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      COVID-19 in jails and prisons: A neglected infection in a marginalized population

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          Abstract

          The world’s prison population is estimated at around 11 million with rates of incarceration ranging from 698 per 100,000 population in the United States to as low as 16 per 100,000 in the Central African Republic [1]. In the US, there are approximately 2.2 million people incarcerated, representing an estimated 24% of the world’s proportion of incarcerated individuals [2–3]. Estimates as of mid-May 2020 in the US demonstrate that state jails hold 1,230,000 individuals, 625,000 are detained in local jails, and 225,000 in federal jails and prisons [4]. Mass incarceration policies have important collateral damage to prisoners, their families and communities [5]. Investing in social capital, community-building practices, public safety strategies, and violence prevention initiatives represent a more cost-effective approach [4–5]. In communities with steady economic and social breakdown, many groups including African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and white working class without a bachelor’s degree are caught in this web of compound and expanding disadvantage [5–6]. Worldwide, in most settings, poor urban communities experience the highest rates of both incarceration and recidivism [5]. We are enduring a pandemic due to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the novel pathogen that causes the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) [7]. This zoonotic agent emerged in December 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei, China, and it has already spread to 187 countries causing almost 6 million confirmed cases and more than 360,000 deaths. In the US alone, as of May 29, there have been 1,750,000 confirmed cases with almost 102,201 deaths [7]. All US states have confirmed cases and most have reported deaths. As the pandemic continues to spread across the country, many outbreaks continue to strike high-population density centers, including nursing homes, residential homes, immigration detention centers, and jails and prisons [8]. Like other viral pathogens, SARS-CoV-2 is closely dependent on the complexity of human behavior and human interactions. There are many documented outbreaks of respiratory pathogens in jails and prisons in many countries [9]. Custodial institutions have been the epicenter of outbreaks of infections amongst prisoners amplifying infections at rates far exceeding those in nonincarcerated communities. Highly transmissible viral infections such as measles, mumps, and the novel coronavirus disseminates rapidly among inmates and staff and potentially into the larger community [9]. Overcrowding, insufficient sanitation, poor ventilation, and inadequate healthcare in prisons contribute to enabling these institutions as breeding grounds of infectious disease outbreaks [9–10]. Detention and incarceration of any kind involves large groups of people living in cohorts in confined spaces creating many challenges for curbing the spread of COVID-19 [10]. The number of single rooms in jails or prisons are insufficient to adhere to the recommended isolation and quarantine guidelines and limits the ability to implement strict infection prevention protocols. The SARS-CoV-2 is able to survive for prolonged periods on materials that are highly prevalent in custodial settings including nonporous surfaces and metallic surfaces complicating disinfection practices. It is exceedingly difficult to comply with established infection prevention protocols recommending repeated disinfection and decontamination of all surfaces in jails and prisons, resulting from the large number of inmates and complex human patterns of interactions between inmates and with the staff [9]. A recent natural experiment inside a cruise ship demonstrated the rapid spread of the SARS-CoV-2 among large crowds inside a closed environment [11]. A total of 696 cumulative cases of COVID-19 and 9 deaths occurred among the 3711 passengers inside the Princess Diamond Cruise berthed at the port of Yokohama, Japan from February 3 to March 1, 2020 [11]. The most recent estimates demonstrate that the basic reproduction number of the SARS-CoV-2 is higher than previously estimated and higher than the influenza virus A/H1N1 that caused the 1918 to 1919 pandemic [8]. In contrast to influenza viruses, transmission of this coronavirus occurs by those with undetected infection having mild symptoms or asymptomatic infection in up to 20% of cases [12]. Thus, transmission of this viral pathogen in closed spaces with a large presence of individuals increases the frequency of exposure and infection. Without complete social distancing in imprisonment settings, our ability to reduce the transmission dynamics to achieve an R0 less than 1 is limited. Globally, there are widespread concerns about large COVID-19 epidemics sweeping through the incarcerated populations in China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and several African nations, leading to calls for parole or early release [13]. In the US, there are already thousands of confirmed cases of COVID-19 tied to prisons and jails with many deaths among prisoners and staff (Table 1). These include some of America’s largest outbreaks in the most populated jails including Cook County Jail, Los Angeles County Jail System, Sterling Prison in Colorado, and many others. However, the true extent of the epidemic inside the walls of prisons and jails in the US is largely unknown because of undertesting and underreporting. As the number of cases of COVID-19 continues to spread in the US, it is likely that there will be an increasing number of clusters and outbreaks in carceral settings with implications to the larger community and to the healthcare system [14]. At this point in the pandemic, the capacity to handle a large influx of critically ill patients coming from jails and prisons is limited. Efforts at the federal, state, and local levels are reducing the number of incarcerated individuals [15]. However, without widespread availability of testing in jails and prisons to guide isolation and quarantine practices, inadequate supply of personal protective equipment for inmates including masks, and the revolving door of jails, hampers the ability to block transmission as the current outbreak inside many correctional facilities has uncovered [15]. 10.1371/journal.pntd.0008409.t001 Table 1 Comparison of four different initiatives compiling data on COVID-19 confirmed cases and deaths among prisoners and staff in correctional facilities across the US (Data to May 29, 2020). Data source COVID-19 cases among jail-prison residents COVID-19 cases among staff COVID-19 deaths among residents COVID-19 deaths among staff in jails/prisons UCLA Law COVID-19 Behind Bars a 38,616 10,182 470 42 COVID Prison Data b 29,519 7402 392 20 CDC Data (May 6 Updated Guidance Correctional Facilities) c 4,893 2,778 88 15 The Marshall Project d 29,251 7,435 415 33 aUCLA Law COVID-19 behind bars data project by Professor Sharon Dolovich, Director–Available from: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1X6uJkXXS-O6eePLxw2e4JeRtM41uPZ2eRcOA_HkPVTk/edit#gid=1197647409. [cited 2020 May 29]. bCOVID Prison Data (Prison Project). Available from: https://covidprisondata.com/. [cited 2020 May 29]. cCOVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities—United States, February–April 2020 Available from: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6919e1.htm. [cited 2020 May 29]. dThe Marshall Project. Available from: https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons. [cited 2020 May 29]. In the US, from a societal perspective, the increasingly identified impact of the COVID-19 pandemic among Hispanic Americans and African Americans reveals the prevailing structural violence across localities in the US [15]. Among these communities, the pervasive disparities that result from policies, economic systems, and institutions that limit peoples’ education, access to resources, power relations, and social networks shapes people’s practices and behaviors [15]. These same forces are responsible for maintaining systematic social inequities that result in poor health. The luxury of social distancing is hard to meet for daily workers including those in the service industry. Equally, except for punitive solitary confinement, social distancing is the antithesis of incarceration. Until we institute structural interventions that address the social, political, and legal environment influencing life opportunities and restoring the biographical stance for regaining control of persons’ lives, imprisonment is a political tool and a for-profit enterprise of special interest groups [2]. As the history of the influenza pandemics of the 20th Century—A/H1N1 in 1918 to 1919, A/H2N2 in 1957, A/H3N2 in 1958—and those of the 21st Century—SARS-CoV-1 in 2003, A/H1N1pdm in 2019, and MERS in 2012—the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is not over until transmission is interrupted in all settings. The synergistic combination of the high-transmissibility of the novel SARS-CoV-2 and the high flow into and out of jails will continue to threaten those imprisoned, the staff, and the larger community [14]. Facing the COVID-19 pandemic calls for worldwide efforts to include joint planning by public health institutions with federal, state, and local authorities to explicitly and transparently implement and monitor preventive and mitigation interventions in correctional facilities [14]. Depopulating jails and prisons during this pandemic is the only means of achieving meaningful social distancing and protecting medically vulnerable persons. To implement effective population management approaches such as sequestration, isolation, and quarantine practices, expanding testing of prisoners and correctional officers is critical inside these facilities. In the long term, policy-makers need to address what this pandemic has uncovered and what we have chosen to neglect: the existence of underlying unfair social and economic structures that are tightly bound to unfair health outcomes in the US and elsewhere. The disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on US prisons and jails is part of a larger pattern of the health disparity aspects of this viral illness. For example, in US Southern states most of the COVID19 deaths now occur among African American populations [15]. Though, in the short term, and while the pandemic continues to reshape the daily lives of all citizens in every corner in the world, no one is safe until everyone is safe, including those who are currently incarcerated. An effective response to prevent and mitigate the COVID-19 impact in custodial settings is a pivotal component of the global response to this pandemic.

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          Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV2)

          Estimation of the prevalence and contagiousness of undocumented novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV2) infections is critical for understanding the overall prevalence and pandemic potential of this disease. Here we use observations of reported infection within China, in conjunction with mobility data, a networked dynamic metapopulation model and Bayesian inference, to infer critical epidemiological characteristics associated with SARS-CoV2, including the fraction of undocumented infections and their contagiousness. We estimate 86% of all infections were undocumented (95% CI: [82%–90%]) prior to 23 January 2020 travel restrictions. Per person, the transmission rate of undocumented infections was 55% of documented infections ([46%–62%]), yet, due to their greater numbers, undocumented infections were the infection source for 79% of documented cases. These findings explain the rapid geographic spread of SARS-CoV2 and indicate containment of this virus will be particularly challenging.
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            Asymptomatic Transmission, the Achilles’ Heel of Current Strategies to Control Covid-19

            Traditional infection-control and public health strategies rely heavily on early detection of disease to contain spread. When Covid-19 burst onto the global scene, public health officials initially deployed interventions that were used to control severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, including symptom-based case detection and subsequent testing to guide isolation and quarantine. This initial approach was justified by the many similarities between SARS-CoV-1 and SARS-CoV-2, including high genetic relatedness, transmission primarily through respiratory droplets, and the frequency of lower respiratory symptoms (fever, cough, and shortness of breath) with both infections developing a median of 5 days after exposure. However, despite the deployment of similar control interventions, the trajectories of the two epidemics have veered in dramatically different directions. Within 8 months, SARS was controlled after SARS-CoV-1 had infected approximately 8100 persons in limited geographic areas. Within 5 months, SARS-CoV-2 has infected more than 2.6 million people and continues to spread rapidly around the world. What explains these differences in transmission and spread? A key factor in the transmissibility of Covid-19 is the high level of SARS-CoV-2 shedding in the upper respiratory tract, 1 even among presymptomatic patients, which distinguishes it from SARS-CoV-1, where replication occurs mainly in the lower respiratory tract. 2 Viral loads with SARS-CoV-1, which are associated with symptom onset, peak a median of 5 days later than viral loads with SARS-CoV-2, which makes symptom-based detection of infection more effective in the case of SARS CoV-1. 3 With influenza, persons with asymptomatic disease generally have lower quantitative viral loads in secretions from the upper respiratory tract than from the lower respiratory tract and a shorter duration of viral shedding than persons with symptoms, 4 which decreases the risk of transmission from paucisymptomatic persons (i.e., those with few symptoms). Arons et al. now report in the Journal an outbreak of Covid-19 in a skilled nursing facility in Washington State where a health care provider who was working while symptomatic tested positive for infection with SARS-CoV-2 on March 1, 2020. 5 Residents of the facility were then offered two facility-wide point-prevalence screenings for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) of nasopharyngeal swabs on March 13 and March 19–20, along with collection of information on symptoms the residents recalled having had over the preceding 14 days. Symptoms were classified into typical (fever, cough, and shortness of breath), atypical, and none. Among 76 residents in the point-prevalence surveys, 48 (63%) had positive rRT-PCR results, with 27 (56%) essentially asymptomatic, although symptoms subsequently developed in 24 of these residents (within a median of 4 days) and they were reclassified as presymptomatic. Quantitative SARS-CoV-2 viral loads were similarly high in the four symptom groups (residents with typical symptoms, those with atypical symptoms, those who were presymptomatic, and those who remained asymptomatic). It is notable that 17 of 24 specimens (71%) from presymptomatic persons had viable virus by culture 1 to 6 days before the development of symptoms. Finally, the mortality from Covid-19 in this facility was high; of 57 residents who tested positive, 15 (26%) died. An important finding of this report is that more than half the residents of this skilled nursing facility (27 of 48) who had positive tests were asymptomatic at testing. Moreover, live coronavirus clearly sheds at high concentrations from the nasal cavity even before symptom development. Although the investigators were not able to retrospectively elucidate specific person-to-person transmission events and although symptom ascertainment may be unreliable in a group in which more than half the residents had cognitive impairment, these results indicate that asymptomatic persons are playing a major role in the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Symptom-based screening alone failed to detect a high proportion of infectious cases and was not enough to control transmission in this setting. The high mortality (>25%) argues that we need to change our current approach for skilled nursing facilities in order to protect vulnerable, enclosed populations until other preventive measures, such as a vaccine or chemoprophylaxis, are available. A new approach that expands Covid-19 testing to include asymptomatic persons residing or working in skilled nursing facilities needs to be implemented now. Despite “lockdowns” in these facilities, coronavirus outbreaks continue to spread, with 1 in 10 nursing homes in the United States (>1300 skilled nursing facilities) now reporting cases, with the likelihood of thousands of deaths. 6 Mass testing of the residents in skilled nursing facilities will allow appropriate isolation of infected residents so that they can be cared for and quarantine of exposed residents to minimize the risk of spread. Mass testing in these facilities could also allow cohorting 7 and some resumption of group activities in a nonoutbreak setting. Routine rRT-PCR testing in addition to symptomatic screening of new residents before entry, conservative guidelines for discontinuation of isolation, 7 and periodic retesting of long-term residents, as well as both periodic rRT-PCR screening and surgical masking of all staff, are important concomitant measures. There are approximately 1.3 million Americans currently residing in nursing homes. 8 Although this recommendation for mass testing in skilled nursing facilities could be initially rolled out in geographic areas with high rates of community Covid-19 transmission, an argument can be made to extend this recommendation to all U.S.-based skilled nursing facilities now because case ascertainment is uneven and incomplete and because of the devastating consequences of outbreaks. Immediately enforceable alternatives to mass testing in skilled nursing facilities are few. The public health director of Los Angeles has recommended that families remove their loved ones from nursing homes, 9 a measure that is not feasible for many families. Asymptomatic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is the Achilles’ heel of Covid-19 pandemic control through the public health strategies we have currently deployed. Symptom-based screening has utility, but epidemiologic evaluations of Covid-19 outbreaks within skilled nursing facilities such as the one described by Arons et al. strongly demonstrate that our current approaches are inadequate. This recommendation for SARS-CoV-2 testing of asymptomatic persons in skilled nursing facilities should most likely be expanded to other congregate living situations, such as prisons and jails (where outbreaks in the United States, whose incarceration rate is much higher than rates in other countries, are increasing), enclosed mental health facilities, and homeless shelters, and to hospitalized inpatients. Current U.S. testing capability must increase immediately for this strategy to be implemented. Ultimately, the rapid spread of Covid-19 across the United States and the globe, the clear evidence of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from asymptomatic persons, 5 and the eventual need to relax current social distancing practices argue for broadened SARS-CoV-2 testing to include asymptomatic persons in prioritized settings. These factors also support the case for the general public to use face masks 10 when in crowded outdoor or indoor spaces. This unprecedented pandemic calls for unprecedented measures to achieve its ultimate defeat.
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              Prisons and custodial settings are part of a comprehensive response to COVID-19

              Prisons are epicentres for infectious diseases because of the higher background prevalence of infection, the higher levels of risk factors for infection, the unavoidable close contact in often overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and unsanitary facilities, and the poor access to health-care services relative to that in community settings. 1 Infections can be transmitted between prisoners, staff and visitors, between prisons through transfers and staff cross-deployment, and to and from the community. As such, prisons and other custodial settings are an integral part of the public health response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). One of the first documented influenza outbreaks in prison occurred in San Quentin prison in California, USA, during the 1918 influenza pandemic. In three separate instances, infection was introduced by a newly received prisoner, and a single transfer to another prison resulted in an outbreak there. Isolation was central to containment. 2 More recently, prison influenza outbreaks have been described in the USA, Canada, Australia, Taiwan, and Thailand.3, 4 We are unaware of any published reports of influenza outbreaks in youth detention or immigration detention centres, although modelling suggests that outbreaks would progress similarly in these settings. 5 Since early 2020, COVID-19 outbreaks have been documented worldwide, including Iran, where 70 000 prisoners have been released in an effort to reduce in-custody transmission. 6 Prisons concentrate individuals who are susceptible to infection and those with a higher risk of complications. COVID-19 has an increased mortality in older people and in those with chronic diseases or immunosuppression. Notably, multimorbidity is normative among people in prison, often with earlier onset and greater severity than in the general population, and prison populations are ageing in many countries. 7 Furthermore, inadequate investment in prison health, substantial overcrowding in some prison settings, and rigid security processess have the potential to delay diagnosis and treatment. As such, COVID-19 outbreaks in custodial settings are of importance for public health, for at least two reasons: first, that explosive outbreaks in these settings have the potential to overwhelm prison health-care services and place additional demands on overburdened specialist facilities in the community; and second, that, with an estimated 30 million people released from custody each year globally, prisons are a vector for community transmission that will disproportionately impact marginalised communities. What must be done to mitigate the impact of large outbreaks of COVID-19 in prisons? The public health importance of prison responses to influenza outbreaks has been recognised in the USA, 8 where the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have developed a checklist for pandemic influenza preparedness in correctional settings. WHO has also issued prison-specific guidance for responding to COVID-19 (panel ). 9 Panel Prison-specific guidance for responding to COVID-19 Joint planning Include prison health and correctional authorities in the overall public health response, rather than permitting them to plan and operate in isolation. Risk management Design and implement adequate systems for limiting importation and exportation of cases from or to the community, and transmission and spread within prisons. Prevention and control Develop protocols for entry screening, personal protection measures, social distancing, environmental cleaning and disinfection, and restriction of movement, including limitation of transfers and access for non-essential staff and visitors. Treatment Explicitly and transparently align prison health systems with the wider health and emergency planning systems, including transfer protocols for patients requiring specialised care. Isolate cases and contacts if required to control the spread of infection in prisons. However, special consideration of the potentially serious mental health effects of isolation in these settings is essential.10, 11 In high-income countries, maintaining isolation without depriving incarcerated people of human contact might be possible. 12 Information sharing Close collaboration between health and justice ministries should be established to ensure continuity of information, which is a crucial component of an effective, coordinated, whole-of-government response. Governance of prison health by a ministry of health, rather than a ministry of justice or similar, is likely to facilitate timely information sharing. 13 Prison health is public health by definition. Despite this and the very porous borders between prisons and communities, prisons are often excluded or treated as separate from public health efforts. The fast spread of COVID-19 will, like most epidemics, disproportionately affect the most disadvantaged people. Therefore, to mitigate the effects of prison outbreaks on tertiary health-care facilities and reduce morbidity and mortality among society's most marginalised, it is crucial that prisons, youth detention centres, and immigration detention centres are embedded within the broader public health response.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Role: Editor
                Journal
                PLoS Negl Trop Dis
                PLoS Negl Trop Dis
                plos
                plosntds
                PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases
                Public Library of Science (San Francisco, CA USA )
                1935-2727
                1935-2735
                22 June 2020
                June 2020
                : 14
                : 6
                : e0008409
                Affiliations
                [1 ] Department of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, University of Colorado, Anschutz Medical Center, Aurora, Colorado, United States of America
                [2 ] Instituto Nacional de Salud, Hospital Infantil de México, Federico Gomez, México City, México
                [3 ] Criminal Defense Attorney, Denver, Colorado, United States of America
                [4 ] UCHealth, Family Medicine, Denver, Colorado, United States of America
                [5 ] Texas Children’s Center for Vaccine Development, Departments of Pediatrics and Molecular Virology & Microbiology, National School of Tropical Medicine, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, United States of America
                National Institutes of Health, UNITED STATES
                Author notes

                The authors declare no conflicts of interest exist.

                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8757-643X
                http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9619-7714
                http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9405-5333
                http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1145-1910
                http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6394-7117
                http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7363-8652
                http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1746-7462
                Article
                PNTD-D-20-00895
                10.1371/journal.pntd.0008409
                7307724
                32569274
                707d87ff-861a-4386-baed-088a8261300c
                © 2020 Franco-Paredes et al

                This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

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