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      Archetype analysis of older adult immunization decision-making and implementation in 34 countries

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          Highlights

          • Immunization for older adults is an important strategy for healthy aging.

          • We conducted a country archetype analysis of vaccine decisions and implementation.

          • We found four distinct archetypes amongst the countries analyzed.

          • Understanding country drivers & facilitators could help inform global strategies.

          Abstract

          The global population of adults over 65 years of age is growing rapidly and is expected to double by 2050. Countries will face substantial health, economic and social burden deriving from vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs) such as influenza, pneumonia and herpes zoster in older adults. It will be essential that countries utilize several public health strategies, including immunization. Understanding the different approaches countries have taken on adult immunization could help provide future learnings and technical support for adult vaccines within life-course immunization strategies. In this study, we describe the priorities and approaches that underlie adult immunization decision-making and implementation processes in 32 high-and-middle-income countries and two territories (“34 countries”) who recommend adult vaccines in their national schedule. We conducted an archetype analysis based on a subset of two dozen indicators abstracted from a larger database. The analysis was based on a mixed-methods study, including results from 120 key informant interviews in six countries and a landscape review of secondary data from 34 countries. We found four distinct archetypes: disease prevention-focused; health security-focused; evolving adult focus; and, child-focused and cost-sensitive. The highest performing countries belonged to the disease prevention-focused and health security archetypes, although there was a range of performance within each archetype. Considering common barriers and facilitators of decision-making and implementation of adult vaccines within a primary archetype could help provide a framework for strategies to support countries with similar needs and approaches. It can also help in developing context-specific policies and guidance, including for countries prioritizing adult immunization programs in light of COVID-19. Further research may be beneficial to further refine archetypes and expand the understanding of what influences success within them. This can help advance policies and action that will improve vaccine access for older adults and build a stronger appreciation of the value of immunization amongst a variety of stakeholders.

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          Generation of political priority for global health initiatives: a framework and case study of maternal mortality.

          Why do some global health initiatives receive priority from international and national political leaders whereas others receive little attention? To analyse this question we propose a framework consisting of four categories: the strength of the actors involved in the initiative, the power of the ideas they use to portray the issue, the nature of the political contexts in which they operate, and characteristics of the issue itself. We apply this framework to the case of a global initiative to reduce maternal mortality, which was launched in 1987. We undertook archival research and interviewed people connected with the initiative, using a process-tracing method that is commonly employed in qualitative research. We report that despite two decades of effort the initiative remains in an early phase of development, hampered by difficulties in all these categories. However, the initiative's 20th year, 2007, presents opportunities to build political momentum. To generate political priority, advocates will need to address several challenges, including the creation of effective institutions to guide the initiative and the development of a public positioning of the issue to convince political leaders to act. We use the framework and case study to suggest areas for future research on the determinants of political priority for global health initiatives, which is a subject that has attracted much speculation but little scholarship.
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            Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Surveillance and Containment Measures for the First 100 Patients with COVID-19 in Singapore — January 2–February 29, 2020

            On March 13, 2020, this report was posted online as an MMWR Early Release. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was first reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, and has since spread globally, resulting in >95,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases worldwide by March 5, 2020 ( 1 ). Singapore adopted a multipronged surveillance strategy that included applying the case definition at medical consults, tracing contacts of patients with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19, enhancing surveillance among different patient groups (all patients with pneumonia, hospitalized patients in intensive care units [ICUs] with possible infectious diseases, primary care patients with influenza-like illness, and deaths from possible infectious etiologies), and allowing clinician discretion (i.e., option to order a test based on clinical suspicion, even if the case definition was not met) to identify COVID-19 patients. Containment measures, including patient isolation and quarantine, active monitoring of contacts, border controls, and community education and precautions, were performed to minimize disease spread. As of March 5, 2020, a total of 117 COVID-19 cases had been identified in Singapore. This report analyzes the first 100 COVID-19 patients in Singapore to determine the effectiveness of the surveillance and containment measures. COVID-19 patients were classified by the primary means by which they were detected. Application of the case definition and contact tracing identified 73 patients, 16 were detected by enhanced surveillance, and 11 were identified by laboratory testing based on providers’ clinical discretion. Effectiveness of these measures was assessed by calculating the 7-day moving average of the interval from symptom onset to isolation in hospital or quarantine, which indicated significant decreasing trends for both local and imported COVID-19 cases. Rapid identification and isolation of cases, quarantine of close contacts, and active monitoring of other contacts have been effective in suppressing expansion of the outbreak and have implications for other countries experiencing outbreaks. On January 2, 2020, days after the first report of the disease from China, the ministry of health (MOH) in Singapore, a small island city-state in Southeast Asia with a population of approximately 5.7 million, developed a local case definition (Supplementary Table, https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85735) and advised all medical practitioners to be vigilant for suspected COVID-19 patients ( 2 ). A confirmed case was defined as a positive test for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, by reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) ( 3 ), or a positive viral microneutralization antibody test using a SARS-CoV-2 virus isolate (BetaCoV/Singapore/2/2020; GISAID accession 76 number EPI_ISL_407987) and conducted using previously published protocols ( 4 ). At hospitals, patients with suspected COVID-19 received chest radiographs and RT-PCR testing on at least two nasopharyngeal swabs collected 24 hours apart ( 5 ). Physicians are mandated to report all suspected and confirmed COVID-19 patients through a centralized disease notification system. The case definition was updated five times following the outbreak’s start to adapt to the evolving global situation (Supplementary Table, https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85735). The MOH carried out contact tracing around confirmed cases to identify persons who might have been infected. Contacts with fever (temperature ≥100.4°F [≥38°C]) or respiratory symptoms were transferred directly to a hospital for further evaluation and testing. Close contacts were defined as having close (within 6.6 ft [2 m]) and prolonged (generally ≥30 minutes) contact with the COVID-19 patient. Contacts at lower risk were persons who had some interactions with the COVID-19 patient for shorter periods of time. Asymptomatic close contacts were placed under compulsory quarantine for 14 days, and contacts at lower risk were placed under active monitoring. All contacts were assessed by telephone for fever or respiratory symptoms by public health officials during the quarantine or monitoring period, thrice daily for close contacts and once daily for contacts at lower risk. Contacts who became symptomatic were transferred to a hospital. Surveillance was enhanced in late January 2020 by testing the following groups for COVID-19: 1) all hospitalized patients with pneumonia (later expanded to include patients with pneumonia evaluated in primary care settings); 2) ICU patients with possible infectious causes as determined by the physician; 3) patients with influenza-like illness at sentinel government and private primary care clinics included in the routine influenza surveillance network; and 4) deaths from possible infectious causes. In addition, medical practitioners could choose to test patients if there was clinical (e.g., prolonged respiratory illness with unknown cause) or epidemiologic (e.g., association with known clusters) suspicion. The effectiveness of Singapore’s surveillance and containment efforts was assessed from the outbreak’s start until February 29 by calculating the 7-day moving average of the interval from symptom onset to isolation in hospital or quarantine. This measure provides an indication of the time spent within the community when a person with COVID-19 is potentially infectious. Differences in the percentages of cases detected through the different surveillance components were tested using the chi-squared or Fisher’s exact test. All analyses were conducted using R statistical software (version 3.5.1; The R Foundation). Among the first 100 confirmed COVID-19 cases in Singapore, the average patient age was 42.5 years (median = 41 years; interquartile range [IQR] = 34–54 years) (Table). The majority (72%) of patients were aged 30–59 years, and 60% of patients were male. RT-PCR confirmed 99% of cases, and one case was confirmed by viral microneutralization testing. Twenty-four cases were imported, and the rest resulted from local transmission. Fifteen patients were ever in the ICU; no deaths have been reported to date. Contact tracing contributed to the primary detection of approximately half (53%) of COVID-19 patients. Another 20 (20%) patients were identified at general practitioner clinics or hospitals because they met the case definition; 16 were identified through enhanced surveillance (15 from pneumonia surveillance and one from the ICU), and another 11 through medical providers’ clinical discretion. No patients were identified through surveillance for influenza-like illness. A significant difference was found in the percentage of cases detected by the various surveillance methods, depending on whether the cases were linked to another COVID-19 patient or by travel to China, compared with cases that could not be linked to another case (p<0.001). Among linked cases, the largest proportion (62.7%) was detected through contact tracing, whereas among unlinked cases, the largest proportion of cases (58.8%) was detected through enhanced surveillance (Table). The earliest symptom onset date reported by a COVID-19 patient was January 14 (Figure 1). The epidemic curve peaked on January 30, when nine patients were identified, before declining to two to five patients per day on February 11 and continuing forward. International importations accounted for a majority of cases at the outbreak’s start before more local cases were detected. The mean interval from symptom onset to hospital isolation or quarantine was 5.6 days (median = 5 days; IQR = 2–8 days). The 7-day moving average of the interval from symptom onset to isolation declined significantly across the study period for both imported and local cases, from 9.0 and 18.0 days to 0.9 and 3.1 days, respectively (p<0.001) (Figure 2). Among the 53 patients first identified through contact tracing, 13 (24.5%) were contacted on or before the date of symptom onset. TABLE Characteristics of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases, by linkage to other known cases (N = 100) — Singapore, January–February 2020 Characteristic No. (%) of COVID-19 cases P-value Total Linked* Unlinked† Age group (yrs) <30 17 (17.0) 17 (20.5) 0 (—) 0.12 30–39 28 (28.0) 23 (27.7) 5 (29.4) 40–49 20 (20.0) 16 (19.3) 4 (23.5) 50–59 24 (24.0) 20 (24.1) 4 (23.5) ≥60 11 (11.0) 7 (8.4) 4 (23.5) Sex Male 60 (60.0) 46 (55.4) 14 (82.4) 0.06 Female 40 (40.0) 37 (44.6) 3 (17.6) Ethnic group Chinese 87 (87.0) 74 (89.2) 13 (76.5) 0.21 Indian 6 (6.0) 4 (4.8) 2 (11.8) Malay 2 (2.0) 1 (1.2) 1 (5.9) Other 5 (5.0) 4 (4.8) 1 (5.9) Primary detection method Contact tracing 53 (53.0) 52 (62.7) 1 (5.9) <0.001 Case definition at medical consult 20 (20.0) 16 (19.3) 4 (23.5) Enhanced surveillance 16 (16.0) 6 (7.2) 10 (58.8) Provider clinical discretion 11 (11.0) 9 (10.8) 2 (11.8) * Patients who were epidemiologically linked to other COVID-19 patients or had recent travel to China. † Patients whose source of infection could not be determined. FIGURE 1 Date of symptom onset and date of report for cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (N = 100), based on importation and linkage* ,† status — Singapore, January 14–February 28, 2020 * Linked patients defined as those who were found to be epidemiologically linked to other COVID-19 patients or who had recent travel to China. † Unlinked patients defined as those whose source of infection could not be determined. The figure consists of two histograms, epidemiologic curves showing the date of symptom onset and the date of report for 100 cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Singapore during January 14–February 28, 2020, based on status of importation and linkage to other cases or travel to China. FIGURE 2 Interval from symptom onset to isolation or hospitalization (7-day moving average), of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19 cases) (N = 100), by importation status — Singapore, January 14–February 28, 2020 The figure is a line graph showing the interval from symptom onset to isolation or hospitalization, using a 7-day moving average, of 100 coronavirus disease 2019 COVID-19) cases in Singapore during January 14–February 28, 2020, by importation status. Discussion In this assessment of the measures that Singapore, a small city-state, put in place to identify COVID-19 patients and contain disease spread in the early outbreak phase, approximately one quarter of cases were detected through enhanced surveillance among hospitalized patients with pneumonia and ICU patients (16 cases [16%]) and through providers’ clinical discretion (11 [11%]). A recent study considered Singapore to have the highest surveillance capacity for COVID-19 among all countries ( 6 ). The study estimated that if other countries had similar detection capacities as Singapore, the global number of imported cases detected would be 2.8 times higher than the observed current number. The surveillance methods in Singapore complemented one another to identify infected persons, with the overlapping components constituting safety nets; none of the methods alone would have detected all patients. The case definition was important for clinicians to use as a foundation, and active case finding around COVID-19 patients through contact tracing was useful in detecting new patients early for isolation. The enhanced surveillance measures of SARS-CoV-2 testing of all patients with pneumonia, surveillance of ICU patients with severe illness and deaths potentially attributable to COVID-19, and clinical discretion in requesting testing were all important in detecting initially unlinked patients for further investigation. Adoption of multiple surveillance mechanisms can ensure broad coverage because each missed case can lead to chains of transmission that might be difficult to contain subsequently. Singapore has implemented aggressive measures to contain local transmission of COVID-19. After an initial increase in locally transmitted cases, the number of newly identified cases decreased after approximately 1 month, determined by symptom onset dates. This decrease is likely a result of the early implementation of surveillance and detection measures while the numbers of patients were still small and individual-level containment was possible; a larger number of cases would have driven community transmission. The decline in the 7-day moving average of interval from onset to isolation in hospital and quarantine was also indicative of efforts to contain disease spread across time. Singapore has also implemented other measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19. To prevent imported cases from seeding local transmission, border control measures included temperature screening initially for travelers on flights from Wuhan before expanding to include all travelers entering Singapore at air, sea, and land checkpoints ( 7 ). Short-term visitors with travel in the past 14 days to selected countries or regions (initially mainland China and later expanded to South Korea, northern Italy, and Iran) were denied entry; Singapore residents returning from these areas were placed under a mandatory 14-day self-quarantine. To reduce community spread, public education messages were focused on personal hygiene and seeking early medical care and self-isolation when having respiratory symptoms. As of March 5, 2020, schools have not closed because there was no widespread community transmission in Singapore and few cases among children; precautionary measures such as reducing mixing across classes or schools have been implemented to limit possible disease transmission. The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, the 7-day moving average interval from symptom onset to isolation could fluctuate for recent dates as additional patients are detected and might be insufficient as a single measure to evaluate the effectiveness of containment. Further indicators to assess effectiveness of containment measures should be investigated. Nevertheless, the downward trend was significant from the outbreak’s start until early February. Second, the case detection methods were primarily focused on symptomatic patients. Further studies are needed to assess the number of asymptomatic patients in the community and their potential to transmit disease and whether additional measures targeting asymptomatic patients would have resulted in further case reductions. Finally, generalizability of results is limited because of the small sample size and lack of cases in settings such as long-term nursing facilities and health care settings. Singapore implemented strong surveillance and containment measures, which appear to have slowed the growth of the outbreak. These measures might be useful for detection and containment of COVID-19 in other countries that are experiencing the start of local COVID-19 outbreaks. Singapore is a small island city-state, and nations with other characteristics might need to adapt and augment Singapore’s approaches to achieve the same level of effectiveness. Summary What is already known about this topic? First detected in China in late 2019, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) transmission has spread globally. What is added by this report? Singapore implemented a multipronged surveillance and containment strategy that contributed to enhanced case ascertainment and slowing of the outbreak. Based on review of the first 100 cases, the mean interval from symptom onset to isolation was 5.6 days and declined after approximately 1 month. What are the implications for public health practice? A multipronged surveillance strategy could lead to enhanced case detection and reduced transmission of highly infectious diseases such as COVID-19.
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              COVID-19: too little, too late?

              The Lancet (2020)
              Although WHO has yet to call the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 infection a pandemic, it has confirmed that the virus is likely to spread to most, if not all, countries. Regardless of terminology, this latest coronavirus epidemic is now seeing larger increases in cases outside China. As of March 3, more than 90 000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been reported in 73 countries. The outbreak in northern Italy, which has seen 11 towns officially locked down and residents threatened with imprisonment if they try to leave, shocked European political leaders. Their shock turned to horror as they saw Italy become the epicentre for further spread across the continent. As the window for global containment closes, health ministers are scrambling to implement appropriate measures to delay spread of the virus. But their actions have been slow and insufficient. There is now a real danger that countries have done too little, too late to contain the epidemic. By striking contrast, the WHO-China joint mission report calls China's vigorous public health measures toward this new coronavirus probably the most “ambitious, agile and aggressive disease containment effort in history”. China seems to have avoided a substantial number of cases and fatalities, although there have been severe effects on the nation's economy. In its report on the joint mission, WHO recommends that countries activate the highest level of national response management protocols to ensure the all-of-government and all-of-society approaches needed to contain viral spread. China's success rests largely with a strong administrative system that it can mobilise in times of threat, combined with the ready agreement of the Chinese people to obey stringent public health procedures. Although other nations lack China's command-and-control political economy, there are important lessons that presidents and prime ministers can learn from China's experience. The signs are that those lessons have not been learned. SARS-CoV-2 presents different challenges to high-income and low-income or middle-income countries (LMICs). A major fear over global spread is how weak health systems will cope. Some countries, such as Nigeria, have so far successfully dealt with individual cases. But large outbreaks could easily overwhelm LMIC health services. The difficult truth is that countries in most of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, are not prepared for an epidemic of coronavirus. And nor are many nations across Latin America and the Middle East. Public health measures, such as surveillance, exhaustive contact tracing, social distancing, travel restrictions, educating the public on hand hygiene, ensuring flu vaccinations for the frail and immunocompromised, and postponing non-essential operations and services will all play their part in delaying the spread of infection and dispersing pressure on hospitals. Individual governments will need to decide where they draw the line on implementing these measures. They will have to weigh the ethical, social, and economic risks versus proven health benefits. The evidence surely indicates that political leaders should be moving faster and more aggressively. As Xiaobo Yang and colleagues have shown, the mortality of critically ill patients with SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia is substantial. As they wrote recently in The Lancet Respiratory Medicine, “The severity of SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia poses great strain on critical care resources in hospitals, especially if they are not adequately staffed or resourced.” This coronavirus is not benign. It kills. The political response to the epidemic should therefore reflect the national security threat that SARS-CoV-2 represents. National governments have all released guidance for health-care professionals, but published advice alone is insufficient. Guidance on how to manage patients with COVID-19 must be delivered urgently to health-care workers in the form of workshops, online teaching, smart phone engagement, and peer-to-peer education. Equipment such as personal protective equipment, ventilators, oxygen, and testing kits must be made available and supply chains strengthened. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control recommends that hospitals set up a core team including hospital management, an infection control team member, an infectious disease expert, and specialists representing the intensive care unit and accident and emergency departments. So far, evidence suggests that the colossal public health efforts of the Chinese Government have saved thousands of lives. High-income countries, now facing their own outbreaks, must take reasoned risks and act more decisively. They must abandon their fears of the negative short-term public and economic consequences that may follow from restricting public freedoms as part of more assertive infection control measures. © 2020 Manuel Silvestri/Reuters Picutres 2020 Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Vaccine
                Vaccine
                Vaccine
                Elsevier Ltd.
                0264-410X
                1873-2518
                16 April 2020
                27 May 2020
                16 April 2020
                : 38
                : 26
                : 4170-4182
                Affiliations
                Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, International Vaccine Access Center, USA
                Author notes
                [* ]Corresponding author at: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, International Vaccine Access Center, 415 N Washington Street, 5th Floor, Baltimore, MD 21231, USA. lprivor1@ 123456jhu.edu
                Article
                S0264-410X(20)30507-7
                10.1016/j.vaccine.2020.04.027
                7252137
                32376108
                13ead52e-916b-4e08-9f9e-0fb2fc64c005
                © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

                Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

                History
                : 8 February 2020
                : 8 April 2020
                : 12 April 2020
                Categories
                Article

                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                adult immunization,decision-making,implementation,vaccine,policy,archetype,healthy aging,older adults,life-course,covid-19

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