11
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access

      Nonhuman Primates Satisfy Utility Maximization in Compliance with the Continuity Axiom of Expected Utility Theory

      research-article

      Read this article at

      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Expected Utility Theory (EUT), the first axiomatic theory of risky choice, describes choices as a utility maximization process: decision makers assign a subjective value (utility) to each choice option and choose the one with the highest utility. The continuity axiom, central to Expected Utility Theory and its modifications, is a necessary and sufficient condition for the definition of numerical utilities. The axiom requires decision makers to be indifferent between a gamble and a specific probabilistic combination of a more preferred and a less preferred gamble. While previous studies demonstrated that monkeys choose according to combinations of objective reward magnitude and probability, a concept-driven experimental approach for assessing the axiomatically defined conditions for maximizing utility by animals is missing. We experimentally tested the continuity axiom for a broad class of gamble types in 4 male rhesus macaque monkeys, showing that their choice behavior complied with the existence of a numerical utility measure as defined by the economic theory. We used the numerical quantity specified in the continuity axiom to characterize subjective preferences in a magnitude-probability space. This mapping highlighted a trade-off relation between reward magnitudes and probabilities, compatible with the existence of a utility function underlying subjective value computation. These results support the existence of a numerical utility function able to describe choices, allowing for the investigation of the neuronal substrates responsible for coding such rigorously defined quantity.

          SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT A common assumption of several economic choice theories is that decisions result from the comparison of subjectively assigned values (utilities). This study demonstrated the compliance of monkey behavior with the continuity axiom of Expected Utility Theory, implying a subjective magnitude-probability trade-off relation, which supports the existence of numerical utility directly linked to the theoretical economic framework. We determined a numerical utility measure able to describe choices, which can serve as a correlate for the neuronal activity in the quest for brain structures and mechanisms guiding decisions.

          Related collections

          Most cited references41

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: not found
          • Article: not found

          Controlling the False Discovery Rate: A Practical and Powerful Approach to Multiple Testing

            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: not found
            • Article: not found

            Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value.

              Economic choice is the behaviour observed when individuals select one among many available options. There is no intrinsically 'correct' answer: economic choice depends on subjective preferences. This behaviour is traditionally the object of economic analysis and is also of primary interest in psychology. However, the underlying mental processes and neuronal mechanisms are not well understood. Theories of human and animal choice have a cornerstone in the concept of 'value'. Consider, for example, a monkey offered one raisin versus one piece of apple: behavioural evidence suggests that the animal chooses by assigning values to the two options. But where and how values are represented in the brain is unclear. Here we show that, during economic choice, neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encode the value of offered and chosen goods. Notably, OFC neurons encode value independently of visuospatial factors and motor responses. If a monkey chooses between A and B, neurons in the OFC encode the value of the two goods independently of whether A is presented on the right and B on the left, or vice versa. This trait distinguishes the OFC from other brain areas in which value modulates activity related to sensory or motor processes. Our results have broad implications for possible psychological models, suggesting that economic choice is essentially choice between goods rather than choice between actions. In this framework, neurons in the OFC seem to be a good candidate network for value assignment underlying economic choice.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                J Neurosci
                J Neurosci
                jneuro
                jneurosci
                J. Neurosci
                The Journal of Neuroscience
                Society for Neuroscience
                0270-6474
                1529-2401
                31 March 2021
                31 March 2021
                : 41
                : 13
                : 2964-2979
                Affiliations
                [1] 1Department of Physiology, Development and Neuroscience, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 3DY, United Kingdom
                [2] 2Department of Neurosurgery, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts 02114
                Author notes
                Correspondence should be addressed to Simone Ferrari-Toniolo at Simone.FerrariToniolo@ 123456gmail.com

                Author contributions: S.F.-T. and W.S. designed research; S.F.-T., P.M.B., F.G., and R.B.-M. performed research; S.F.-T. analyzed data; S.F.-T. wrote the first draft of the paper; S.F.-T. and W.S. edited the paper; S.F.-T. wrote the paper.

                Author information
                https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9009-0764
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2901-003X
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6455-0648
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5989-7647
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8530-4518
                Article
                JN-RM-0955-20
                10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0955-20.2020
                8018892
                33542082
                82da8aaa-2044-4169-959c-9ccb91c94e9b
                Copyright © 2021 Ferrari-Toniolo et al.

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properly attributed.

                History
                : 22 April 2020
                : 13 November 2020
                : 19 November 2020
                Funding
                Funded by: http://doi.org/10.13039/100010269Wellcome
                Award ID: WT 095495
                Award ID: WT 204811
                Funded by: http://doi.org/10.13039/501100000781EC | European Research Council (ERC)
                Award ID: 293549
                Categories
                Research Articles
                Behavioral/Cognitive

                continuity axiom,decision making,expected utility theory,reward risk,utility

                Comments

                Comment on this article