Bit Transmission Probability Maximizing the Key Rate of the BB84
  Protocol

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Abstract

In all papers on the BB84 protocol, the transmission probability of each bit value is usually set to be equal. In this paper, we show that by assigning different transmission probability to each transmitted qubit within a single polarization basis, we can generally improve the key generation rate of the BB84 protocol and achieve a higher key rate.

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Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

John Preskill, Peter W. Shor (2000)

We prove the security of the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement-purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.

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An information-theoretic security proof for QKD protocols

, , (2005)

We present a new technique for proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the BB84, the six-state, and the B92 protocol with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel.