Duruz, Aleppo, Damascus, and the Sanjak of Alexandretta. The French hoped to prevent the development of a common national culture or unity against their rule. Eddé advised the French to keep the Muslim peoples divided in order to guarantee a Christian dominance in Greater Syria. French considerations, however, involved balancing their vital colonial interests with the demographic and geographical complexity of Greater Syria. This complexity was quickly reduced to sectarian and provincial zones of power and competition. In the state of Grand Liban, the Muslim communities comprised almost 50% of the total population.¹⁴ If Grand Liban was to become a viable mandatory state for the French in the Levant, it could not survive on the basis of its Christian population, including the Maronites who formed half of this population.¹⁵ Until 1933, 'Arida supported the view that Lebanon should be a Christian state.¹⁶ Even if 'Arida's aspirations for a "Christian" state did not change, practical considerations forced him and other Maronite leaders to draw vital alliances with Muslim leaders in defense of common economic interests and in opposition to the threat of French capitalist projects as the case of the tobacco monopoly demonstrates.

Tobacco, the French, and the People of Mount Lebanon

The production of tobacco became a significant element in the economic life of Lebanese farmers starting in the late nineteenth century. The liberal economic policies during the *mutassarifiyya* encouraged the planting and making of tobacco, which rapidly spread in most villages and towns of Mount Lebanon. Then in 1924, the French mandatory powers introduced a policy to "modernize" the Syrian and Lebanese industries, taking steps to facilitate the importation of industrial machinery exempt from customs duties, and opened the market for European capitalists to invest in the Levant.¹⁷ As far as the tobacco industry is concerned, the French ended the monopoly of the old Ottoman Régie and liberalized tobacco production in 1929. They launched a fiscal system, known as the *banderole*, mainly to organize cultivating, manufacturing of cigarettes, and trade of tobacco and ultimately to levy taxes on production and consumption of cigarettes.¹⁸ The tobacco industry, nonetheless, flourished to an extent that no less than 200 new tobacco factories sprang up in Mount Lebanon alone. Only 30 of these factories, mostly owned by Christians, were considered by the French as "principal manufacturers" of cigarettes with large enterprises that had more than one branch in the area.¹⁹ Meanwhile, a big multi-national foreign firm, the Libano-Syrian Company of Tobacco, enjoyed a hegemonic position and purchased the assets

and the trademarks of the tobacco brands that belonged to the defunct Ottoman Régie.²⁰ In addition, it acquired a license from the mandatory government to export its products to the French market and enjoyed a reduced tariff granted by the government in Paris. Furthermore, it expanded its trade with a number of European countries and with Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine.²¹ Its global standing had a devastating effect on the emerging local tobacco companies to an extent that only five firms outlived the severe conditions resulting from the competition.²² Experiencing the brunt of relentless economic competition, the Christian elite of Mount Lebanon, the Maronite Church, and the tobacco investors and their affiliates resisted the French imposition of economic or fiscal innovations and considered them to be an attack on the local economy.²³ They particularly opposed the tobacco monopoly project, which the French proposed as an alternative to the “chaotic” liberal system. The ostensible justification of the French for the tobacco monopoly was the treasury’s need for additional revenues to feed the expanding bureaucracy in the countries under their mandate.²⁴ They argued that the monopoly and tight control of revenues coming from tobacco were essential procedures as far as their rule would go. French officials in Paris settled this matter with little regard for the impact it would have on the lives and interests of their sympathizers, which included thousands of Lebanese families who considered France “their protector.” Ultimately and against the objections of the people of Mount Lebanon, Comte de Martel, the French High Commissioner, announced in November 1934 that the French authorities were determined to put the whole process of tobacco production under state monopoly.²⁵ A year later, De Martel granted a private European company the exclusive right to cultivate tobacco, make cigarettes, and buy and sell tobacco in Lebanon and Syria.²⁶ The indifference of the French to the demands of the tobacco growers, the industrialists, and the Maronite church reveals the discrepancies in the visions of the economic arrangements and decision-making power in Lebanon. The Maronite clerical leadership found that their hopes of achieving a sovereign status for Lebanon meant that they had to navigate at times against their ally’s imperial interests.

The conflict between the French and the Maronite church with its economic and geopolitical dimensions departs from the depiction by Ussama Makdisi of French activities in Mount Lebanon as a “gentle crusade.”²⁷ Makdisi, brushing aside the role of French investors, military leaders, and diplomats underlined the role of “Western writers, travelers, missionaries, painters, and poets” in bending the Lebanese to their will without coercion or military force. He adds that the French advanced their interests “primarily through the pen and paintbrush rather than the sword and musket.”²⁸ Obviously, political economy was a vital area of contention involving French coercion, military threat, and economic pressure. The limitation of Makdisi’s assessment lies in the separation it draws between

spheres of culture, the economy, legal regulation, and politics, all of which were interconnected in shaping the broad historical process leading to French ascendancy in Mount Lebanon.

Makdisi perceived the colonial encounter in nineteenth-century Lebanon as “less a relation of power mediated by various degrees of resistance than a location of cultural interaction—a “contact zone”—consciously exploited by the natives for their own material benefit.”²⁹ This depiction assumes that the diverse constituents of this zone, that is, its multiple actors, have equal access to the means and tools of economic and cultural capital. It assumes that material benefit was open to all and enhanced by certain cultural discourses and symbolisms. The “contact zone” framework presents the various relations of the natives to the French as a “transaction” initiated by the two parties simultaneously as they agree to use it for their advantage. Obviously, there were advantages for the Christian elites over their Muslim counterparts, and there were in turn limits as to what the Maronite Christian leadership could achieve, as the options offered to it were restricted by French capitalist interests. Negotiation, conformity, and resistance all appear to be part of the colonial experience in Mount Lebanon, revealing the centrality of the structure of power and economic relations to the cultural exchanges between colonizers and colonized.

The Opposition of the Régie, the Condescending French, and Patriarch 'Arida

Patriarch 'Arida championed a nationwide campaign against the tobacco monopoly which persisted for months after the establishment of the Régie on January 30, 1935. It was a peaceful campaign reflecting 'Arida's determined drive toward an independent Lebanon against an imperial power. It cut across Muslim and Christian lines and galvanized the support of the nationalist movement in Syria where thousands of Syrians took to the streets of Damascus after a Friday prayer shouting, *La Ilaha Illa'llah*, *'Arida Habibullah* (No God but God and 'Arida is God's friend). 'Arida's political campaign represented a group of tobacco industrialists and farmers whose interests were not featured in the French design of Grand Liban which, on the contrary, accommodated the interests of a Lebanese mercantile (comprador) class. The latter were integrated into the world economy and consequently were incorporated into a division of labor which tied the economy of Lebanon with the fields of banking, services, transportation, and tourism.³⁰ Plans and policies for industrial and agricultural developments, the two major productive sectors in any economy, were not the major concern of the French-Lebanese consortium who worked to literally turn Lebanon into the “Switzerland of the East,” with a free and secure banking system that would

attract Arab capital to the Lebanese haven. The opposition of 'Arida partially represented, in my opinion, a hope by an industrialist group who attempted to preserve a nascent industrial base which was flourishing after the demise of the silk industry. This hope was killed by the monopolistic policies of the French in Lebanon that catered to the interests of local and international capitalists.

The French were disturbed and surprised by the highly discontented opposition, which was led and motivated by their "allies," those least expected to stand up against them. The Patriarch launched a campaign to prohibit smoking, declaring that it was hazardous to one's health and also harmful to national pride. Bonfires were prepared in villages and towns where smokers disposed of their cigarettes. The women performed ululations (*zagharid*) and a *dabki* folkloric dance in defiance of the monopoly. Students emerged from their schools to join the protesters, chanting songs. In Beirut and other cities, they distributed pamphlets saying, "Prove to the world that you do not accept injury and violations against your nation's dignity caused by one person [Comte De Martel]. Boycott the Régie's cigarettes to quit smoking."³¹ In several towns with a Christian majority such as Jounieh, Hammana, and Wadi Shahrur, people started mock funeral processions carrying a coffin covered with a black sheet representing the Régie. On the sheet, the following statement was written: "A Bas le Monopole" (Down with the Monopole). Lebanese women in the Feminist Union, an obscure organization, founded the Committee for the Advancement of the Moral Order, which distributed leaflets condemning the policy of the French. It called on mothers as the "guardians of morality," to protect their families from the evils of tobacco.³² They declared,

An exhausted nation enslaved by cigarettes is a nation whose youth cannot conceive the hope of building with their own hands, a free and respected nation.

Oh women of this cherished city [Beirut], the Feminist Union calls upon you—amidst such dangerous moral disorder—to lead the way for a true life, free of any moral disgrace that can touch the youth. Oh mothers, safeguard the morality of your children and prevent them from attending places of amusement, which undermine proper education. Cultivate the flowers of the nation and support the Feminist Union's fight against alcohol and tobacco.³³

Hundreds of letters and petitions from Lebanon and all regions of the Lebanese diaspora poured into the French government in Paris rejecting the Régie and its anticipated damage to the economy. The French-Lebanese police attacked the processions and arrested scores of people. The French started a propaganda campaign to convince the Lebanese public of the existence of a secret agreement between the Syrian National Bloc and 'Arida. It focused on a belief that the two aimed to unite Lebanon and Syria into one country.³⁴ This was meant to discredit 'Arida in the eyes of the Lebanese and damage his reputation among Mount

Lebanon's Christians who aspired to live in an independent country. Indeed, the French publicized the view that the Syrian National Bloc planned a conspiracy against the French in reaction to the latter's suspension of the Syrian constitution. The National Bloc leaders, the French claimed, manipulated the fragile situation in Grand Liban and tried to damage the relationship between the French and the Christian communities in Lebanon, who were the "natural clients of France."³⁵ The French perceived the cross-communal and cross-class opposition to the Régie a sign of an independent Lebanese nationalist awareness that would ultimately threaten their colonial policy in the Levant and North Africa. Nonetheless, 'Arida's leadership assumed popular national dimensions as he rose against the French on "behalf of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples."³⁶

The French reports draw out hierarchies of colonial subjects and point to the ambiguities in the status of pro-French subjects like the Maronites. Maronite leaders were as such reminded of their subordination and "inferiority" to the French only to defy them and insist on their modern Francophone identity and hence challenge the relations of imperialism. French condescension was reflected in a number of reports describing the ascendancy of Monsieur 'Arida to the Seat of the Maronite Patriarchy in 1932. It seems that the French High Commissioner, Comte De Martel, had not been in favor of Patriarch 'Arida since day one of the latter's rise to the Patriarchal Seat. Slurs and pejorative terms such as "stubborn," "pretty Oriental," "weak," and "impotent" are only a few phrases used by De Martel to characterize 'Arida to his superiors at the Foreign Ministry in Paris. The phrases could also suggest a perception of the colonized which commonly included qualities such as passivity, stupidity, or at least deficient ability of abstract thought and logical argument, and ultimately dependency on the French or another outside power. It would logically follow that 'Arida and the people he represented were inferior and incapable of performing certain roles because of inherited ethnic failings.

De Martel reported that 'Arida was elected to the Patriarchal Seat simply because he was a marginal member at the 1932 conclave which met to choose a successor to Patriarch Ilyas Peter al-Huwayyik (1843-1931). According to De Martel, during the tense conclave of 1932, 'Arida was elected not for his credentials and qualifications but simply because, in addition to his old age, he belonged to the separatist group, or the group that was in favor of the autonomy of the Eastern Churches, that opposed the partisans of the Roman allegiance. However, it is not clear in the report where the French colonial authorities stood in this polarization.

The French report cherishes the policies of Msgr. Huwayyik, the predecessor of Msgr. Arida, who, they believed, had enjoyed a great prestige in Lebanon as a whole. Huwayyik was officially elected in 1899, and in the eyes of the French, he "was the lively representative of the Maronite tradition of the pre-war period,"

and with the support of the French, “he stood firm against the Turkish oppressors.” Moreover, he was confirmed as the leader of his nation at the 1919 Conference of the League of Nations during which Huwayyik was decisive in obtaining the French Mandate on Lebanon.

The French official believes that the transition from Huwayyik to 'Arida was a difficult process as the latter was not ready to occupy the position. As the archbishop of Tripoli for long years, the report states that 'Arida made himself known as an honorable bishop, living a perfectly dignified life, known “by his very big charity to the famished populations during and immediately after the war” [he sold his cross to feed the hungry during the WWI famine]. 'Arida was also recognized, as the reports finds, by his interest in economic affairs which led him to take an active role in the founding of two considerable businesses the society of Lebanese Cement and the Hydro-electric Utility of Kadisha. Here, the French report notes that 'Arida failed in running these two companies because he lacked any administrative or business skill, and ultimately, the two enterprises were driven to bankruptcy. What rescued these companies from this fatal situation, according to the report, was the timely “intervention of foreign capital.” Moreover, 'Arida himself, as the president of the administrative councils of these companies, was also saved from the potential resulting lawsuits he could have been subjected to. One concludes from this account that 'Arida, the good hearted and honorable bishop, did not enjoy entrepreneurial talent, as did foreign capitalists, and consequently, he should have confined his activities to religious matters. What if 'Arida wanted to protect a nascent national industry from foreign hegemony? We do not expect to find an answer from the French report.

The assistants of 'Arida are also weak and corrupt according to De Martel who finds that 'Arida, who had never intervened in general communal affairs “suddenly was found to lead a divided and the least disciplined episcopate which voted for him.” He was surrounded by incompetent and suspicious assistants, such as Msgr Khoury, who was the unfortunate candidate for the Patriarchal Seat and enjoyed limited confidence from 'Arida. 'Arida replaced him with Msgr Akl, “an intriguing [read devious] prelate, of a rudimentary culture and accessible particularly to the temptation of any kind.”

The French high commissioner thinks that 'Arida was captured by the prestigious reputation that his predecessor Patriarch Huwayyik had gained. The latter became a national hero for all Lebanese when he consistently campaigned, locally and internationally, for Lebanon's independence. Thus, 'Arida, the “very respectable, ... real Francophile,” but nonetheless, “narrow minded and stubborn,” wanted to continue the same line of action as his predecessor. Consequently, and from the perspective of the French governor, 'Arida's actions had to be prestigious, could not fall short of his predecessor's, and to achieve this, he must intervene in all

political or administrative matters nationwide. The outcome, De Martel continues, was disappointing because “Bad service by [’Arida’s] insufficient preparation, ... the absence of his critical spirit and his more than mediocre entourage ... in fact [’Arida] is the toy of this entourage who were concerned in a bigger share in material life.”

The report then discusses the inability of ’Arida to lead in grand affairs. He glaringly failed in bringing together his community in 1932 and to make them agree on a single candidate for presidency. This weakness allowed a Muslim figure to run for presidency, but he was not elected.³⁷ Moreover, in 1933, ’Arida could not prevent Msgr Moubarrak from delivering fierce speeches against the government intended to create public disorder. On the contrary, ’Arida’s interventions in the small affairs were “so frequent that they were inefficient and did not increase the patriarchal authority over his people,” De Martel writes.

’Arida’s associates were not spared from the harsh assessment of the High Commissioner, who thought that the Patriarch was alienated from his community and did not have solid and lively contacts with society at large. De Martel found that ’Arida, who did not leave his residence, only contacted the external world through his “non objective entourage or through discontented visitors who come to complain to him and to obtain some favors.” According to De Martel, this explained ’Arida’s lack of touch with reality.

De Martel’s concluding remarks are deterministic as he asserts that “It seems hopeless to change the position of the Patriarch on any affair once he takes a stand,” but if the decision to establish the tobacco monopoly were enforced and became an “accomplished fact,” ’Arida would not go against it. In other words, the French thought that because “Orientals” believe in *al-Qada’wa al-Qadar* (Fate and Destiny), they need change or cancel their plans to impose the tobacco monopoly as, from the perspective of the “Orientals,” it would become a *fait accompli* and, consequently, would be accepted by them as a destiny.

The French, the Tobacco Protest, and the “Syrian Conspiracy”

The French reports and correspondences covering the popular national protests against the Régie in 1935-36 contained diverse and contradictory elements. The reports agree that massive protests were triggered by De Martel’s decision to re-instate the tobacco monopoly. Only a few reports, however, include the full demands of the peasants and workers and the slogans raised by them throughout Syrian and Lebanese cities. For the most part, protesters appear in these reports as misguided and driven by the false claims of Patriarch ’Arida, a powerful man and an icon of Maronite success in Mount Lebanon. Some reports embellished ’Arida’s indifference to the welfare of common people.³⁸

Some French reports considered the opposition leaders misinformed about the nature of the Régie, having acted upon “tendentious information” received from Beirut and Damascus.³⁹ The resistance to the Régie, one report noted, was not “founded on arguments about economic or fiscal stability.”⁴⁰ Rather, it was an expression of private interest and individualism, which overlooked collective benefit and rose in protest when “struck by a measure of public order.”⁴¹ These reports added that the Lebanese would end their opposition to the tobacco monopoly if they only understood the latter’s significance in generating state revenues. They complained that their explanations fell on deaf ears because “the Patriarch does not reason, neither does his people.”⁴² To prop up their private interests, anti-Régie protesters (like ʿArida) used propaganda and public agitation to rally wide sectors of society against the French.

The French claims that Patriarch ʿArida received encouragement from the Syrian nationalists who rejected French partition of Greater Syria and the creation of Grand Liban and who had found common cause with ʿArida on the question of the monopoly.⁴³ As soon as it became known that the tobacco monopoly would be re-instated, reports continue to declare, Khalil Maatouk, a major Syrian financier and holder of the Persian tobacco monopoly, tried unsuccessfully to secure his ownership of the concession. Meanwhile, Maatouk spread bitter nationalist sentiments against the French.⁴⁴ He did not own a factory or agricultural terrains in Lebanon or Syria, so he tried to join forces with tobacco manufacturers including ʿArida, and persuaded the latter to oppose the French monopoly.⁴⁵ As such, French reports highlighted the role of Maatouk in bringing ʿArida to the resistance side, but they also insisted that ʿArida had exploited the resistance for his own political ends.⁴⁶ This picture challenges the conclusions which Meir Zamir, a modern historian, advanced about the conflict between the French and the Maronite Libanists. Zamir argued that at its root, the conflict was a personal “quarrel” between ʿArida and De Martel, which revealed the former’s “naiveté and vanity.” Zamir insists, for instance, that ʿArida’s role in the opposition was the outcome of the manipulations of the Syrian nationalists. These observations do not accord with the French reports which present ʿArida as a calculating maverick. The Syrian nationalists, the French complained, were waiting for an opportunity to exploit the differences between France and its “Christian clientele in Lebanon.”⁴⁷ Notwithstanding, neither the view that ʿArida was manipulated by others or that he was the instigator illuminates the full context of the French-Maronite conflict. Both depictions overlook the significant socio-economic and political shifts experienced by the Maronite leadership in Mount Lebanon after the formation of Grand Liban.

Unlike the leaders of the Muslim opposition, ʿArida’s dissidence comes after a tradition of cordial relations with the French. The latter painted him as a self-seeking

opportunist who resented the failure of his business enterprises and the flourishing of the concessionary foreign companies.⁴⁸ The two large companies established by 'Arida derived their entire capital from Lebanese resources. With an incompetent personnel and administration, a French report stated that the companies floundered and came to pass to foreign capitalists.⁴⁹

In 'Arida's eyes, the High Commissioner had confiscated "the last resource of the country" for the benefit of French financiers.⁵⁰ 'Arida opposed foreign investments in the Lebanese economy, especially in sectors considered beneficial and viable for national capitalists. 'Arida continued to insist on the cultural and religious affinities between "Lebanon" and France, but he saw the founding of a strong state under Maronite leadership a major gain for French interests in the Levant. He expected the French to reciprocate the anticipated benefits. On their part, the French reminded 'Arida of their "obligations" to the Muslim and Christian population living outside Mount Lebanon and Beirut. The Maronites, a French official angrily pointed out, expected the French to support "their extravagant privileges beyond the [limits] of common law."⁵¹

In a crafty but revealing statement, 'Arida summarized the paradoxes of Maronite-French relations to a surprised French diplomat, reflecting that "France is like a fire. It can warm you up, but you cannot get close to it for fear that you might burn!"⁵² At a distance, France could be a source of warmth. It was also a wrathful power capable of destroying those who dare transgress the boundaries of its colonial interests. There could be no intimate or secure relationship with France, 'Arida seemed to imply.

Allies or Clients: The French Orientalist Discourse

French Orientalist discourse stressed the noble task of the French in bringing enlightenment and progress to an indolent "East."⁵³ The French colonizer, Albert Memmi reflected, perceived the colonized as in need of "protection":

From this comes the concept of a protectorate. It is in the colonized own interest that he be excluded from management functions, and that those heavy responsibilities be reserved for the colonizer. Whenever the colonizer adds, in order not to fall prey to anxiety, that the colonized is a wicked, backward person with evil, thievish, somewhat sadistic instincts, he thus justifies his police and his legitimate severity. After all, he must defend himself against the dangerous foolish acts of the irresponsible, and at the same time-what meritorious concern!-protect him against himself.⁵⁴

Yet this "canonic Orientalist paradigm" does not easily accord with the French approach to their Maronite subjects. Depictions of a "barbaric" or "depraved" subject hardly appear in the French reports dealing with 'Arida or the Maronite

elite. A few times, the “irrationality” of the Lebanese protestors is contrasted to the “noble” civilizing goals of France.⁵⁵ The reports also point occasionally to the tenacious and unreasonable position of ʿArida and Mount Lebanon’s leaders. True also, the Maronite elite was excluded from “management functions” and protected from “heavy responsibilities” relating to the tobacco monopoly.⁵⁶ Yet in the case of the silk industry, the French included the Syrian-Lebanese Christian entrepreneurs in their business ventures. The Maronite elite, in particular, was considered able and willing to “progress” along European lines.

Aside from ʿArida’s “maneuvers,” the French reports discuss at length the expectations of Mount Lebanon’s Christian leaders, throwing light on the changing reality of French-Maronite relations. One report noted that the “psychological and sentimental” dispositions of the peoples and leaders of Mount Lebanon provided a fertile ground for the growth of a national uprising.⁵⁷ These dispositions were tied to the exceptional benefits Mount Lebanon enjoyed:

[A] region of half-Maronite, half-Druze population, was created as an autonomous district, in order to provide effective protection for the minorities residing in it against persecution from the surrounding Syrian Sunnite majority and against all potential schemes of the Ottoman Government itself ... According to this status, Mount Lebanon enjoyed far-ranging privileges. It was exempted from Empire Taxes and military service, paying only the expenses of its own administration and police. To this end a budget was established and managed by a governor, assisted by an administrative council. The Ottoman Government, which received no part of the collected local taxes, still had to pay for the potential deficit in this separate budget.⁵⁸

The French mandatory authority tried to safeguard the autonomy of Grand Liban, extend its frontiers, and turn it into a viable state:

To the old Mount Lebanon were added the coastal region from Nakoura to Tripoli, the Southern Lebanon, and the Biqaʿ, and the granaries of the country which the Lebanese of Mount Lebanon had claimed since the beginning.⁵⁹

The old Mount Lebanon (or the *mutasarrifiyya*), the French tried to argue, was living “in seclusion under the double protection of the [Ottoman] Empire and the Powers” and did not cover any part of the expenses related to its own security, infrastructure, or communication networks.⁶⁰ After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the peoples of Mount Lebanon found the payment of these expenses burdensome.⁶¹ The Maronite leaders may have also faced additional expenses, resulting from the expansion of Grand Liban and the addition of new territories. The report implied that the expectations of “the Lebanese” or more specifically the people of Mount Lebanon, namely, the preservation of their old privileges

and exemptions were unrealistic. France established Grand Liban and as such, the French (alone), they seemed to think, were responsible for its expenses.⁶²

Evidently, the French discourse about delivering long-awaited freedoms to Christian and Muslim minorities previously “oppressed” and “persecuted” under the Ottomans faced distinct challenges. In one report, a French official argues that the Lebanese people regret that their country is no longer part of the Ottoman Empire. They also yearn for the “old days” when their neighbors envied them, saying “happy is he who possesses a goat’s cot in Lebanon [Mount Lebanon].”⁶³ French reports noted that feelings of loss among Lebanese leaders led to anti-French attitudes. They do not, however, provide all the motives for these attitudes. These leaders resented the foreign companies’ control over the country’s natural resources, labor, and profits. The French denied that the Maronite elite possessed the administrative and entrepreneurial abilities required for such capitalist projects:

In fact, the indigenou, whether this term denotes the state or the people(s), have no capital, no technical competencies, and no management skills that average companies need. New concessions were thus given to a French bank in order to issue currencies and to French groups in order to conduct the necessary studies, works and new public services.⁶⁴

The global economic depression of the 1930s played no small role in the mounting restlessness of French colonial authorities. French reports highlighted the disparate effect of the depression on European and Lebanese employees in Grand Liban. French employees were better paid than the locals and were exempted from taxes. Moreover, the concessionary companies, whose contracts were granted by the French authority and had the state guarantee in case of deficit, were spared from the economic crisis. The superior conditions of these companies allowed them to dominate the economy and play a role in building the “infrastructure” and the bureaucracy.⁶⁵ France appeared to the Lebanese opposition as “an uncompromising financial power” extorting profit through the French holders of the companies’ shares when the country was “heading towards ruin.”⁶⁶

The French proceeded with their plans and bypassed the Lebanese parliament in instating the monopoly in January 1935. They had expected a vehement resistance from parliament deputies who had been loyal to them until this point.⁶⁷ Indeed, the French considered their Mandate a source of much-needed order and development in a country like Lebanon. They also noted that their mandatory policies were becoming more difficult to implement:

[W]e should abandon the hope of obtaining unanimous support and should act according to the interests of Lebanon and ours ... The Mandatory action is not easy to

achieve in these conditions. In order to execute it smoothly, we should understand that perfection is not of this world, that Lebanon should adapt itself to some disorder, and that, our tutelage is not eternal. It would be futile to insist on the rigorous application of principles, which may not survive us.⁶⁸

This statement highlights the French account of the dilemmas of their mandatory policies in Lebanon. The Régie was imposed and became a *fait accompli* despite the protests and political campaigns. The French continued to marginalize Patriarch 'Arida and spread rumors about an agreement with the Vatican to remove him from his post and replace him by another person.⁶⁹ Patriarch 'Arida, however, continued to agitate for a sovereign Lebanon and remained in the Seat of the Maronite Patriarch of Antioch until 1955.

Conclusion

'Arida rose openly against the French after their imposition of the tobacco monopoly in 1935. His diplomatic maneuvers and political campaigns against them took a critical form and were unprecedented among the Maronite clergy in Grand Liban. The French had underestimated the drive for independence among the Maronite elite, and they were swift in subjugating 'Arida and isolating him.

'Arida's politics during this phase disclosed a new development in the relationship between the Maronite clerical leadership and the French colonialists. The article examined new layers in this relationship illuminating the Maronites' ambivalence about their endorsement of Grand Liban and underscored their frustration with the French Mandate. The "Francophile" Maronite leadership had its set of priorities and interests when it collaborated with the Mandatory authorities in Grand Liban. 'Arida's reaction to the re-imposition of the Régie monopoly and his correspondences with the French disclosed his "nostalgia" for Petit Liban. Rather than maintaining a firm and passionate defense of Grand Liban, a number of Maronite clerics and entrepreneurs started to lament the loss of Petit Liban. They dreaded in addition to Grand Liban's religious heterogeneity the decline in Maronite political autonomy and economic profit. Thus, while Maronite leaders were the privileged "partners" of the French in Syria and Lebanon, they were ultimately in a relationship of subordination to them. These leaders reacted to subordination and to French "superiority" by challenging relations of imperialism, as 'Arida did, yet from the position of being a "cultured" Francophone Christian. To be sure, the colonial "encounter" cannot be separated from relations of power involving various forms and levels of resistance. It is in this framework and through such relations of power that 'Arida and a group of Maronite leaders framed their ideas about themselves and their national identity as well as their cultural sensibilities.

Evidently, 'Arida's mistrust of the French following the economic setbacks he and many local businessmen in Mount Lebanon and Beirut experienced led him in the mid-1930s to embrace his national partners, the Muslims. He strove to build mutual interest and strong ties with the Muslim communities in Grand Liban even if he continued to strive for the Christians' dominance in it.

Notes

1. The relationship of Patriarch 'Arida and the Zionist movement is not part of this article. Patriarch 'Arida and his vision to found Lebanon as a "Christian state" led him and other Lebanese Maronite leaders to explore a possible alliance with the pre-1948 Zionist movement but without compromising the essential components of this imagined Christian state, as independent, sovereign, and immune from being eclipsed by another cultural affinity whether Zionist, Muslim, or French. For a study of 'Arida and the Zionist, see Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900-1948* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1994).
2. Yusuf Sawda, a representative of the Libanist discourse and a founder of Hizb al-Qawmiyya al-Lubnaniyya (The Party of Lebanese Nationalism) urged France to help Lebanon achieve its independence and protect it from absorption by its Arab Muslim neighbors. Sawda argued that France must help preserve Lebanon due to the strong historical ties between the two countries. See Yusuf Sawda, *Fi Sabil Lubnan*, 3rd ed. (Beirut, Lebanon: Manshurat Dar Lahd Khatir, 1988), 325. See also Michelle Hartman and Alessandro Olsaretti, "'The First Boat and the First Oar': Inventions of Lebanon in the Writings of Michel Chiha," *Radical History Review* 86 (2003), 37-38; Kais M. Firro, "Lebanese Nationalism versus Arabism: From Bulus Nujaym to Michel Chiha," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40:5 (2004), 1-10; Raghid al-Solh, *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation* (London: The Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I.B.Tauris, 2004), 6.
3. On "mechanistic" approaches in the study of external historical forces, see Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Seventeenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 12.
4. Albert Hourani, *Lebanon and Syria: A Political Essay* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 4.
5. Ibid. By Francophile elements, Hourani meant the Christians, the Alawites, the Kurds, and other minorities.
6. Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965), 207. Recently, Salibi has expressed "nostalgia" for the French Mandate over Lebanon. See Hashim Qasim, "Muqabala ma' al-Mu'arrikh Kamal Salibi," *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi* 378 (2010), 129.
7. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 163.
8. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Syrian and Lebanon under the French Mandate* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 112.
9. See the introduction of Antoine 'Arida, *Lubnan wa Faransa*, translated by Faris Ghassoub (Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Farabi, 1987), 27.
10. Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 163-165; "Moving beyond Orientalist Fantasy, Sectarian Polemic, and Nationalist Denial," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40:4 (2008), 558-560.
11. See Shafiq Juha, *Ma'rakat al-Masir Lubnan fi 'Ahid al-Intidab al-Faransi* (Beirut, Lebanon: Maktabat Ras Beirut, 1995), 292-293.

12. See Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 51-52. See also Joseph Antoine Labaki, *Mutasarrifiyyat Jabal Lubnan: Masa'il wa Qadaya, 1861-1915* (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Karma, 1995), 256. See also Eisenberg, *My Enemy's Enemy*, for the several proposals that the early Zionist movement and Maronite figures, including Patriarch 'Arida, exchanged to change the demographic composition of Jabal 'Amil, 78; 98; 100.
13. See 'Isam Khalifa, *Fi Mu'tarak al-Qadiyya al-Lubnaniyya* (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Jil lil al-Tabi' wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', 1985), 70.
14. Mas'ud Dahir, *Tarikh Lubnan al-'Ijtima'i, 1914-1926* (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Matbu'at al-Sharqiyya, 1984), 53-54.
15. The Maronites formed 52% of all the Christian communities in Lebanon. Kamal Salibi believes that Grand Liban was the project of the rich Lebanese Catholics which was adopted by the French when they took over Lebanon in 1918. See Qasim, "Muqabala," 129.
16. Khalifa, *Fi Mu'tarak al-Qadiyya*, 70.
17. George Hakim, "Industry," in Sa'id Himadeh, ed., *Economic Organization of Syria* (New York and Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1973), 126. French sources point to the increasing investments of European entrepreneurs in the private Libano-Syrian tobacco company established in 1930. This change went hand in hand with the "modernizing" of industrial processes. As a result of the issuance of new laws, around 185 new industrial undertakings replaced their machines with new ones. See Hakim, "Industry," 130-132 and Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), *Mandat, Syrie-Liban 1918-1940*, 14 mars, 1934, carton 866.
18. The banderole law of tobacco issued in June 1930 replaced the law of tobacco monopoly that existed in all the Ottoman provinces except Mount Lebanon. The new law liberated all processes of manufacturing, cultivating, and marketing in the territories under French rule. The state levied taxes by sticking a stamp on tobacco packets. Under the banderole, tobacco products, which did not carry official stamps purchased from the Ministry of Finance, were not admitted into the market. See Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1882-1908* (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 13-18.
19. The standards for this classification have to do with the size of the working force, capital, and connection to the international market. See, *L'indicateur: Libano-Syrien, 1928-1929*, Per 356, Nantes, 15-16.
20. The old Ottoman Régie had two tobacco factories in Damascus and Aleppo that together employed 200 workers. See Badr al-Din al-Siba'i, *Adwa' 'ala al-Ra'ismal al-Ajnabi fi Suriyya: 1850-1958* (Damascus, Syria: Dar al-Jamahir, 1967), 44. Four major financial groups established its 7,000,000 FF capital. These were the French group which contributed 3,700,000 FF, the Franco-Suisse group which contributed 1,000,000 FF, the Anglo-American Egyptian group which contributed 2,000,000 FF, and the Libano-Syrian group which contributed 300,000 FF. See also, MAE, Nantes, *Mandat Syrie-Liban 1918-1940* [Pour le Haut Commissaire sur la compagnie Libano-Syrienne], 14 mars, 1934, carton 866.
21. Al-Siba'i, *Adwa' 'ala al-Ra'ismal*, 44. These territories had been subjected to British colonization after WWI.
22. From the interview between a tobacco industrialist and the Mgr Patriarch Elias Richa. See MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1918-1940*, no title, carton 718, mars 19, 1936 and MAE, *Levant, Syrie-Liban, 1918-1940*, "Tabacs et Monopole," 3 aout, 1934, vol. 549.
23. MAE, *Levant, Syrie-Liban, 1918-1929* [Régie Ottomane des Tabacs], 7 Mars, 1924, vol. 320, 45a.
24. This runs contrary to Longrigg's claim that the expenses of the French mandate were "borne by the French" or that they "did not recover these 'civil expenses of the Mandate'." See, Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon*, 115.
25. See Yahe Karyergatian, "Monopoly in the Lebanese Tobacco Industry," (MA thesis, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, 1965), 26.

26. The company in question consisted of the Libano-Syrian Tobacco Company, a Syrian entrepreneur Osman Charbati and a number of Lebanese entrepreneurs such as Hanna Qasouf and Brothers, Sema'an Sawaya and Sons, and Munib Sukkari. See Al-Iqtisadi (1977): 12. For more on the Régie, see Malek Abisaab, *Militant Women of a Fragile Nation* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010), chapters 1 and 2.
27. Makdissi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, 16.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 8.
30. See Carolyn Gates, *The Historical Role of Political Economy in the Development of Modern Lebanon* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1989), 8, 17-18.
31. "Ahali Bisharri Yarmun al-Tabigh fi al-Nar," *Al-Nahar* 3:2 (1935), 4.
32. Abisaab, *Militant Women*, 44.
33. Ibid.
34. Juha, *Ma'rakat Masir Lubnan*, 428.
35. See MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 9 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban," vol. 500, 1.
36. MAE, *Paris, Syrie-Liban, 1918-1940*, "On Excellence Monsieur Le Ministre Des Affaires Etrangères (Levant)," Février 1, 1935, carton 718.
37. De Martel is referring to the time when the Maronite leaders could not agree on a presidential candidate in 1932. Muhammad al-Jisir, a Sunni Muslim leader, seized the state of discord among Christian dignitaries and declared his intention to run for presidency. Al-Jisir relied on the Lebanese constitution which gives the right to any Lebanese to become the president. Christian leaders rejected the al-Jisir maneuver and asserted that the Lebanese presidency had been designed exclusively for the Maronite because they are the largest Lebanese sect. See Juha, *Ma'rakat Masir Lubnan*, 343.
38. MAE, *Pairs, Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 20 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban," vol. 500, 210.
39. Ibid.
40. MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1918-1929*, "Expose Des Du Projet D'arrete Instituant Un Monopole Fiscal Des Tabacs Dans Toute L'etendue Des Territoires Sous Mandat, Beyrouth," 13 Avril, 1929, vol. 320, 2.
41. MAE, *Pairs, Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 20 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban," vol. 500, 210.
42. Ibid.
43. MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 9 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban," vol. 500, 1.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. The report noted that Maatouk used his connections with high dignitaries in Bkérké. Bkérké, a town in Mount Lebanon, is the location of the Maronite Patriarch.
46. MAE, *Pairs, Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 23 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban. Monopole des Tabacs," vol. 500, 213-214.
47. MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 9 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban," vol. 500, 1.
48. See Meir Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926-1939* (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1997), 167.
49. Ibid. 'Arida founded a cement company with some of his relatives but later sold it to a Jewish investor. See Juha, *Mu'tarak Masir Lubnan*, 392 and *al-Manara* 6:1 (January, 1930), 69.
50. MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 9 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban," vol. 500, 7.
51. Ibid., 8.
52. Ibid.
53. Desmond Hosford and Chong J. Wojtkowski, *French Orientalism: Culture, Politics and the Imagined Other* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010).
54. Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1965), 82.
55. MAE, *Pairs, Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 23 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban. Monopole des Tabacs," vol. 500, 213.

56. The colonial authorities granted a number of economic privileges to selected European companies, mostly French. These companies were the Société des Tramways et d'Électricité, the Régie Co Intéressée Libano-Syrienne des Tabacs et Tombacs, the Régie Générale des Chemins, and the Banque de Syrie au Liban.
57. MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 9 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban," vol. 500, 2.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 3.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 4.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 5.
65. Ibid.
66. MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1930-1940*, 9 Avril, 1935, "Situation politique au Liban," vol. 500, 7.
67. Ibid., 397-398.
68. Ibid., 11-12.
69. See Juha, *Ma'rakat al-Masir*, 422.

References

French archival sources

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE): Paris and Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE): Nantes.

Arabic sources

- "Ahali Bisharri Yarmun al-Tabigh fi al-Nar." (1935). *Al-Nahar*, 3(2), 4.
- Al-Siba'i, Badr al-Din. (1967). *Adwa' 'ala al-Ra'ismal al-Ajnabi fi Suriyya: 1850-1958*. Damascus, Syria: Dar al-Jamahir.
- 'Arida, Antoine. (1987). *Lubnan wa Faransa*, translated by Faris Ghassoub. Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Farabi.
- Juha, Shafiq. (1995). *Ma'rakat al-Masir Lubnan fi 'Ahid al-Intidab al-Faransi*. Beirut, Lebanon: Maktabat Ras Beirut.
- Khalifa, 'Isam. (1985). *Fi Mu'tarak al-Qadiyya al-Lubnaniyya*. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Jil lil al-Tabi' wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi'.
- Labaki, Antoine Joseph. (1995). *Mutasarrifiyyat Jabal Lubnan: Masa'il wa Qadaya, 1861-1915*. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Karma.
- Qasim, Hashim. (2010). Muqabala ma' al-Mu'arrikh Kamal Salibi. *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, 378, 129.
- Sawda, Yusuf. (1988). *Fi Sabil Lubnan*. 3rd ed. Beirut, Lebanon: Manshurat Dar Lahd Khatir.

Western sources

- Abisaab, Malek. (2010). *Militant Women of a Fragile Nation*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at. (2005). *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Seventeenth to Eighteenth Centuries*. 2nd ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Akarli, Engin. (1993). *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*. Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Al-Solh, Raghid. (2004). *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation*. London: The Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I.B.Tauris.
- Eisenberg, Laura Zittarain. (1994). *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900-1948*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

- Firro, M. Kais. (2004). Lebanese Nationalism versus Arabism: From Bulus Nujaym to Michel Chiha. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40(5), 1-27.
- Gates, Carolyn. (1989). *The Historical Role of Political Economy in the Development of Modern Lebanon*. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies.
- Hakim, George. (1973). Industry. In *Economic Organization of Syria*, ed. Sa'id Himadeh. New York and Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut.
- Hartman, Michelle and Alessandro Olsaretti. (2003). "The First Boat and the First Oar": Inventions of Lebanon in the Writings of Michel Chiha. *Radical History Review*, 86, 37-38.
- Hosford, Desmond and Chong J. Wojtkowski. (2010). *French Orientalism: Culture, Politics and the Imagined Other*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Hourani, Albert. (1946). *Lebanon and Syria: A Political Essay*. London and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Karyergatian, Yahe. (1965). "Monopoly in the Lebanese Tobacco Industry." MA Thesis, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Longrigg, Hemsley Stephen. (1958). *Syrian and Lebanon under the French Mandate*. London and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Makdisi, Ussama. (2000). *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*. Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Makdisi, Ussama. (2008). Moving beyond Orientalist Fantasy, Sectarian Polemic, and Nationalist Denial. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 40(4), 559-560.
- Memmi, Albert. (1965). *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Quataert, Donald. (1983). *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1882-1908*. New York: New York University Press.
- Salibi, Kamal. (1965). *The Modern History of Lebanon*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Zamir, Meir. (1997). *Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926-1939*. London and New York: I.B.Tauris.