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      Bronchoscopy, laryngoscopy, and esophagoscopy during the COVID‐19 pandemic

      research-article
      , BS 1 , , , MD, FAPCR 1 , , MD, FACS 2
      Head & Neck
      John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
      bronchoscopy, coronavirus, COVID‐19, esophagoscopy, laryngoscopy

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          Abstract

          Background

          The United States now has the highest death toll due to COVID‐19. Many otolaryngology procedures, including laryngoscopy, bronchoscopy, and esophagoscopy, place otolaryngologists at increased risk of coronavirus transmission due to close contact with respiratory droplets and aerosolization from the procedure. The aim of this study is to provide an overview of guidelines on how to perform these procedures during the coronavirus pandemic.

          Methods

          Literature review was performed. Articles citing laryngoscopy, bronchoscopy, esophagoscopy use with regard to COVID‐19 were included.

          Results

          Laryngoscopy, bronchoscopy, and esophagoscopy are all used in both emergent and elective situations. Understanding the risk stratification of cases and the varied necessity of personal protective equipment is important in protecting patients and health care workers.

          Conclusions

          Summary guidelines based on the literature available at this time are presented in order to decrease transmission of the virus and protect those involved.

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          Most cited references9

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          A novel coronavirus outbreak of global health concern

          In December, 2019, Wuhan, Hubei province, China, became the centre of an outbreak of pneumonia of unknown cause, which raised intense attention not only within China but internationally. Chinese health authorities did an immediate investigation to characterise and control the disease, including isolation of people suspected to have the disease, close monitoring of contacts, epidemiological and clinical data collection from patients, and development of diagnostic and treatment procedures. By Jan 7, 2020, Chinese scientists had isolated a novel coronavirus (CoV) from patients in Wuhan. The genetic sequence of the 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) enabled the rapid development of point-of-care real-time RT-PCR diagnostic tests specific for 2019-nCoV (based on full genome sequence data on the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data [GISAID] platform). Cases of 2019-nCoV are no longer limited to Wuhan. Nine exported cases of 2019-nCoV infection have been reported in Thailand, Japan, Korea, the USA, Vietnam, and Singapore to date, and further dissemination through air travel is likely.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 As of Jan 23, 2020, confirmed cases were consecutively reported in 32 provinces, municipalities, and special administrative regions in China, including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 3 These cases detected outside Wuhan, together with the detection of infection in at least one household cluster—reported by Jasper Fuk-Woo Chan and colleagues 6 in The Lancet—and the recently documented infections in health-care workers caring for patients with 2019-nCoV indicate human-to-human transmission and thus the risk of much wider spread of the disease. As of Jan 23, 2020, a total of 835 cases with laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection have been detected in China, of whom 25 have died and 93% remain in hospital (figure ). 3 Figure Timeline of early stages of 2019-nCoV outbreak 2019-nCoV=2019 novel coronavirus. In The Lancet, Chaolin Huang and colleagues 7 report clinical features of the first 41 patients admitted to the designated hospital in Wuhan who were confirmed to be infected with 2019-nCoV by Jan 2, 2020. The study findings provide first-hand data about severity of the emerging 2019-nCoV infection. Symptoms resulting from 2019-nCoV infection at the prodromal phase, including fever, dry cough, and malaise, are non-specific. Unlike human coronavirus infections, upper respiratory symptoms are notably infrequent. Intestinal presentations observed with SARS also appear to be uncommon, although two of six cases reported by Chan and colleagues had diarrhoea. 6 Common laboratory findings on admission to hospital include lymphopenia and bilateral ground-glass opacity or consolidation in chest CT scans. These clinical presentations confounded early detection of infected cases, especially against a background of ongoing influenza and circulation of other respiratory viruses. Exposure history to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale market served as an important clue at the early stage, yet its value has decreased as more secondary and tertiary cases have appeared. Of the 41 patients in this cohort, 22 (55%) developed severe dyspnoea and 13 (32%) required admission to an intensive care unit, and six died. 7 Hence, the case-fatality proportion in this cohort is approximately 14·6%, and the overall case fatality proportion appears to be closer to 3% (table ). However, both of these estimates should be treated with great caution because not all patients have concluded their illness (ie, recovered or died) and the true number of infections and full disease spectrum are unknown. Importantly, in emerging viral infection outbreaks the case-fatality ratio is often overestimated in the early stages because case detection is highly biased towards the more severe cases. As further data on the spectrum of mild or asymptomatic infection becomes available, one case of which was documented by Chan and colleagues, 6 the case-fatality ratio is likely to decrease. Nevertheless, the 1918 influenza pandemic is estimated to have had a case-fatality ratio of less than 5% 13 but had an enormous impact due to widespread transmission, so there is no room for complacency. Table Characteristics of patients who have been infected with 2019-nCoV, MERS-CoV, and SARS-CoV7, 8, 10, 11, 12 2019-nCoV * MERS-CoV SARS-CoV Demographic Date December, 2019 June, 2012 November, 2002 Location of first detection Wuhan, China Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Guangdong, China Age, years (range) 49 (21–76) 56 (14–94) 39·9 (1–91) Male:female sex ratio 2·7:1 3·3:1 1:1·25 Confirmed cases 835† 2494 8096 Mortality 25† (2·9%) 858 (37%) 744 (10%) Health-care workers 16‡ 9·8% 23·1% Symptoms Fever 40 (98%) 98% 99–100% Dry cough 31 (76%) 47% 29–75% Dyspnoea 22 (55%) 72% 40–42% Diarrhoea 1 (3%) 26% 20–25% Sore throat 0 21% 13–25% Ventilatory support 9·8% 80% 14–20% Data are n, age (range), or n (%) unless otherwise stated. 2019-nCoV=2019 novel coronavirus. MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. SARS-CoV=severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus. * Demographics and symptoms for 2019-nCoV infection are based on data from the first 41 patients reported by Chaolin Huang and colleagues (admitted before Jan 2, 2020). 8 Case numbers and mortalities are updated up to Jan 21, 2020) as disclosed by the Chinese Health Commission. † Data as of Jan 23, 2020. ‡ Data as of Jan 21, 2020. 9 As an RNA virus, 2019-nCoV still has the inherent feature of a high mutation rate, although like other coronaviruses the mutation rate might be somewhat lower than other RNA viruses because of its genome-encoded exonuclease. This aspect provides the possibility for this newly introduced zoonotic viral pathogen to adapt to become more efficiently transmitted from person to person and possibly become more virulent. Two previous coronavirus outbreaks had been reported in the 21st century. The clinical features of 2019-nCoV, in comparison with SARS-CoV and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-CoV, are summarised in the table. The ongoing 2019-nCoV outbreak has undoubtedly caused the memories of the SARS-CoV outbreak starting 17 years ago to resurface in many people. In November, 2002, clusters of pneumonia of unknown cause were reported in Guangdong province, China, now known as the SARS-CoV outbreak. The number of cases of SARS increased substantially in the next year in China and later spread globally, 14 infecting at least 8096 people and causing 774 deaths. 12 The international spread of SARS-CoV in 2003 was attributed to its strong transmission ability under specific circumstances and the insufficient preparedness and implementation of infection control practices. Chinese public health and scientific capabilities have been greatly transformed since 2003. An efficient system is ready for monitoring and responding to infectious disease outbreaks and the 2019-nCoV pneumonia has been quickly added to the Notifiable Communicable Disease List and given the highest priority by Chinese health authorities. The increasing number of cases and widening geographical spread of the disease raise grave concerns about the future trajectory of the outbreak, especially with the Chinese Lunar New Year quickly approaching. Under normal circumstances, an estimated 3 billion trips would be made in the Spring Festival travel rush this year, with 15 million trips happening in Wuhan. The virus might further spread to other places during this festival period and cause epidemics, especially if it has acquired the ability to efficiently transmit from person to person. Consequently, the 2019-nCoV outbreak has led to implementation of extraordinary public health measures to reduce further spread of the virus within China and elsewhere. Although WHO has not recommended any international travelling restrictions so far, 15 the local government in Wuhan announced on Jan 23, 2020, the suspension of public transportation, with closure of airports, railway stations, and highways in the city, to prevent further disease transmission. 16 Further efforts in travel restriction might follow. Active surveillance for new cases and close monitoring of their contacts are being implemented. To improve detection efficiency, front-line clinics, apart from local centres for disease control and prevention, should be armed with validated point-of-care diagnostic kits. Rapid information disclosure is a top priority for disease control and prevention. A daily press release system has been established in China to ensure effective and efficient disclosure of epidemic information. Education campaigns should be launched to promote precautions for travellers, including frequent hand-washing, cough etiquette, and use of personal protection equipment (eg, masks) when visiting public places. Also, the general public should be motivated to report fever and other risk factors for coronavirus infection, including travel history to affected area and close contacts with confirmed or suspected cases. Considering that substantial numbers of patients with SARS and MERS were infected in health-care settings, precautions need to be taken to prevent nosocomial spread of the virus. Unfortunately, 16 health-care workers, some of whom were working in the same ward, have been confirmed to be infected with 2019-nCoV to date, although the routes of transmission and the possible role of so-called super-spreaders remain to be clarified. 9 Epidemiological studies need to be done to assess risk factors for infection in health-care personnel and quantify potential subclinical or asymptomatic infections. Notably, the transmission of SARS-CoV was eventually halted by public health measures including elimination of nosocomial infections. We need to be wary of the current outbreak turning into a sustained epidemic or even a pandemic. The availability of the virus' genetic sequence and initial data on the epidemiology and clinical consequences of the 2019-nCoV infections are only the first steps to understanding the threat posed by this pathogen. Many important questions remain unanswered, including its origin, extent, and duration of transmission in humans, ability to infect other animal hosts, and the spectrum and pathogenesis of human infections. Characterising viral isolates from successive generations of human infections will be key to updating diagnostics and assessing viral evolution. Beyond supportive care, 17 no specific coronavirus antivirals or vaccines of proven efficacy in humans exist, although clinical trials of both are ongoing for MERS-CoV and one controlled trial of ritonavir-boosted lopinavir monotherapy has been launched for 2019-nCoV (ChiCTR2000029308). Future animal model and clinical studies should focus on assessing the effectiveness and safety of promising antiviral drugs, monoclonal and polyclonal neutralising antibody products, and therapeutics directed against immunopathologic host responses. We have to be aware of the challenge and concerns brought by 2019-nCoV to our community. Every effort should be given to understand and control the disease, and the time to act is now. This online publication has been corrected. The corrected version first appeared at thelancet.com on January 29, 2020
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            Estimates of the severity of coronavirus disease 2019: a model-based analysis

            Summary Background In the face of rapidly changing data, a range of case fatality ratio estimates for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) have been produced that differ substantially in magnitude. We aimed to provide robust estimates, accounting for censoring and ascertainment biases. Methods We collected individual-case data for patients who died from COVID-19 in Hubei, mainland China (reported by national and provincial health commissions to Feb 8, 2020), and for cases outside of mainland China (from government or ministry of health websites and media reports for 37 countries, as well as Hong Kong and Macau, until Feb 25, 2020). These individual-case data were used to estimate the time between onset of symptoms and outcome (death or discharge from hospital). We next obtained age-stratified estimates of the case fatality ratio by relating the aggregate distribution of cases to the observed cumulative deaths in China, assuming a constant attack rate by age and adjusting for demography and age-based and location-based under-ascertainment. We also estimated the case fatality ratio from individual line-list data on 1334 cases identified outside of mainland China. Using data on the prevalence of PCR-confirmed cases in international residents repatriated from China, we obtained age-stratified estimates of the infection fatality ratio. Furthermore, data on age-stratified severity in a subset of 3665 cases from China were used to estimate the proportion of infected individuals who are likely to require hospitalisation. Findings Using data on 24 deaths that occurred in mainland China and 165 recoveries outside of China, we estimated the mean duration from onset of symptoms to death to be 17·8 days (95% credible interval [CrI] 16·9–19·2) and to hospital discharge to be 24·7 days (22·9–28·1). In all laboratory confirmed and clinically diagnosed cases from mainland China (n=70 117), we estimated a crude case fatality ratio (adjusted for censoring) of 3·67% (95% CrI 3·56–3·80). However, after further adjusting for demography and under-ascertainment, we obtained a best estimate of the case fatality ratio in China of 1·38% (1·23–1·53), with substantially higher ratios in older age groups (0·32% [0·27–0·38] in those aged <60 years vs 6·4% [5·7–7·2] in those aged ≥60 years), up to 13·4% (11·2–15·9) in those aged 80 years or older. Estimates of case fatality ratio from international cases stratified by age were consistent with those from China (parametric estimate 1·4% [0·4–3·5] in those aged <60 years [n=360] and 4·5% [1·8–11·1] in those aged ≥60 years [n=151]). Our estimated overall infection fatality ratio for China was 0·66% (0·39–1·33), with an increasing profile with age. Similarly, estimates of the proportion of infected individuals likely to be hospitalised increased with age up to a maximum of 18·4% (11·0–7·6) in those aged 80 years or older. Interpretation These early estimates give an indication of the fatality ratio across the spectrum of COVID-19 disease and show a strong age gradient in risk of death. Funding UK Medical Research Council.
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              Early dynamics of transmission and control of COVID-19: a mathematical modelling study

              Summary Background An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has led to 95 333 confirmed cases as of March 5, 2020. Understanding the early transmission dynamics of the infection and evaluating the effectiveness of control measures is crucial for assessing the potential for sustained transmission to occur in new areas. Combining a mathematical model of severe SARS-CoV-2 transmission with four datasets from within and outside Wuhan, we estimated how transmission in Wuhan varied between December, 2019, and February, 2020. We used these estimates to assess the potential for sustained human-to-human transmission to occur in locations outside Wuhan if cases were introduced. Methods We combined a stochastic transmission model with data on cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Wuhan and international cases that originated in Wuhan to estimate how transmission had varied over time during January, 2020, and February, 2020. Based on these estimates, we then calculated the probability that newly introduced cases might generate outbreaks in other areas. To estimate the early dynamics of transmission in Wuhan, we fitted a stochastic transmission dynamic model to multiple publicly available datasets on cases in Wuhan and internationally exported cases from Wuhan. The four datasets we fitted to were: daily number of new internationally exported cases (or lack thereof), by date of onset, as of Jan 26, 2020; daily number of new cases in Wuhan with no market exposure, by date of onset, between Dec 1, 2019, and Jan 1, 2020; daily number of new cases in China, by date of onset, between Dec 29, 2019, and Jan 23, 2020; and proportion of infected passengers on evacuation flights between Jan 29, 2020, and Feb 4, 2020. We used an additional two datasets for comparison with model outputs: daily number of new exported cases from Wuhan (or lack thereof) in countries with high connectivity to Wuhan (ie, top 20 most at-risk countries), by date of confirmation, as of Feb 10, 2020; and data on new confirmed cases reported in Wuhan between Jan 16, 2020, and Feb 11, 2020. Findings We estimated that the median daily reproduction number (R t) in Wuhan declined from 2·35 (95% CI 1·15–4·77) 1 week before travel restrictions were introduced on Jan 23, 2020, to 1·05 (0·41–2·39) 1 week after. Based on our estimates of R t, assuming SARS-like variation, we calculated that in locations with similar transmission potential to Wuhan in early January, once there are at least four independently introduced cases, there is a more than 50% chance the infection will establish within that population. Interpretation Our results show that COVID-19 transmission probably declined in Wuhan during late January, 2020, coinciding with the introduction of travel control measures. As more cases arrive in international locations with similar transmission potential to Wuhan before these control measures, it is likely many chains of transmission will fail to establish initially, but might lead to new outbreaks eventually. Funding Wellcome Trust, Health Data Research UK, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and National Institute for Health Research.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                reddyp@musc.edu
                Journal
                Head Neck
                Head Neck
                10.1002/(ISSN)1097-0347
                HED
                Head & Neck
                John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Hoboken, USA )
                1043-3074
                1097-0347
                01 May 2020
                : 10.1002/hed.26221
                Affiliations
                [ 1 ] Department of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery Medical University of South Carolina Charleston South Carolina USA
                [ 2 ] Department of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery Massachusetts Eye and Ear Boston Massachusetts USA
                Author notes
                [*] [* ] Correspondence

                Priyanka D. Reddy, Department of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery, Medical University of South Carolina, 135 Rutledge Avenue, MSC 550, Charleston, SC 29425.

                Email: reddyp@ 123456musc.edu

                Author information
                https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0365-4504
                https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0664-4571
                Article
                HED26221
                10.1002/hed.26221
                7267422
                32348600
                b46df87a-445e-4b67-a11a-5cc60871b5fb
                © 2020 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

                This article is being made freely available through PubMed Central as part of the COVID-19 public health emergency response. It can be used for unrestricted research re-use and analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source, for the duration of the public health emergency.

                History
                : 17 April 2020
                : 20 April 2020
                Page count
                Figures: 1, Tables: 1, Pages: 4, Words: 1681
                Categories
                Special Issue
                Special Issue
                Custom metadata
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                corrected-proof
                Converter:WILEY_ML3GV2_TO_JATSPMC version:5.8.3 mode:remove_FC converted:03.06.2020

                Otolaryngology
                bronchoscopy,coronavirus,covid‐19,esophagoscopy,laryngoscopy
                Otolaryngology
                bronchoscopy, coronavirus, covid‐19, esophagoscopy, laryngoscopy

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