Dear editor
“A great deal of intelligence can be invested in ignorance when the need for illusion
is deep”. Saul Bellow
Paille and Martini’s review on nalmefene for alcohol dependence deserves some comment.1
First, the authors stated no conflict of interest despite both repeatedly received
money from Lundbeck laboratories, the company marketing nalmefene (eg, http://www.lundbeck.com/fr/a-propos-de-lundbeck/transparence-des-liens
and https://www.transparence.sante.gouv.fr/flow/main?execution=e2s1). We recently
challenged such unprofessional behavior in a French journal where authors also masked
their conflicts of interest and provided an inaccurate analysis.2
Second, the data analysis is flawed and failed to discuss the limitations.
a. Nalmefene [17-N-cyclopropylmethyl-3,14-dihydroxy-4,5-beta-alpha-epoxy-6 methylenemorphinan
hydrochloride (10365 NIH)], is a simple 6-methyl derivative of naltrexone. Its origin
goes back to early 1980. Naltrexone is a drug that had a marketing authorization on
validated and rigorous criteria (abstinence) and all the related numerous independent
trials using a solid methodology are consistent.3,4 Instead, nalmefene is characterized
by a dystocia. In 1998, Contral Pharma tried to develop nalmefene against alcohol
use disorders. The trials in this indication like in other more anecdotal conditions
(eating behavior, memory disorder, bronchospasm, pruritus, cystitis …) have been unsuccessful,
the results failing to reach statistical significance. The Lundbeck laboratory acquired
the patent for this somewhat forgotten molecule and tried to relaunch its development.
b. “If you torture the data enough, nature will Always confess”. Ronald Coase. All
three trials (Sense 1, 2 and 3) exhibit poor results, which may explain why these
have not been published in the core clinical journals unlike the pivotal trials of
acamprosate or naltrexone.4–6 Sense 1 and 2 trials were pooled to provide a basis
for the marketing authorization with a post hoc analysis of a subgroup of patients
– representing only ¼ of the cohort, this is far from an intention to treat analysis.7,8
There were too many missing data and too many patients were lost to follow-up.9 Sense
3 study is not significant regarding the 4 endpoint measures (both primary and secondary).10
But the authors underlined significant results for endpoints at the 13th month despite
this was not in the original protocol of the study. Last, there is a significant bias
of attrition, only 61% of patients in the nalmefene group completing the study against
67% in the placebo group.
c. The endpoint (consumption of alcohol) was on a declarative basis and no objective
measures commonly used in the tests were retained: alcohol, CDT (carbohydrate deficient
transferrin) or ethyl glucuronide (hair or urine).11
d. The endpoint was not validated. The decrease in consumption is a surrogate endpoint
and so far no study has shown it could reduce hospitalization, morbidity, or mortality
rates. A decrease in consumption could be a temporary solution to develop the therapeutic
alliance when a patient is not ready for abstinence. However, considering this endpoint
as a success is nothing but hype or a hoax. The paradigm of reducing risks is well
established for the risk of infection with a drug addict. Reducing risk by reducing
consumption remains a myth. It goes back to 1973, but the extended follow-up of the
cohort has shown that this concept was inappropriate.12 All studies testing a decrease
in consumption failed to show evidence for effectiveness.13 What would we say if a
drug against morbid obesity had a marketing authorization without data on weight or
morbidity because it allows patients to refrain from eating one slice of pizza per
day?14 The marketing authorization from the European Medicines Agency relied on a
“white paper” on accepting the decrease in consumption as a surrogate endpoint. This
position is not accepted by the FDA. The “white paper” was authored by van den Brink
who has received fees from Lundbeck, as all investigators publishing nalmefene trials.7,8,10
Sense 3 was also published in a journal where the two publishers were also paid by
Lundbeck and failed to respond to a request to publish a brief critical analysis of
the trial (A Braillon, personal communication, 2015).10
e. It was neither scientific nor ethical not to compare nalmefene to a validated treatment
that received a marketing authorization. Helsinki declaration (1964) stated that any
experimental maneuver was to be compared to the best available care as a comparator
(Article II.2). It was possible to build such comparative tests.
Third, independent evaluations are negative.
a. The independent drug bulletin Prescrire concluded: “In both trials, patients taking
nalmefene declared two “heavy drinking days” per month less than patients in the placebo
groups. Daily consumption of alcohol was 5–9 grams lower with nalmefene than with
placebo. The most common side effects are insomnia, dizziness, headache and nausea,
which were severe in more than 10% of patients. Other serious but less common side
effects include confusion, hallucination and dissociation, usually at the beginning
of the treatment. These side effects have affected about 3% of patients treated with
nalmefene, a figure three times higher than in the placebo groups. The consequences
of nalmefene mixed with large amounts of alcohol are not known. In practice, the clinical
relevance of nalmefene in alcohol-dependent patients seeking to reduce or abstain
is questionable. The impact of nalmefene on alcohol dependence complications is not
known. The crucial first step in the management of alcohol-dependent patients is to
establish a relationship based on trust and to provide psychological and social support.
When drugs are considered, it is best to choose acamprosate or naltrexone, drugs that
are only moderately effective but better evaluated”.15
b. The Drug Evaluation German Agency (IQWIG) made its conclusion on December 1: “Nalmefene
for alcohol dependence: no benefit evidenced” (https://www.iqwig.de/en/press/press-releases/press-releases/nalmefene-for-alcohol-dependence-added-benefit-not-proven.6458.html).
c. The French Health Authority concluded that nalmefene trials showed little evidence
for an improvement in actual benefit when compared to existing treatments (rating
=4, on a scale of 5 to 1, the highest). The agency advised to restrict prescription
to addiction specialists considering the major importance of psycho-social care, a
difficult condition to achieve in general practice. Such restriction is rarely used
by the Commission (http://www.has-sante.fr/portail/jcms/c_1737894/en/selincroenct12915english-version).
d. The Swedish Agency for health assessment concluded (March 31, 2015) to the lack
of interest of nalmefene compared to existing treatments and did not recommend its
reimbursement (http://www.tlv.se/beslut/beslut-lakemedel/avslag-uteslutningar/Selincro-ingar-inte-i-hogkostnadsskyddet/).
Fourth, who will benefit from nalmefene? Monthly cost for nalmefene in France is €101.34
vs €36.07 for naltrexone. The psychosocial support, a key element in the care of patients
with addiction but it is not reimbursed by the health care scheme. Accordingly, this
money could have been better used to cover two monthly psychologist visits.
Fifth, on June 19, 2013, the European Commission imposed a €93.8 million fine to Lundbeck
for having offered payments and other bribes to other companies who accepted to delay
the marketing of their cheaper generic of citalopram. The Vice-President of the Commission
Joaquín Almunia said: “Agreements of this type (breach of EU antitrust rules. Article
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) directly affect patients
and national health systems, which are already subject to strict budget constraints”
(http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/almunia-fines-lundbeck-and-rivals-for-fudging-competition-on-medicines/).