Coupling perception to action through incidental sensory consequences of motor behaviour

The spatial interaction of visual attention and saccadic eye movements was investigated in a dual-task paradigm that required a target-directed saccade in combination with a letter discrimination task. Subjects had to saccade to locations within horizontal letter strings left and right of a central fixation cross. The performance in discriminating between the symbols "E" and "E", presented tachistoscopically before the saccade within the surrounding distractors was taken as a measure of visual attention. The data show that visual discrimination is best when discrimination stimulus and saccade target refer to the same object; discrimination at neighboring items is close to chance level. Also, it is not possible, in spite of prior knowledge of discrimination target position, to direct attention to the discrimination target while saccading to a spatially close saccade target. The data strongly argue for an obligatory and selective coupling of saccade programming and visual attention to one common target object. The results favor a model in which a single attentional mechanism selects objects for perceptual processing and recognition, and also provides the information necessary for motor action.

There are ever more compelling tools available for neuroscience research, ranging from selective genetic targeting to optogenetic circuit control to mapping whole connectomes. These approaches are coupled with a deep-seated, often tacit, belief in the reductionist program for understanding the link between the brain and behavior. The aim of this program is causal explanation through neural manipulations that allow testing of necessity and sufficiency claims. We argue, however, that another equally important approach seeks an alternative form of understanding through careful theoretical and experimental decomposition of behavior. Specifically, the detailed analysis of tasks and of the behavior they elicit is best suited for discovering component processes and their underlying algorithms. In most cases, we argue that study of the neural implementation of behavior is best investigated after such behavioral work. Thus, we advocate a more pluralistic notion of neuroscience when it comes to the brain-behavior relationship: behavioral work provides understanding, whereas neural interventions test causality.