63
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access

      Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances

      research-article

      Read this article at

      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          In this paper, we set out to develop a theoretical and conceptual framework for the new field of Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience. This framework should be able to integrate insights from several relevant disciplines: theory on embodied cognition, ecological psychology, phenomenology, dynamical systems theory, and neurodynamics. We suggest that the main task of Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience is to investigate the phenomenon of skilled intentionality from the perspective of the self-organization of the brain-body-environment system, while doing justice to the phenomenology of skilled action. In previous work, we have characterized skilled intentionality as the organism's tendency toward an optimal grip on multiple relevant affordances simultaneously. Affordances are possibilities for action provided by the environment. In the first part of this paper, we introduce the notion of skilled intentionality and the phenomenon of responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances. Second, we use Friston's work on neurodynamics, but embed a very minimal version of his Free Energy Principle in the ecological niche of the animal. Thus amended, this principle is helpful for understanding the embeddedness of neurodynamics within the dynamics of the system “brain-body-landscape of affordances.” Next, we show how we can use this adjusted principle to understand the neurodynamics of selective openness to the environment: interacting action-readiness patterns at multiple timescales contribute to the organism's selective openness to relevant affordances. In the final part of the paper, we emphasize the important role of metastable dynamics in both the brain and the brain-body-environment system for adequate affordance-responsiveness. We exemplify our integrative approach by presenting research on the impact of Deep Brain Stimulation on affordance responsiveness of OCD patients.

          Related collections

          Most cited references37

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: not found

          A free energy principle for the brain.

          By formulating Helmholtz's ideas about perception, in terms of modern-day theories, one arrives at a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological facts: using constructs from statistical physics, the problems of inferring the causes of sensory input and learning the causal structure of their generation can be resolved using exactly the same principles. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible fashion. The ensuing scheme rests on Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory input is caused. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to understand many aspects of cortical organisation and responses. In this paper, we show these perceptual processes are just one aspect of emergent behaviours of systems that conform to a free energy principle. The free energy considered here measures the difference between the probability distribution of environmental quantities that act on the system and an arbitrary distribution encoded by its configuration. The system can minimise free energy by changing its configuration to affect the way it samples the environment or change the distribution it encodes. These changes correspond to action and perception respectively and lead to an adaptive exchange with the environment that is characteristic of biological systems. This treatment assumes that the system's state and structure encode an implicit and probabilistic model of the environment. We will look at the models entailed by the brain and how minimisation of its free energy can explain its dynamics and structure.
            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            Cortical mechanisms of action selection: the affordance competition hypothesis.

            Paul Cisek (2007)
            At every moment, the natural world presents animals with two fundamental pragmatic problems: selection between actions that are currently possible and specification of the parameters or metrics of those actions. It is commonly suggested that the brain addresses these by first constructing representations of the world on which to build knowledge and make a decision, and then by computing and executing an action plan. However, neurophysiological data argue against this serial viewpoint. In contrast, it is proposed here that the brain processes sensory information to specify, in parallel, several potential actions that are currently available. These potential actions compete against each other for further processing, while information is collected to bias this competition until a single response is selected. The hypothesis suggests that the dorsal visual system specifies actions which compete against each other within the fronto-parietal cortex, while a variety of biasing influences are provided by prefrontal regions and the basal ganglia. A computational model is described, which illustrates how this competition may take place in the cerebral cortex. Simulations of the model capture qualitative features of neurophysiological data and reproduce various behavioural phenomena.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              The metastable brain.

              Neural ensembles oscillate across a broad range of frequencies and are transiently coupled or "bound" together when people attend to a stimulus, perceive, think, and act. This is a dynamic, self-assembling process, with parts of the brain engaging and disengaging in time. But how is it done? The theory of Coordination Dynamics proposes a mechanism called metastability, a subtle blend of integration and segregation. Tendencies for brain regions to express their individual autonomy and specialized functions (segregation, modularity) coexist with tendencies to couple and coordinate globally for multiple functions (integration). Although metastability has garnered increasing attention, it has yet to be demonstrated and treated within a fully spatiotemporal perspective. Here, we illustrate metastability in continuous neural and behavioral recordings, and we discuss theory and experiments at multiple scales, suggesting that metastable dynamics underlie the real-time coordination necessary for the brain's dynamic cognitive, behavioral, and social functions. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Front Hum Neurosci
                Front Hum Neurosci
                Front. Hum. Neurosci.
                Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
                Frontiers Media S.A.
                1662-5161
                12 August 2014
                2014
                : 8
                : 599
                Affiliations
                [1] 1Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, Netherlands
                [2] 2Department of Philosophy, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, Netherlands
                [3] 3Department of Neurology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences Leipzig, Germany
                [4] 4Department of Psychiatry, Academic Medical Center, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, Netherlands
                Author notes

                Edited by: Louise Barrett, University of Lethbridge, Canada

                Reviewed by: Robert A. Barton, University of Durham, UK; Eric Phillip Charles, The Pennsylvania State University, USA

                *Correspondence: Erik Rietveld, Department of Philosophy/ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 141, 1012 GC Amsterdam, Netherlands e-mail: d.w.rietveld@ 123456amc.uva.nl

                This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.

                Article
                10.3389/fnhum.2014.00599
                4130179
                25161615
                c9308607-ed1f-48fe-be6d-6abf938e1415
                Copyright © 2014 Bruineberg and Rietveld.

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

                History
                : 31 March 2014
                : 17 July 2014
                Page count
                Figures: 2, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 70, Pages: 14, Words: 12751
                Categories
                Neuroscience
                Hypothesis and Theory Article

                Neurosciences
                affordances,self-organization,metastability,optimal grip,merleau-ponty,neurodynamics,free energy principle,landscape of affordances

                Comments

                Comment on this article