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      Anchoring in a Social Context: How the Possibility of Being Misinformed by Others Impacts One's Judgment

      1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
      Social Cognition
      Guilford Publications

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          Abstract

          Building on research about naïve theories of biases, we propose that people are more likely to engage in critical thinking when assessing others’ reasoning. Hence, anchoring effects should be reduced when anchor values are presented as others’ estimates and people perceive others as less knowledgeable (i.e., more prone to biases) than themselves. Three experiments tested this hypothesis by presenting the same anchors as other participants’ answers or without a specified source. This source manipulation was combined with explicit forewarnings about the anchoring effect, which have been shown to trigger debiasing efforts. In support of our hypothesis, results showed that anchors provided by a social source effectively reduced the anchoring effect and did so in a more reliable way than forewarnings. Furthermore, the response-time analysis in two of the experiments suggests that such attenuation was the result of deliberate adjustment.

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          Most cited references56

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          Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.

          This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
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            Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing.

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              Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.

              Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Social Cognition
                Social Cognition
                Guilford Publications
                0278-016X
                February 2023
                February 2023
                : 41
                : 1
                : 67-87
                Affiliations
                [1 ] CICPSI, Faculdade de Psicologia, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal
                Article
                10.1521/soco.2023.41.1.67
                7a3b8da0-1c4f-4ba8-9472-031b708b7221
                © 2023
                History

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