14
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
1 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access

      Trends in invasive bacterial diseases during the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic: analyses of prospective surveillance data from 30 countries and territories in the IRIS Consortium

      research-article
      , MBBCh a , , PhD b , , MSc c , , MSc d , , PhD e , , MSc f , , Prof, MD g , , PhD h , , Prof, MD i , , PhD j , , PhD k , , PhD f , , PhD e , l , , PhD m , , MB e , l , , PhD n , o , , PhD p , , NZCS q , , NatDipMedTech r , , PhD s , , BSc t , , PhD n , o , , PhD u , , MD e , l , v , , PhD r , , PhD d , , Prof, MSc w , , PhD x , , MD y , , Prof, PhD z , , PhD aa , ab , , Prof, MD ac , , PhD h , , MD y , , Prof, MD l , ad , , Prof, MSc ae , , PhD af , , PhD m , , MBBS ag , , PhD ah , ai , , MD aj , , Prof, MD w , , MD ak , , PhD al , , MD c , , MD k , , MSc ai , , MSc am , , PhD an , , Prof, PhD ah , , BSc t , , Prof, PhD ao , ap , , PhD aq , , Prof, DPhil ar , , PhD e , , MBChB as , , PhD af , , PhD at , , HND au , , PhD e , , Prof, MD aa , ab , av , , Prof, MD aw , , BA Hons ag , , PhD ak , , MD ay , , MSc az , , PhD aaa , , MLT aa , , PhD aab , aac , , MD ax , , MSc m , , PhD aad , , BSc(Hons) m , , PhD aae , , PhD aae , , MPH d , , PhD aaf , , PhD an , , PhD am , , Prof, PhD aag , aah , , Prof, PhD al , ag , , DMSc y , , Prof, FRCPath aai , aaj , , PhD aak , , Prof, MD s , , PhD am , , Prof, PhD aal , , PhD am , , PhD aam , , Prof, PhD aan , , MD aao , , MD aj , , Prof, PhD r , , PhD u , , PhD aap , , PhD g , , Prof, DPhil a , *
      The Lancet. Digital Health
      Elsevier Ltd

      Read this article at

      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Summary

          Background

          The Invasive Respiratory Infection Surveillance (IRIS) Consortium was established to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on invasive diseases caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, Neisseria meningitidis, and Streptococcus agalactiae. We aimed to analyse the incidence and distribution of these diseases during the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the 2 years preceding the pandemic.

          Methods

          For this prospective analysis, laboratories in 30 countries and territories representing five continents submitted surveillance data from Jan 1, 2018, to Jan 2, 2022, to private projects within databases in PubMLST. The impact of COVID-19 containment measures on the overall number of cases was analysed, and changes in disease distributions by patient age and serotype or group were examined. Interrupted time-series analyses were done to quantify the impact of pandemic response measures and their relaxation on disease rates, and autoregressive integrated moving average models were used to estimate effect sizes and forecast counterfactual trends by hemisphere.

          Findings

          Overall, 116 841 cases were analysed: 76 481 in 2018–19, before the pandemic, and 40 360 in 2020–21, during the pandemic. During the pandemic there was a significant reduction in the risk of disease caused by S pneumoniae (risk ratio 0·47; 95% CI 0·40–0·55), H influenzae (0·51; 0·40–0·66) and N meningitidis (0·26; 0·21–0·31), while no significant changes were observed for S agalactiae (1·02; 0·75–1·40), which is not transmitted via the respiratory route. No major changes in the distribution of cases were observed when stratified by patient age or serotype or group. An estimated 36 289 (95% prediction interval 17 145–55 434) cases of invasive bacterial disease were averted during the first 2 years of the pandemic among IRIS-participating countries and territories.

          Interpretation

          COVID-19 containment measures were associated with a sustained decrease in the incidence of invasive disease caused by S pneumoniae, H influenzae, and N meningitidis during the first 2 years of the pandemic, but cases began to increase in some countries towards the end of 2021 as pandemic restrictions were lifted. These IRIS data provide a better understanding of microbial transmission, will inform vaccine development and implementation, and can contribute to health-care service planning and provision of policies.

          Funding

          Wellcome Trust, NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Torsten Söderberg Foundation, Stockholm County Council, Swedish Research Council, German Federal Ministry of Health, Robert Koch Institute, Pfizer, Merck, and the Greek National Public Health Organization.

          Related collections

          Most cited references30

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: not found
          • Article: not found

          Conducting Meta-Analyses inRwith themetaforPackage

            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: found
            Is Open Access

            Global burden of bacterial antimicrobial resistance in 2019: a systematic analysis

            (2022)
            Summary Background Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a major threat to human health around the world. Previous publications have estimated the effect of AMR on incidence, deaths, hospital length of stay, and health-care costs for specific pathogen–drug combinations in select locations. To our knowledge, this study presents the most comprehensive estimates of AMR burden to date. Methods We estimated deaths and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) attributable to and associated with bacterial AMR for 23 pathogens and 88 pathogen–drug combinations in 204 countries and territories in 2019. We obtained data from systematic literature reviews, hospital systems, surveillance systems, and other sources, covering 471 million individual records or isolates and 7585 study-location-years. We used predictive statistical modelling to produce estimates of AMR burden for all locations, including for locations with no data. Our approach can be divided into five broad components: number of deaths where infection played a role, proportion of infectious deaths attributable to a given infectious syndrome, proportion of infectious syndrome deaths attributable to a given pathogen, the percentage of a given pathogen resistant to an antibiotic of interest, and the excess risk of death or duration of an infection associated with this resistance. Using these components, we estimated disease burden based on two counterfactuals: deaths attributable to AMR (based on an alternative scenario in which all drug-resistant infections were replaced by drug-susceptible infections), and deaths associated with AMR (based on an alternative scenario in which all drug-resistant infections were replaced by no infection). We generated 95% uncertainty intervals (UIs) for final estimates as the 25th and 975th ordered values across 1000 posterior draws, and models were cross-validated for out-of-sample predictive validity. We present final estimates aggregated to the global and regional level. Findings On the basis of our predictive statistical models, there were an estimated 4·95 million (3·62–6·57) deaths associated with bacterial AMR in 2019, including 1·27 million (95% UI 0·911–1·71) deaths attributable to bacterial AMR. At the regional level, we estimated the all-age death rate attributable to resistance to be highest in western sub-Saharan Africa, at 27·3 deaths per 100 000 (20·9–35·3), and lowest in Australasia, at 6·5 deaths (4·3–9·4) per 100 000. Lower respiratory infections accounted for more than 1·5 million deaths associated with resistance in 2019, making it the most burdensome infectious syndrome. The six leading pathogens for deaths associated with resistance (Escherichia coli, followed by Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Acinetobacter baumannii, and Pseudomonas aeruginosa) were responsible for 929 000 (660 000–1 270 000) deaths attributable to AMR and 3·57 million (2·62–4·78) deaths associated with AMR in 2019. One pathogen–drug combination, meticillin-resistant S aureus, caused more than 100 000 deaths attributable to AMR in 2019, while six more each caused 50 000–100 000 deaths: multidrug-resistant excluding extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, third-generation cephalosporin-resistant E coli, carbapenem-resistant A baumannii, fluoroquinolone-resistant E coli, carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae, and third-generation cephalosporin-resistant K pneumoniae. Interpretation To our knowledge, this study provides the first comprehensive assessment of the global burden of AMR, as well as an evaluation of the availability of data. AMR is a leading cause of death around the world, with the highest burdens in low-resource settings. Understanding the burden of AMR and the leading pathogen–drug combinations contributing to it is crucial to making informed and location-specific policy decisions, particularly about infection prevention and control programmes, access to essential antibiotics, and research and development of new vaccines and antibiotics. There are serious data gaps in many low-income settings, emphasising the need to expand microbiology laboratory capacity and data collection systems to improve our understanding of this important human health threat. Funding Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Wellcome Trust, and Department of Health and Social Care using UK aid funding managed by the Fleming Fund.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker)

              COVID-19 has prompted unprecedented government action around the world. We introduce the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), a dataset that addresses the need for continuously updated, readily usable and comparable information on policy measures. From 1 January 2020, the data capture government policies related to closure and containment, health and economic policy for more than 180 countries, plus several countries' subnational jurisdictions. Policy responses are recorded on ordinal or continuous scales for 19 policy areas, capturing variation in degree of response. We present two motivating applications of the data, highlighting patterns in the timing of policy adoption and subsequent policy easing and reimposition, and illustrating how the data can be combined with behavioural and epidemiological indicators. This database enables researchers and policymakers to explore the empirical effects of policy responses on the spread of COVID-19 cases and deaths, as well as on economic and social welfare.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Lancet Digit Health
                Lancet Digit Health
                The Lancet. Digital Health
                Elsevier Ltd
                2589-7500
                27 July 2023
                September 2023
                27 July 2023
                : 5
                : 9
                : e582-e593
                Affiliations
                [a ]Nuffield Department of Population Health, Big Data Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
                [b ]National Reference Laboratory for Meningococci, National Center of Microbiology, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Madrid, Spain
                [c ]Immunisation and Countermeasures Division, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
                [d ]Instituto Nacional de Salud, Bogotá, Colombia
                [e ]Irish Meningitis and Sepsis Reference Laboratory, Children's Health Ireland, Dublin, Ireland
                [f ]Staphylococcus and Streptococcus Reference Section, AMRHAI, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
                [g ]Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Center of Respiratory Medicine, National Clinical Research Center for Respiratory Diseases, Institute of Respiratory Medicine, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, Peking Union Medical College, Beijing, China
                [h ]Swiss National Reference Center for Invasive Pneumococci, Institute for Infectious Diseases, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
                [i ]Department of Pediatrics, Seoul National University College of Medicine, Seoul, South Korea
                [j ]Department of Health, Microbiology Division, Public Health Laboratory Services Branch, Centre for Health Protection, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
                [k ]University of Würzburg, Institute for Hygiene and Microbiology, National Reference Centre for Meningococci and Haemophilus influenzae, Würzburg, Germany
                [l ]Department of Microbiology, Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, Dublin, Ireland
                [m ]Public Health Wales, Cardiff, Wales, UK
                [n ]National Reference Centre for Streptococcus pneumoniae, University Hospitals Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
                [o ]Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Transplantation, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
                [p ]Statens Serum Institut, Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology & Prevention, Copenhagen, Denmark
                [q ]Meningococcal Reference Laboratory, Institute of Environmental Science and Research, Porirua, New Zealand
                [r ]Centre for Respiratory Diseases and Meningitis, National Institute for Communicable Diseases, Division of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
                [s ]Institut Pasteur, Univeristé Paris Cité, Invasive Bacterial Infections Unit and National Reference Centre for Meningococci and Haemophilus influenzae, Paris, France
                [t ]National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada, Winnipeg, MB, Canada
                [u ]National Center for Microbiology and CIBER of Respiratory Research, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Madrid, Spain
                [v ]Clinical Innovation Unit, Rotunda, Dublin, Ireland
                [w ]Department of Clinical Microbiology, Landspitali, The National University Hospital of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland
                [x ]Immunisation and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Division and Respiratory and Vaccine Preventable Bacteria Reference Unit, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
                [y ]Statens Serum Institut, Department of Bacteria, Parasites & Fungi, Copenhagen, Denmark
                [z ]Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
                [aa ]Microbiology Department, Institut Recerca Sant Joan de Déu, Hospital Sant Joan de Deu, Barcelona, Spain
                [ab ]CIBER of Epidemiology and Public Health, Madrid, Spain
                [ac ]Karolinska Institutet, Karolinska University Hospital, Public Health Agency of Sweden, Stockholm, Sweden
                [ad ]Department of Clinical Microbiology, Beaumont Hospital, Dublin, Ireland
                [ae ]Department of Microbiology, Faculty of Medicine, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
                [af ]National Reference Laboratory for Neisseria meningitidis, Department of Laboratory Medicine, Clinical Microbiology, Faculty of Medicine and Health, Örebro University, Örebro, Sweden
                [ag ]Public Health Agency, Belfast, UK
                [ah ]Department of Biology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
                [ai ]Laboratorio Central de Salud Pública, Asunción, Paraguay
                [aj ]National Reference Laboratory for Streptococcal Infections, Centre for Epidemiology and Microbiology, National Institute of Public Health, Prague, Czech Republic
                [ak ]National Reference Laboratory for Meningococcal Infections, Centre for Epidemiology and Microbiology, National Institute of Public Health, Prague, Czech Republic
                [al ]National Reference Centre for Bacterial Meningitis, Department of Epidemiology and Clinical Microbiology, National Medicines Institute, Warsaw, Poland
                [am ]Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare, Helsinki, Finland
                [an ]Respiratory and Vaccine Preventable Bacteria Reference Unit, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
                [ao ]National Belgian Reference Centre for Haemophilus influenzae, Laboratoire des Hôpitaux Universitaires de Bruxelles-Universitair Laboratorium van Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
                [ap ]Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, University of Mons, Mons, Belgium
                [aq ]Meningococcal National Reference Centre, Sciensano, Belgium
                [ar ]Population Health Medicine, Public Health and Primary Care, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
                [as ]Division of Public Health Surveillance and Response, National Institute for Communicable Diseases, Division of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
                [at ]Public Health Agency of Sweden, Solna, Sweden
                [au ]Streptococcal Reference Laboratory, Institute of Environmental Science and Research Limited, Porirua, New Zealand
                [av ]Medicine Department, Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
                [aw ]University of Otago, Christchurch, New Zealand
                [ax ]Laboratoire National de Sante, Dudelange, Luxembourg
                [ay ]Ministère de la Santé - Direction de la santé, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
                [az ]National Reference Laboratory for Haemophilus Infections, Centre for Epidemiology and Microbiology, National Institute of Public Health, Prague, Czech Republic
                [aaa ]NSW Pneumococcal Reference Laboratory, Institute of Clinical Pathology and Medical Research - NSW Health Pathology, Sydney, NSW, Australia
                [aab ]Laboratorio de Referencia e Investigación en Resistencia a Antibióticos e Infecciones Relacionadas con la Asistencia Sanitaria, Centro Nacional de Microbiología, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Majadahonda, Madrid, Spain
                [aac ]CIBER de Enfermedades Infecciosas, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Madrid, Spain
                [aad ]National Belgian Reference Centre for Haemophilus influenzae, Laboratoire des Hôpitaux Universitaires de Bruxelles-Universitair Laboratorium van Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
                [aae ]Public Health Laboratories–Jerusalem, Public Health Services, Ministry of Health, Jerusalem, Israel
                [aaf ]Bacterial Respiratory Infection Service, Scottish Microbiology Reference Laboratories, Glasgow Royal Infirmary, Glasgow, UK
                [aag ]NSW Pneumococcal Reference Laboratory, Institute of Clinical Pathology and Medical Research - NSW Health Pathology, Sydney, NSW, Australia
                [aah ]Sydney Institute for Infectious Diseases, University of Sydney, NSW, Australia
                [aai ]Bacterial Respiratory Infection Service, Scottish Microbiology Reference Laboratories, Glasgow Royal Infirmary, Glasgow, UK
                [aaj ]College of Medical, Veterinary & Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
                [aak ]Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, Netherlands
                [aal ]National Meningitis Reference Laboratory, Department of Public Health Policy, School of Public Health, University of West Attica, Athens, Greece
                [aam ]Department of Medical Microbiology, German National Reference Centre for Streptococci, University Hospital RWTH Aachen, Aachen, Germany
                [aan ]Department of Medical Microbiology and Infection Prevention, and Netherlands Reference Laboratory for Bacterial Meningitis, Amsterdam University Medical Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
                [aao ]Laboratory of Medical Biology and National Reference Centre for Pneumococci, Intercommunal Hospital of Créteil, Créteil, France
                [aap ]National Laboratory for Meningitis and Pneumococcal Infections, Center of Bacteriology, Institute Adolfo Lutz, São Paulo, Brazil
                Author notes
                [* ]Correspondence to: Professor Angela Brueggemann, Nuffield Department of Population Health, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 7LF, UK angela.brueggemann@ 123456ndph.ox.ac.uk
                Article
                S2589-7500(23)00108-5
                10.1016/S2589-7500(23)00108-5
                10914672
                37516557
                e6b72cc9-3f6c-442c-999b-07e2ca5ad8fb
                © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license

                This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

                History
                Categories
                Articles

                Comments

                Comment on this article