European disunion: democracy, sovereignty and the politics of emergency : Stefan Auer Hurst, London, 2022, 288 pp., ISBN: 978 1 78738 684 6

Abstract

The end of history has ended and sovereignty is back with a vengeance. Against this backdrop the EU has been struggling: its ‘attempt to overcome a world of sovereign states has unwittingly weakened its ability to act’ (p. 169). This is the core claim of Stefan Auer’s excellent European Disunion: Democracy, Sovereignty and the Politics of Emergency. With reference to the past decade or more of EU ‘emergencies’—including the eurozone crisis, refugee crisis, Brexit, Russia’s invasions of Ukraine and an imperilled liberal democracy in Poland and Hungary—Auer adeptly substantiates this claim. He shows us how ‘the unanswered question of European sovereignty’ (p. 103) has, on multiple occasions, left the EU flailing. The EU has too often found itself confronted with a ‘sovereignty paradox’, whereby ‘nation states having lost control to the supranational level [are] unable to act effectively on their own, while at the same time, they keep enough power to obstruct common solutions’ (p. 75). That inability to act, respond or ‘decide’ has, ironically, meant that an EU that was founded to defend democracy and the rule of law has, in some cases at least, contributed to their erosion. Auer convincingly shows us that this core failing is not easily corrected or overcome in either theory or practice. He tackles, in turn, arguments in favour of a ‘post-sovereign Europe’, a ‘sovereign Europe’ and a revival of the sovereign nation-state. Turn-of-the-century arguments in favour of a ‘post-sovereign’ EU were usually made with reference to early 20th century European history—often seen through a distinctly German lens—and the theoretical perils of ethnic nationalism. German leaders and liberal German intellectuals, such as Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck, are singled out by Auer as adopting such a position: defending a contemporary EU, or at least many of its post-sovereign features. But for Auer, it is this very post-sovereign or post-national status quo that has been the problem in the face of the repeated ‘emergencies’ mentioned above. With reference to the ideas of the controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt, he argues: ‘accounts of a post-national or supranational Europe [fail to] tell us …what is to happen in the case of the exception. The question of who decides on the emergency is, after all, the very question about sovereignty which these theories declared obsolete’ (p. 49). Calls for a more assertive ‘sovereign Europe’—associated in Auer’s account primarily with the recent rhetoric of French President Emmanuel Macron—fare little better in his analysis. They are met with clear opposition, not only from the aforementioned (often German) defenders of something close to the status quo, but also a rising tide of nationalists, as reflected in Brexit, growing far-right and left opposition within France, and a broader increase in nationalism in central Europe and beyond. In many contexts, that opposition reflects a failure of what Auer calls an ‘undemocratic liberalism’ (p. 151). This refers, in particular, to an economic (neo)liberalism imposed on East-Central European states in transition from communism and also on southern European economies in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. Such a (neo)liberalism may have been compatible with certain human and minority rights, but its economic consequences laid the foundation for the ‘illiberal democracy’ that has been celebrated by populists, particularly Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Such arguments are compelling. They reminded me of discussions of the EU’s ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ (made by the likes of Burak Tansel and Ian Bruff); arguments on the EU’s role in ‘hollowing out’ the nation-state (associated with, among others, Peter Mair, Chris Bickerton and Vivien Schmidt); and Jonathan Hopkin’s account of its rise in Anti-System Politics (OUP, 2020). At times reading Auer—particularly his critique of turn-of-the-century imaginaries of ‘post-sovereignty’—it feels as if his own preferred response would be a partial return to the European nation-state. He is sympathetic, for instance, to the position of the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in defending German constitutional sovereignty in the face of EU encroachment, and he seems to regard Maastricht Treaty, especially its initiation of a sovereignty-encroaching monetary union, as ‘a step too far’ (p. 42). This would seem to place Auer with those who have argued—usually from a broadly liberal nationalist or communitarian theoretical position—that some kind of re-empowerment of the sovereign European nation-state would be desirable (among many others, fellow critics of Habermas such as Wolfgang Streeck). As he says, ‘there is no point denying that the populist appeal to national and national sovereignty resonates’. As such, ‘if the EU’s reluctant empire is to remain “united in diversity”… it might need more acceptance of its heterogeneity’ (p. 173). As far as the EU is concerned, ‘less would be more’ (p. 184). Where a broad communitarian position advocates a practical re-empowerment of nation-states in Europe, it has met with important critiques of both a normative and practical variety. Normative critics often point to the exclusionary tendencies inherent in even an ostensibly liberal nationalism, with reference, for instance, to immigration policy. Practical critics point to the essentially transnational or global nature of contemporary policy problems—relating, inter alia, to security, economy and environment—which require a collective response beyond the European nation-state. Auer himself perhaps manages to dodge those critiques. While sympathetic to the communitarian positions, and especially the Schmittian defence of the need for sovereignty in moments of emergency, he at once acknowledges the practical difficulties of a return to the nation-state. With reference to Bickerton’s European Integration: From Nation State to Member State (OUP, 2012), he notes that, ‘whether and how the process [of moving from nation to member state] can be reversed is far from certain’. Similarly, on the rule of law, he hedges his bets, suggesting that, ‘Europe is endangered both by excessive reliance on formal legalism… as well as populist transgressions against judicial independence’ (p. 160). Ultimately, Auer’s own position on what is to be done in relation to the core problem of sovereignty that he carefully illuminates remains frustratingly enigmatic. But perhaps that is as it should be. While a lack of sovereignty has been problematic in recent times for the various reasons that he articulates, a broader European history rightly cautions against its excesses; in particular, illuminating the dangers of a concentrated sovereign authority with the agency to both determine and act upon Schmitt’s ‘exception’. Auer, therefore, is surely correct to row back from any straightforward conclusion that a simple transfer of sovereignty—towards either the European or national level—would represent any kind of panacea. For this reader, Auer’s recognition of a ‘sovereignty paradox’—and his own difficulties in showing the path to overcoming it—might have made for a more sympathetic account of the extant EU’s difficulties in navigating recent crises. In the context of his own account, his claim that ‘[rather] than failing forward, Europe is failing’ (p. 183) feels excessively stark. Indeed, it is possible to reject a functionalist teleology, while at once pointing to some of the ways in which the EU and its members have done far more than many would have expected in response to recent crises: for instance, in terms of the economic response to Covid-19 or to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, it is at least ambiguous as to whether ostensibly far more sovereign nation-states have fared better than the EU in recent years. From the lived perspective of a Brexit Britain that is hardly ‘succeeding’ that is certainly the case. Auer does acknowledge that any recalibration towards greater sovereignty—nationally or at EU level—must be carefully navigated. Indeed, at its best Auer’s account shows a commitment to nuance and pluralism: ‘…if we are serious about our commitment to democracy, we must remain open to the idea that there is not one correct answer to the question of an appropriate location of sovereignty, or whether sovereignty as a term is relevant in the first place. Democrats should be wary of believers in absolute truth’ (p. 98). Thus, while he is right to suggest that the EU must strive to do better on the economy, on security and defence and on the rule of law, he is also right that it is not obvious how it might do so. The main strength of Auer’s excellent book is its historically, theoretically and empirically rich articulation of the ways in which the longstanding tensions of European integration—inter alia, between sovereignty and supranationalism; democracy and law; society and economy—have played out in the recent EU project. Drawing on Schmitt, Auer expertly articulates the importance of sovereign decision in the context of emergency, while at once demonstrating the inherent difficulties of ascertaining who should take those decisions and where. Ultimately his account shows that it may not be possible for the EU to entirely overcome the ‘sovereignty paradox’ that European Disunion so expertly illuminates. For this reader, it also confirmed a sense that any definitive resolution to that paradox would also be undesirable.