How (not) to underestimate unconscious perception

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Abstract

Recent work questions whether previously reported unconscious perceptual effects are genuinely unconscious, or due to weak conscious perception. Some philosophers and psychologists react by rejecting unconscious perception or by holding that it has been overestimated. I argue that the most significant attack on unconscious perception commits the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of interpreting evidence that observers were conscious of something as evidence that they were conscious of task‐relevant features. This fallacy is prevalent in consciousness research: if unconscious perception exists, scientists could routinely underestimate it. I conclude with methodological recommendations for moving the debate forward.

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Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

George Mashour, Pieter Roelfsema, Jean-Pierre Changeux … (2020)

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A signal detection theoretic approach for estimating metacognitive sensitivity from confidence ratings.

Brian Maniscalco, Hakwan C. Lau (2012)

How should we measure metacognitive ("type 2") sensitivity, i.e. the efficacy with which observers' confidence ratings discriminate between their own correct and incorrect stimulus classifications? We argue that currently available methods are inadequate because they are influenced by factors such as response bias and type 1 sensitivity (i.e. ability to distinguish stimuli). Extending the signal detection theory (SDT) approach of Galvin, Podd, Drga, and Whitmore (2003), we propose a method of measuring type 2 sensitivity that is free from these confounds. We call our measure meta-d', which reflects how much information, in signal-to-noise units, is available for metacognition. Applying this novel method in a 2-interval forced choice visual task, we found that subjects' metacognitive sensitivity was close to, but significantly below, optimality. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings, as well as related computational issues of the method. We also provide free Matlab code for implementing the analysis. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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Measuring consciousness: is one measure better than the other?

Kristian Sandberg, Bert Timmermans, Morten Overgaard … (2010)

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering (PDW), in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine (1) which scale best correlates with performance, and (2) whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus (1) PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and (2) we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies. Copyright © 2010. Published by Elsevier Inc.