23
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: not found

      How apes get into and out of joint actions : Shared intentionality as an interactional achievement

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisher
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others ( Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality ( Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination ( Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans ( Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to illustrate our framework.

          Related collections

          Most cited references163

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: not found

          Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition.

          We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.
            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: not found
            • Article: not found

            The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Book: not found

              Supersizing the Mind : Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension

              Andy Clark (2008)
              Studies of mind, thought, and reason have tended to marginalize the role of bodily form, real-world action, and environmental backdrop. In recent years, both in philosophy and cognitive science, this tendency has been identified and, increasingly, resisted. The result is a plethora of work on what has become known as embodied, situated, distributed, and even ‘extended’ cognition. Work in this new, loosely-knit field depicts thought and reason as in some way inextricably tied to the details of our gross bodily form, our habits of action and intervention, and the enabling web of social, cultural, and technological scaffolding in which we live, move, learn, and think. But exactly what kind of link is at issue? And what difference might such a link or links make to our best philosophical, psychological, and computational models of thought and reason? These are among the large unsolved problems in this increasingly popular field. This book offers both a tour of the emerging landscape, and an argument in favour of one approach to the key issues. That approach combines the use of representational, computational, and information-theoretic tools with an appreciation of the importance of context, timing, biomechanics, and dynamics. More controversially, it depicts some coalitions of biological and non-biological resources as the extended cognitive circuitry of individual minds.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems
                IS
                John Benjamins Publishing Company
                1572-0373
                1572-0381
                December 31 2020
                February 9 2021
                December 31 2020
                February 9 2021
                : 21
                : 3
                : 353-386
                Affiliations
                [1 ]University of Neuchâtel
                [2 ]La Vallée des Singes Zoological park
                [3 ]University of California San Diego
                [4 ]University of St Andrews
                Article
                10.1075/is.18048.gen
                b4611948-b0a3-4d58-bb4c-03b11551b9b6
                © 2021

                https://benjamins.com/content/customers/rights

                History

                Comments

                Comment on this article