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      Witnessing, Remembering, and Testifying: Why the Past Is Special for Human Beings

      research-article
      1 , 2 , 3 , 1 , 4
      Perspectives on Psychological Science
      SAGE Publications
      episodic memory, testimony, commitments

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          Abstract

          The past is undeniably special for human beings. To a large extent, both individuals and collectives define themselves through history. Moreover, humans seem to have a special way of cognitively representing the past: episodic memory. As opposed to other ways of representing knowledge, remembering the past in episodic memory brings with it the ability to become a witness. Episodic memory allows us to determine what of our knowledge about the past comes from our own experience and thereby what parts of the past we can give testimony about. In this article, we aim to give an account of the special status of the past by asking why humans have developed the ability to give testimony about it. We argue that the past is special for human beings because it is regularly, and often principally, the only thing that can determine present social realities such as commitments, entitlements, and obligations. Because the social effects of the past often do not leave physical traces behind, remembering the past and the ability to bear testimony it brings is necessary for coordinating social realities with other individuals.

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          The future of memory: remembering, imagining, and the brain.

          During the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in research examining the role of memory in imagination and future thinking. This work has revealed striking similarities between remembering the past and imagining or simulating the future, including the finding that a common brain network underlies both memory and imagination. Here, we discuss a number of key points that have emerged during recent years, focusing in particular on the importance of distinguishing between temporal and nontemporal factors in analyses of memory and imagination, the nature of differences between remembering the past and imagining the future, the identification of component processes that comprise the default network supporting memory-based simulations, and the finding that this network can couple flexibly with other networks to support complex goal-directed simulations. This growing area of research has broadened our conception of memory by highlighting the many ways in which memory supports adaptive functioning. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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            Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.

            Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.
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              Gossip in evolutionary perspective.

              R. Dunbar (2004)
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Perspect Psychol Sci
                Perspect Psychol Sci
                PPS
                sppps
                Perspectives on Psychological Science
                SAGE Publications (Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA )
                1745-6916
                1745-6924
                21 January 2020
                March 2020
                : 15
                : 2
                : 428-443
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University
                [2 ]Department of Psychology, Harvard University
                [3 ]Department of Philosophy, Harvard University
                [4 ]Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London
                Author notes
                [*]Johannes B. Mahr, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA 02144 E-mail: jmahr@ 123456fas.harvard.edu
                Author information
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7358-0152
                Article
                10.1177_1745691619879167
                10.1177/1745691619879167
                7059205
                31961781
                0e44953f-365b-4f77-9c44-d6eea720b4dc
                © The Author(s) 2020

                This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages ( https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

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                Funding
                Funded by: european research council, FundRef https://doi.org/10.13039/501100000781;
                Award ID: PARTNERS, #742231
                Categories
                Regular Articles
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                episodic memory,testimony,commitments
                episodic memory, testimony, commitments

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