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      Comparing Dynamic Specifications: The Case of Presidential Approval

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      Publication date (Print):
      Journal: Political Analysis
      Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)

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          Abstract

          This article compares a variety of models of presidential approval in terms of their dynamic properties and their theoretical underpinnings. Exponential distributed lags, partial adjustment, error correction, and transfer function models are considered. The major difference between the models lies in interpretation rather than statistical properties. The error correction model seems most satisfactory. Approval models based on individual level theories are examined, and found to give no additional purchase.

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          Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson

          John Mueller (1970)
          I think [my grandchildren] will be proud of two things. What I did for the Negro and seeing it through in Vietnam for all of Asia. The Negro cost me 15 points in the polls and Vietnam cost me 20.
          Article 0 comments Cited 234 times – based on 0 reviews     Review now
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            Systematic Sampling, Temporal Aggregation, and the Study of Political Relationships

            John Freeman (1989)
            Systematic sampling and temporal aggregation are the practices of sampling a time series at regular intervals and of summing or averaging time series observations over a time interval, respectively. Both practices are a source of statistical error and faulty inference. The problems that systematic sampling and temporal aggregation create for the construction of strongly specified and weakly specified models are discussed. The seriousness of these problems then is illustrated with respect to the debate about superpower rivalry. The debate is shown to derive, in part, from the fact that some researchers employ highly temporally aggregated measures of U.S. and Soviet foreign policy behavior. The larger methodological lessons are that we need to devote more time to determining the natural time unit of our theories and to conducting robustness checks across levels of temporal aggregation.
            Article 0 comments Cited 15 times – based on 0 reviews     Review now
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              A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance

              William Keech, Henry Chappell (1985)
              Most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance, voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote-hungry politicians. Drawing on macroeconomic theory, we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes, but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies. We find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete. Our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts. The results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy.
              Article 0 comments Cited 11 times – based on 0 reviews     Review now
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Journal ID (publisher-id): applab
                Title: Political Analysis
                Abbreviated Title: Polit. anal.
                Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
                ISSN (Print): 1047-1987
                ISSN (Electronic): 1476-4989
                Publication date Created: 1991
                Publication date (Print): January 2017
                Volume: 3
                Issue:
                Pages: 51-87
                Article
                DOI: 10.1093/pan/3.1.51
                SO-VID: 6b357452-ce1b-42e8-b7aa-378fcd48736f
                Copyright © © 1991
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