When Membership Gives Strength to Act: Inclusion of the Group Into the Self and Feeling of Personal Agency

Recent research shows individuals' identification with in-groups to be psychologically important and socially consequential. However, there is little agreement about how identification should be conceptualized or measured. On the basis of previous work, the authors identified 5 specific components of in-group identification and offered a hierarchical 2-dimensional model within which these components are organized. Studies 1 and 2 used confirmatory factor analysis to validate the proposed model of self-definition (individual self-stereotyping, in-group homogeneity) and self-investment (solidarity, satisfaction, and centrality) dimensions, across 3 different group identities. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated the construct validity of the 5 components by examining their (concurrent) correlations with established measures of in-group identification. Studies 5-7 demonstrated the predictive and discriminant validity of the 5 components by examining their (prospective) prediction of individuals' orientation to, and emotions about, real intergroup relations. Together, these studies illustrate the conceptual and empirical value of a hierarchical multicomponent model of in-group identification.

The meaning maintenance model (MMM) proposes that people have a need for meaning; that is, a need to perceive events through a prism of mental representations of expected relations that organizes their perceptions of the world. When people's sense of meaning is threatened, they reaffirm alternative representations as a way to regain meaning-a process termed fluid compensation. According to the model, people can reaffirm meaning in domains that are different from the domain in which the threat occurred. Evidence for fluid compensation can be observed following a variety of psychological threats, including most especially threats to the self, such as self-esteem threats, feelings of uncertainty, interpersonal rejection, and mortality salience. People respond to these diverse threats in highly similar ways, which suggests that a range of psychological motivations are expressions of a singular impulse to generate and maintain a sense of meaning.

There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the "comparator model". In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts.