Dynamic reward and penalty strategies of green building construction incentive: an evolutionary game theory-based analysis

Meng, Qingfeng; Liu, Yingying; Li, Zhen; Wu, Changzhi

doi:10.1007/s11356-021-13624-z

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Dynamic reward and penalty strategies of green building construction incentive: an evolutionary game theory-based analysis

Author(s): Qingfeng Meng , Yingying Liu , Zhen Li , Changzhi Wu

Publication date (Electronic): April 14 2021

Journal: Environmental Science and Pollution Research

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

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Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky (1979)

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Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty

Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman (1992)

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323

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Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics

Peter D Taylor, Leo Jonker (1978)

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Title: Environmental Science and Pollution Research

Abbreviated Title: Environ Sci Pollut Res

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

ISSN (Print): 0944-1344

ISSN (Electronic): 1614-7499

Publication date Created: September 2021

Publication date (Electronic): April 14 2021

Publication date (Print): September 2021

Volume: 28

Issue: 33

Pages: 44902-44915

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11356-021-13624-z

PubMed ID: 33852119

SO-VID: 4dc76599-826e-4402-94e8-829b43f46d13

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Dynamic reward and penalty strategies of green building construction incentive: an evolutionary game theory-based analysis

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Journal of Green Building

Most cited references 40

Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty

Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics

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