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Abstract
As a core component of new energy vehicle development, power battery will bring serious
environmental pollution if it is not disposed of in a standardized way after retirement,
so a scientific recycling mechanism is the key to achieve sustainable development.
This paper explores the EPR mechanism of power battery recycling from a supply-side
perspective based on a game theory approach. The system dynamics evolution model was
constructed using Vensim software. Model testing, reward and punishment mechanism
design and analysis of key parameters changes were carried out. The results show that
the initial state of tripartite strategy choice is not conducive to the positive operation
of reverse supply chain. The curve gradually fluctuates toward positive strategy side
after the introduction of static reward and punishment mechanism, at which time the
three parties show a cyclical behavior pattern. The dynamic reward and punishment
mechanism can make consumers and almost 97% of the new energy vehicle manufacturers
(NEVMs) participate in the environmental protection of power battery recycling, which
has a better effect. In addition, the high cost of recycling will prevent a higher
percentage of NEVMs from participating in supply chain construction. At the same time,
the recycling price raised by private enterprises and small workshops is also one
of the key factors that interfere with the participation of supply-side groups in
formal recycling.