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      Effects of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy on hospitals competition under non-price regulation

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          Abstract

          Background

          Poor medical care and high fees are two major problems in the world health care system. As a result, health care insurance system reform is a major issue in developing countries, such as China. Governments should take the effect of health care insurance system reform on the competition of hospitals into account when they practice a reform. This article aims to capture the influences of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy and the importance of medical quality to patients on hospitals competition under non-price regulation.

          Methods

          We establish a three-stage duopoly model with quantity and quality competition. In the model, qualitative difference and asymmetric medical insurance subsidy among hospitals are considered. The government decides subsidy (or reimbursement) ratios in the first stage. Hospitals choose the quality in the second stage and then support the quantity in the third stage. We obtain our conclusions by mathematical model analyses and all the results are achieved by backward induction.

          Results

          The importance of medical quality to patients has stronger influence on the small hospital, while subsidy has greater effect on the large hospital. Meanwhile, the importance of medical quality to patients strengthens competition, but subsidy effect weakens it. Besides, subsidy ratios difference affects the relationship between subsidy and hospital competition. Furthermore, we capture the optimal reimbursement ratio based on social welfare maximization. More importantly, this paper finds that the higher management efficiency of the medical insurance investment funds is, the higher the best subsidy ratio is.

          Conclusions

          This paper states that subsidy is a two-edged sword. On one hand, subsidy stimulates medical demand. On the other hand, subsidy raises price and inhibits hospital competition. Therefore, government must set an appropriate subsidy ratio difference between large and small hospitals to maximize the total social welfare. For a developing country with limited medical resources and great difference in hospitals such as China, adjusting the reimbursement ratios between different level hospitals and increasing medical quality are two reasonable methods for the sustainable development of its health system.

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          Most cited references25

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          Assessing competition in hospital care markets: the importance of accounting for quality differentiation.

          A Tay (2002)
          Quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry, where the choices of Medicare patients are unaffected by prices. Unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness, this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market. I estimate a random-coefficients discrete-choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both distance and quality are substantial. The estimates suggest that patients do not substitute toward alternative hospitals in proportion to current market shares, implying that geographic market concentration is an inappropriate measure of hospital competitiveness.
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            The association between asymmetric information, hospital competition and quality of healthcare: evidence from Italy

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              • Article: not found

              How to subsidize energy efficiency under duopoly efficiently?

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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                wangchan0512@163.com
                pynie2013@163.com
                Journal
                Int J Equity Health
                Int J Equity Health
                International Journal for Equity in Health
                BioMed Central (London )
                1475-9276
                15 November 2016
                15 November 2016
                2016
                : 15
                : 184
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, 510632 People’s Republic of China
                [2 ]Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, Guangzhou, 510320 People’s Republic of China
                Article
                468
                10.1186/s12939-016-0468-8
                5109695
                27846902
                955abc8f-0f46-4ea4-bbe2-aa38427aa0a0
                © The Author(s). 2016

                Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver ( http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.

                History
                : 5 August 2016
                : 31 October 2016
                Categories
                Research
                Custom metadata
                © The Author(s) 2016

                Health & Social care
                quality competition,medical insurance subsidy,management efficiency,game theory,i11,l51,i13

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