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      Dopamine Reward Prediction Error Responses Reflect Marginal Utility

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      1 , 2 , , 1 , 2 , 1
      Current Biology
      Cell Press

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          Summary

          Background

          Optimal choices require an accurate neuronal representation of economic value. In economics, utility functions are mathematical representations of subjective value that can be constructed from choices under risk. Utility usually exhibits a nonlinear relationship to physical reward value that corresponds to risk attitudes and reflects the increasing or decreasing marginal utility obtained with each additional unit of reward. Accordingly, neuronal reward responses coding utility should robustly reflect this nonlinearity.

          Results

          In two monkeys, we measured utility as a function of physical reward value from meaningful choices under risk (that adhered to first- and second-order stochastic dominance). The resulting nonlinear utility functions predicted the certainty equivalents for new gambles, indicating that the functions’ shapes were meaningful. The monkeys were risk seeking (convex utility function) for low reward and risk avoiding (concave utility function) with higher amounts. Critically, the dopamine prediction error responses at the time of reward itself reflected the nonlinear utility functions measured at the time of choices. In particular, the reward response magnitude depended on the first derivative of the utility function and thus reflected the marginal utility. Furthermore, dopamine responses recorded outside of the task reflected the marginal utility of unpredicted reward. Accordingly, these responses were sufficient to train reinforcement learning models to predict the behaviorally defined expected utility of gambles.

          Conclusions

          These data suggest a neuronal manifestation of marginal utility in dopamine neurons and indicate a common neuronal basis for fundamental explanatory constructs in animal learning theory (prediction error) and economic decision theory (marginal utility).

          Highlights

          • Monkeys’ risk attitudes depend on reward magnitude

          • Numerical utility functions are derived from choices under risk

          • Dopamine responses depend on the slope of the utility function

          • Dopamine reward responses can train risk preferences

          Abstract

          Stauffer et al. show that dopamine prediction error responses code marginal utility, a fundamental economic variable that reflects risk preferences. They measure utility functions and relate dopamine reward responses to the utility functions’ first derivatives. The dopamine responses track both increasing and decreasing marginal utility.

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          Most cited references44

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          Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms

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            Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects

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              Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value.

              Economic choice is the behaviour observed when individuals select one among many available options. There is no intrinsically 'correct' answer: economic choice depends on subjective preferences. This behaviour is traditionally the object of economic analysis and is also of primary interest in psychology. However, the underlying mental processes and neuronal mechanisms are not well understood. Theories of human and animal choice have a cornerstone in the concept of 'value'. Consider, for example, a monkey offered one raisin versus one piece of apple: behavioural evidence suggests that the animal chooses by assigning values to the two options. But where and how values are represented in the brain is unclear. Here we show that, during economic choice, neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encode the value of offered and chosen goods. Notably, OFC neurons encode value independently of visuospatial factors and motor responses. If a monkey chooses between A and B, neurons in the OFC encode the value of the two goods independently of whether A is presented on the right and B on the left, or vice versa. This trait distinguishes the OFC from other brain areas in which value modulates activity related to sensory or motor processes. Our results have broad implications for possible psychological models, suggesting that economic choice is essentially choice between goods rather than choice between actions. In this framework, neurons in the OFC seem to be a good candidate network for value assignment underlying economic choice.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Curr Biol
                Curr. Biol
                Current Biology
                Cell Press
                0960-9822
                1879-0445
                03 November 2014
                03 November 2014
                : 24
                : 21
                : 2491-2500
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Department of Physiology, Development, and Neuroscience, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3DY, UK
                Author notes
                []Corresponding author william.stauffer@ 123456gmail.com
                [2]

                Co-first author

                Article
                S0960-9822(14)01128-2
                10.1016/j.cub.2014.08.064
                4228052
                25283778
                63dd3311-ca54-4b3f-b61e-e5a772afe2c5
                © 2014 The Authors
                History
                : 8 June 2014
                : 28 July 2014
                : 29 August 2014
                Categories
                Article

                Life sciences
                Life sciences

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