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      Exploring the impact of ketamine on the experience of illusory body ownership.

      Biological Psychiatry
      Elsevier BV

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          Abstract

          Our sense of body ownership is profound and familiar, yet it may be misleading. In the rubber-hand illusion, synchronous tactile and visual stimulation lead to the experience that a rubber hand is actually one's own. This illusion is stronger in schizophrenia. Given the evidence that ketamine, a noncompetitive N-methyl-D-aspartate antagonist reproduces symptoms of schizophrenia, we sought to determine whether the rubber-hand illusion is augmented by ketamine.

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          Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see.

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            Touching a rubber hand: feeling of body ownership is associated with activity in multisensory brain areas.

            In the "rubber-hand illusion," the sight of brushing of a rubber hand at the same time as brushing of the person's own hidden hand is sufficient to produce a feeling of ownership of the fake hand. We shown previously that this illusion is associated with activity in the multisensory areas, most notably the ventral premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004). However, it remains to be demonstrated that this illusion does not simply reflect the dominant role of vision and that the premotor activity does not reflect a visual representation of an object near the hand. To address these issues, we introduce a somatic rubber-hand illusion. The experimenter moved the blindfolded participant's left index finger so that it touched the fake hand, and simultaneously, he touched the participant's real right hand, synchronizing the touches as perfectly as possible. After approximately 9.7 s, this stimulation elicited an illusion that one was touching one's own hand. We scanned brain activity during this illusion and two control conditions, using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Activity in the ventral premotor cortices, intraparietal cortices, and the cerebellum was associated with the illusion of touching one's own hand. Furthermore, the rated strength of the illusion correlated with the degree of premotor and cerebellar activity. This finding suggests that the activity in these areas reflects the detection of congruent multisensory signals from one's own body, rather than of visual representations. We propose that this could be the mechanism for the feeling of body ownership.
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              Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.

              Advances in cognitive neuroscience offer us new ways to understand the symptoms of mental illness by uniting basic neurochemical and neurophysiological observations with the conscious experiences that characterize these symptoms. Cognitive theories about the positive symptoms of schizophrenia--hallucinations and delusions--have tended to treat perception and belief formation as distinct processes. However, recent advances in computational neuroscience have led us to consider the unusual perceptual experiences of patients and their sometimes bizarre beliefs as part of the same core abnormality--a disturbance in error-dependent updating of inferences and beliefs about the world. We suggest that it is possible to understand these symptoms in terms of a disturbed hierarchical Bayesian framework, without recourse to separate considerations of experience and belief.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                20947068
                3025328
                10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.07.032

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