Can we detect consciousness in newborn infants?

In masking, a stimulus is rendered invisible through the presentation of a second stimulus shortly after the first. Over the years, authors have typically explained masking by postulating some early disruption process. In these feedforward-type explanations, the mask somehow "catches up" with the target stimulus, disrupting its processing either through lateral or interchannel inhibition. However, studies from recent years indicate that visual perception--and most notably visual awareness itself--may depend strongly on cortico-cortical feedback connections from higher to lower visual areas. This has led some researchers to propose that masking derives its effectiveness from selectively interrupting these reentrant processes. In this experiment, we used electroencephalogram measurements to determine what happens in the human visual cortex during detection of a texture-defined square under nonmasked (seen) and masked (unseen) conditions. Electro-encephalogram derivatives that are typically associated with reentrant processing turn out to be absent in the masked condition. Moreover, extrastriate visual areas are still activated early on by both seen and unseen stimuli, as shown by scalp surface Laplacian current source-density maps. This conclusively shows that feedforward processing is preserved, even when subject performance is at chance as determined by objective measures. From these results, we conclude that masking derives its effectiveness, at least partly, from disrupting reentrant processing, thereby interfering with the neural mechanisms of figure-ground segmentation and visual awareness itself.

Infants have a sophisticated behavioral and cognitive repertoire suggestive of a capacity for conscious reflection. Yet, demonstrating conscious access in infants remains challenging, mainly because they cannot report their thoughts. Here, to circumvent this problem, we studied whether an electrophysiological signature of consciousness found in adults, corresponding to a late nonlinear cortical response [~300 milliseconds (ms)] to brief pictures, already exists in infants. We recorded event-related potentials while 5-, 12-, and 15-month-old infants (N = 80) viewed masked faces at various levels of visibility. In all age groups, we found a late slow wave showing a nonlinear profile at the expected perceptual thresholds. However, this late component shifted from a weak and delayed response in 5-month-olds (starting around 900 ms) to a more sustained and faster response in older infants (around 750 ms). These results reveal that the brain mechanisms underlying the threshold for conscious perception are already present in infancy but undergo a slow acceleration during development.

The adult human brain quickly adapts to regular temporal sequences, and emits a sequence of novelty responses when these regularities are violated. These novelty responses have been interpreted as error signals that reflect the difference between the incoming signal and predictions generated at multiple cortical levels. Do infants already possess such a hierarchy of violation-detection mechanisms? Using high-density recordings of event-related potentials during an auditory local-global violation paradigm, we show that three-month-old infants process novelty in temporal sequences at two distinct levels. Violations of local expectancies, such as perceiving a deviant vowel "a" after repeated presentation of another vowel i-i-i, elicited an early auditory mismatch response. Conversely, violations of global expectancies, such as hearing the rare sequence a-a-a-a instead of the frequent sequence a-a-a-i, modulated this early mismatch response and led to a late frontal negative slow wave, whose cortical sources included the left inferior frontal region. These results suggest that the infant brain already possesses two dissociable systems for temporal sequence learning.