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      Empirical Failures of the Claim That Autistic People Lack a Theory of Mind

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          Abstract

          The claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind—that they fail to understand that other people have a mind or that they themselves have a mind—pervades psychology. This article (a) reviews empirical evidence that fails to support the claim that autistic people are uniquely impaired, much less that all autistic people are universally impaired, on theory-of-mind tasks; (b) highlights original findings that have failed to replicate; (c) documents multiple instances in which the various theory-of-mind tasks fail to relate to each other and fail to account for autistic traits, social interaction, and empathy; (c) summarizes a large body of data, collected by researchers working outside the theory-of-mind rubric, that fails to support assertions made by researchers working inside the theory-of-mind rubric; and (d) concludes that the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind is empirically questionable and societally harmful.

          SCIENTIFIC ABSTRACT

          The assertion that autistic people lack a theory of mind—that they fail to understand that other people have a mind or that they themselves have a mind—pervades psychology. In this article, we critically examine the empirical basis of this assertion. We review empirical evidence that fails to support the claim that autistic people are uniquely impaired, much less that all autistic people are universally impaired, on theory-of-mind tasks. We highlight seminal theory-of-mind findings that have failed to replicate. We document multiple instances in which the various theory-of-mind tasks fail to converge and fail to predict autistic traits, social interaction, and empathy. We summarize a large body of data, collected by researchers working outside the theory-of-mind rubric, that fails to support assertions made by researchers working inside the theory-of-mind rubric. We conclude that the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind is empirically questionable and societally harmful.

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          Most cited references211

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          On the ontological status of autism: the ‘double empathy problem’

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            Autism: the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory.

            The mind-blindness theory of autism spectrum conditions has been successful in explaining the social and communication difficulties that characterize these conditions but cannot explain the nonsocial features (the narrow interests, need for sameness, and attention to detail). A new theory, the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory, is summarized, which argues two factors are needed to explain the social and nonsocial features of the condition. This is related to other cognitive theories such as the weak central coherence theory and the executive dysfunction theory. The E-S theory is also extended to the extreme male brain theory as a way of understanding the biased sex ratio in autism. Etiological predictions are discussed, as are the clinical applications arising from the E-S theory.
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              Neuroanatomical and neurochemical bases of theory of mind.

              This paper presents a novel neurobiological model of theory of mind (ToM) that incorporates both neuroanatomical and neurochemical levels of specificity. Within this model, cortical and subcortical regions are functionally organized into networks that subserve the ability to represent cognitive and affective mental states to both self and other. The model maintains that (1) cognitive and affective aspects of ToM are subserved by dissociable, yet interacting, prefrontal networks. The cognitive ToM network primarily engages the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsal striatum; and the affective ToM network primarily engages the ventromedial and orbitofrontal cortices, the ventral anterior cingulate cortex, the amygdala and the ventral striatum; (2) self and other mental-state representation is processed by distinct brain regions within the mentalizing network, and that the ability to distinguish between self and other mental states is modulated by a functionally interactive dorsal and ventral attention/selection systems at the temporoparietal junction and the anterior cingulate cortex; and (3) ToM functioning is dependent on the integrity of the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems which are primarily engaged in the maintenance and application processes of represented mental states. In addition to discussing the mechanisms involved in mentalizing in terms of its component processes, we discuss the model's implications to pathologies that variably impact one's ability to represent, attribute and apply mental states. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                101613308
                41654
                Arch Sci Psychol
                Arch Sci Psychol
                Archives of scientific psychology
                2169-3269
                17 December 2019
                9 December 2019
                2019
                14 January 2020
                : 7
                : 1
                : 102-118
                Affiliations
                University of Wisconsin—Madison
                University of Michigan
                Author notes
                Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Morton Ann Gernsbacher, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1202 West Johnson Street, Madison, WI 53706. magernsb@ 123456wisc.edu

                Morton Ann Gernsbacher, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—Madison; Melanie Yergeau, Department of English Language and Literature, University of Michigan.

                Article
                NIHMS1063909
                10.1037/arc0000067
                6959478
                31938672
                7310d499-756f-4a3d-84c8-86134fc6e85e

                This article has been published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s). Author(s) grant(s) the American Psychological Association the exclusive right to publish the article and identify itself as the original publisher.

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                autism,theory of mind,convergent validity,predictive validity,reproducibility

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