Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) can emerge in areas with low poliovirus
immunity and cause outbreaks* of paralytic polio (
1
–
5
). Among the three types of wild poliovirus, type 2 was declared eradicated in 2015
(
1
,
2
). The use of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV; types 1, 2, and 3 Sabin strains)
ceased in April 2016 via a 1-month–long, global synchronized switch to bivalent OPV
(bOPV; types 1 and 3 Sabin strains) in immunization activities (
1
–
4
). Monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2; type 2 Sabin strain) is available for cVDPV type
2 (cVDPV2) outbreak response immunization (
1
–
5
). The number and geographic breadth of post-switch cVDPV2 outbreaks have exceeded
forecasts that trended toward zero outbreaks 4 years after the switch and assumed
rapid and effective control of any that occurred (
4
). New cVDPV2 outbreaks have been seeded by mOPV2 use, by both suboptimal mOPV2 coverage
within response zones and recently mOPV2-vaccinated children or contacts traveling
outside of response zones, where children born after the global switch are fully susceptible
to poliovirus type 2 transmission (
2
–
4
). In addition, new emergences can develop by inadvertent exposure to Sabin OPV2-containing
vaccine (i.e., residual response mOPV2 or tOPV) (
4
). This report updates the January 2018–June 2019 report with information on global
cVDPV outbreaks during July 2019–February 2020 (as of March 25, 2020)
†
(
2
). Among 33 cVDPV outbreaks reported during July 2019–February 2020, 31 (94%) were
cVDPV2; 18 (58%) of these followed new emergences. In mid-2020, the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative (GPEI) plans to introduce a genetically stabilized, novel OPV type 2 (nOPV2)
that has a lower risk for generating VDPV2 than does Sabin mOPV2; if nOPV2 is successful
in limiting new VDPV2 emergences, GPEI foresees the replacement of Sabin mOPV2 with
nOPV2 for cVDPV2 outbreak responses during 2021 (
2
,
4
,
6
).
Detection of cVDPV Type 1
No poliovirus genetically linked to the Papua New Guinea cVDPV type 1 (cVDPV1) emergence
(PNG-MOR-1
§
) was detected after November 2018 (
1
,
2
). In Indonesia, the most recent cVDPV1 outbreak isolate was from February 2019 (IDN-PAP-1),
and in Myanmar (Burma), the most recent were from August 2019 (MMR-KAY-1) (
2
) (Table) (Figure 1). During the reporting period, a new cVDPV1 emergence (PHL-NCR-2)
was first detected in environmental surveillance (sewage) samples collected in July
2019 in the National Capital Region of the Philippines. Genetically linked virus was
isolated from sewage samples collected in Sabah State, Malaysia, in June and November
2019; however, delays in sample processing resulted in findings not being released
until December 2019. The most recent isolate linked to PHL-NCR-2 was detected in a
specimen from a patient from Malaysia with acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) onset in
January 2020.
TABLE
Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) detected, by serotype, source and
other selected characteristics — worldwide, July 2019–February 2020
Country
Emergence designation*
Years detected†
Serotype
No. of isolates§ July 2019–February 2020
Capsid protein VP1 divergence from Sabin OPV strain**(%)
Date of latest outbreak case, healthy child specimen, or environmental sample††
From AFP cases
From other human sources (non-AFP)¶
From environmental surveillance
Afghanistan
PAK-GB-1
2020
2
0
0
10
1.1–2.0
Feb 5, 2020
Angola
ANG-HUI-1
2019–2020
2
76
2
13
0.7–1.8
Feb 9, 2020
Angola
ANG-LNO-2
2019
2
14
1
0
1.1–2.2
Dec 25, 2019
Angola
ANG-MOX-1
2019
2
12
2
0
0.8–1.6
Dec 18, 2019
Angola
ANG-LUA-1
2019
2
34
3
14
0.7–1.5
Dec 27, 2019
Benin
NIE-JIS-1
2019–2020
2
8
0
0
3.3
Jan 16, 2020
Burkina Faso
NIE-JIS-1
2019–2020
2
1
3
0
3.7
Jan 11, 2020
Cameroon
CHA-NDJ-1
2019
2
0
0
2
1.1
Dec 16, 2019
Cameroon
NIE-JIS-1
2019
2
0
0
1
3.3
Dec 2, 2019
Cameroon
CAR-BNG-1
2020
2
1
0
0
2.2
Jan 30, 2020
CAR
CAR-BAM-1
2019
2
3
2
6
0.8–2.1
Nov 20, 2019
CAR
CAR-BER-1
2019
2
3
3
1
0.8–1.2
Dec 8, 2019
CAR
CAR-BIM-2
2019
2
0
0
3
1.3–2.2
Sep 11, 2019
CAR
CAR-BIM-3
2019
2
2
7
0
0.8–1.6
Aug 23, 2019
CAR
CAR-BNG-1
2019–2020
2
9
3
10
0.7–1.9
Feb 5, 2020
Chad
NIE-JIS-1
2019–2020
2
5
7
2
2.6–4.5
Feb 5, 2020
Chad
CHA-NDJ-1
2019–2020
2
8
3
10
0.7–2.5
Feb 5, 2020
China
CHN-XIN-1
2018–2019
2
0
1
0
3.0
Aug 18, 2019
Côte d’Ivoire
NIE-JIS-1
2019–2020
2
0
0
31
2.8–4.0
Feb 11, 2020
Côte d’Ivoire
TOG-SAV-1
2020
2
1
0
0
2.0
Feb 10, 2020
DRC
DRC-HLO-2
2019
2
13
5
0
1.0–1.7
Dec 13, 2019
DRC
DRC-KAS-3
2019–2020
2
18
6
0
1.3–2.2
Feb 8, 2020
DRC
DRC-SAN-1
2019
2
26
1
0
0.7–1.8
Nov 30, 2019
DRC
ANG-LUA-1
2019–2020
2
12
3
0
0.7–1.3
Jan 22, 2020
Ethiopia
SOM-BAN-1
2019
2
3
0
0
5.4–5.6
Aug 13, 2019
Ethiopia
ETH-ORO-1
2019–2020
2
11
3
1
1.1–2.6
Feb 12, 2020
Ethiopia
ETH-ORO-2
2019–2020
2
3
0
0
1.2–1.5
Jan 26, 2020
Ethiopia
ETH-ORO-3
2019–2020
2
1
1
0
2.0–2.2
Feb 21, 2020
Ethiopia
ETH-SOM-1
2019
2
0
1
2
1.5
Dec 30, 2019
Ghana
NIE-JIS-1
2019–2020
2
24
29
50
1.8–4.0
Feb 15, 2020
Malaysia
PHL-NCR-1
2019
2
0
0
2
6.8–7.1
Nov 19, 2019
Malaysia
PHL-NCR-2
2019–2020
1
3
0
8
3.6–3.9
Jan 24, 2020
Myanmar§§
MMR-KAY-1
2019
1
2
5
0
3.4–3.6
Aug 21, 2019
Nigeria
NIE-JIS-1
2018–2019
2
1
2
2
2.4–2.5
Oct 9, 2019
Nigeria
NIE-KGS-1
2019–2020
2
2
1
5
0.9–1.5
Jan 26, 2020
Nigeria
NIE-KGS-2
2019
2
1
3
0
0.7–0.8
Aug 8, 2019
Nigeria
NIE-SOS-6
2019
2
0
0
1
1.1
Sep 11, 2019
Pakistan
PAK-GB-1
2019–2020
2
41
18
65
0.7–2.0
Feb 10, 2020
Pakistan
PAK-GB-2
2019
2
0
2
1
0.7–1.3
Aug 28, 2019
Pakistan
PAK-GB-3
2019
2
1
1
0
0.9–1.0
Aug 22, 2019
Pakistan
PAK-KOH-1
2019
2
1
1
2
0.7–1.3
Nov 12, 2019
Pakistan
PAK-TOR-1
2019–2020
2
2
4
4
0.7–1.5
Jan 3, 2020
Philippines
PHL-NCR-1
2019–2020
2
14
6
30
6.8–7.8
Jan 24, 2020
Philippines
PHL-NCR-2
2019
1
1
1
22
3.3–4.4
Nov 28, 2019
Somalia
SOM-BAN-1
2017–2020
2
0
0
10
5.7–6.4
Feb 4, 2020
Togo
NIE-JIS-1
2019–2020
2
11
1
0
2.7–4.1
Jan 23, 2020
Togo
TOG-SAV-1
2019–2020
2
3
2
0
1.4–1.9
Feb 1, 2020
Zambia
ZAM-LUA-1
2019
2
1
2
0
1.0–1.1
Sep 25, 2019
Zambia
ANG-MOX-1
2019
2
1
0
0
1.1
Nov 25, 2019
Total cVDPV
—¶¶
—¶¶
—¶¶
373
135
308
—¶¶
—¶¶
Abbreviations: AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic
Republic of the Congo; OPV = oral poliovirus vaccine.
* Outbreaks list total cases clearly associated with cVDPVs; emergences indicate independent
cVDPV outbreaks and designate the location of the emergence and the number of emergences
in a geographic region.
† Total years detected.
§ Total VDPV-positive specimens obtained from AFP patients and total VDPV-positive
environmental (sewage) samples as of March 25 2020, for all emergences except the
following: 1) ETH-ORO-1, ETH-ORO-2, ETH-ORO-3, ETH-SOM-1, and SOM-BAN-1 (as of March
24, 2020) and 2) CHA-NDJ-1, NIE-JIS-1, NIE-KGS-1, NIE-KGS-2, NIE-SOS-6, and TOG-SAV-1
(as of March 27, 2020).
¶ Contacts and healthy child sampling as of March 25, 2020, for all emergences except
for the following: 1) ETH-ORO-1, ETH-ORO-3, and ETH-SOM-1 (as of March 24, 2020) and
2) CHA-NDJ-1, NIE-JIS-1, NIE-KGS-1, NIE-KGS-2, and TOG-SAV-1 (as of March 27, 2020).
** Percentage of divergence is estimated from the number of nucleotide differences
in the VP1 region from the corresponding parental OPV strain.
†† For AFP cases, dates refer to date of paralysis onset; for contacts, healthy children,
and environmental (sewage) samples, dates refer to date of collection.
§§ U.S. State Department country name is Burma.
¶¶ Not cumulative data.
FIGURE 1
Ongoing circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks — worldwide, July
2019–February 2020*
Abbreviations: cVDPV1 = cVDPV type 1; cVDPV2 = cVDPV type 2.
* Data as of March 24–27, 2020.
The figure consists of maps showing selected countries in Africa and Asia with ongoing
circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreaks during July 2019–February 2020.
Detection of cVDPV2
During July 2019–February 2020, among 31 active cVDPV2 outbreaks, 18 (58%) followed
new emergences; one outbreak in Malaysia and the Philippines (PHL-NCR-1) was detected
during the reporting period, although genetic sequencing analyses indicate that the
emergence occurred years earlier and genetically linked viruses circulated undetected
by surveillance (Table) (Figure 1) (
1
,
2
). Twenty-four (77%) of the 31 active outbreaks affected African countries; seven
of these (29%) resulted in international spread (Figure 2).
FIGURE 2
Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases and environmental samples positive for circulating
vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 associated with outbreaks ongoing during July 2019–February
2020 that involved international spread since emergence, by outbreak and country —
Africa, October 2017–February 2020*
,†
Abbreviation: CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo;
ENV = environmental surveillance.
* Dates (month/year) refer to the date of specimen collection. For samples collected
on the same dates, symbols will overlap; thus, not all isolates are visible.
† Data as of March 25, 2020, for all emergences except the following: 1) SOM-BAN-1
(as of March 24, 2020) and 2) CHA-NDJ-1, NIE-JIS-1, and TOG-SAV-1 (as of March 27,
2020).
The figure is a diagram showing numbers and dates for acute flaccid paralysis cases
and environmental samples positive for circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type
2, which were associated with cVDPV2 outbreaks ongoing during July 2019–February 2020,
that involved international spread since emergence, by outbreak and country, in Africa
during October 2017–February 2020.
Western Africa. The previously described cVDPV2 emergence in Nigeria (NIE-JIS-1) continued
to circulate during the reporting period (
1
,
2
); the most recent NIE-JIS-1 isolations in Niger and Nigeria were detected among specimens
from AFP patients in April and October 2019, respectively. Detection of genetically
linked virus from AFP patients’ specimens and through environmental surveillance occurred
in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo during the
reporting period. Since its first detection in Nigeria in January 2018, NIE-JIS-1
emergence has resulted in 101 cases in seven countries (
1
,
2
). Ongoing transmission of previously reported cVDPV2 emergences (NIE-KGS-1 and NIE-KGS-2)
and of a new cVDPV2 emergence (NIE-SOS-6) was detected in Nigeria (
2
). No polioviruses genetically linked to other previously described emergences (NIE-SOS-3,
NIE-SOS-4, and NIE-SOS-5) (
1
,
2
) were detected during the reporting period. A new emergence (TOG-SAV-1) in Togo was
first detected in November 2019, and a genetically linked virus was isolated from
a specimen obtained from an AFP patient in Côte d’Ivoire in February 2020.
Central Africa. Five Central African countries were affected by cVDPV2 outbreaks during
July 2019–February 2020. Each country had a minimum of two cVDPV2 emergences circulating
during the reporting period, with the Central African Republic (CAR) having five.
In Angola, no poliovirus genetically linked to the previously described cVDPV2 emergence
(ANG-LNO-1) was detected after May 2019 (
2
). However, polioviruses genetically linked to previously described emergences (ANG-HUI-1
and ANG-LNO-2) continued to circulate during the reporting period within Angola, resulting
in 78 cases (ANG-HUI-1) and 15 cases (ANG-LNO-2) since first detection (
2
). In addition, two new emergences were detected in June (ANG-LUA-1) and September
(ANG-MOX-1) 2019, resulting in a total of 46 cVDPV2 cases in Angola; the two emergences
also circulated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; ANG-LUA-1) and Zambia
(ANG-MOX-1). The detection of concurrent and independent cVDPV2 emergences in Angola
might be associated with mOPV2 response–related supplementary immunization activities
(SIAs; vaccination campaigns) in neighboring DRC or related to other Sabin OPV2 inadvertent
exposure in Angola; investigation is ongoing.
In CAR, the previously described CAR-BAM-1 and CAR-BIM-2 emergences continued to circulate
during the reporting period, resulting in three cases and six detections of CAR-BAM-1
and three detections of CAR-BIM-2 through environmental surveillance (
2
). No polioviruses genetically linked to the previously described CAR-BAM-2 or CAR-BIM-1
emergences were detected after June 2019 (
2
). Three new emergences (CAR-BER-1, CAR-BIM-3, and CAR-BNG-1) were detected during
the reporting period and resulted in a total of 14 cases in CAR. Virus genetically
linked to CAR-BNG-1 was isolated from a specimen obtained from an AFP patient in Cameroon
with paralysis onset in January 2020.
In Chad, circulation of a new emergence (CHA-NDJ-1) was first detected in October
2019. Genetically linked viruses were continually detected in specimens from AFP patients
in Chad into 2020 and from environmental surveillance in Cameroon and Chad through
the end of 2019.
In DRC, the previously described emergences, DRC-HLO-2, DRC-KAS-3, and DRC-SAN-1,
continued to circulate, resulting in 20, 21, and 32 cases, respectively, since detection
(
2
). During the reporting period, cVDPV2 genetically linked to the Angola ANG-LUA-1
emergence was detected in specimens obtained from 12 AFP patients in DRC. No evidence
of continued circulation of the other previously described emergences (DRC-HKA-1,
DRC-HLO-1, DRC-KAS-1, DRC-KAS-2, DRC-MAN-1, DRC-MON-1, and DRC-TPA-1) was found (
1
,
2
).
Southern Africa. In Zambia, the ZAM-LUA-1 emergence was detected in specimens obtained
from an AFP patient and two contacts during July–September 2019. In addition, cVDPV2
linked to the ANG-MOX-1 emergence was detected in a specimen obtained from an AFP
patient with paralysis onset in November 2019. In Mozambique, no transmission related
to the previously described MOZ-ZAM-2 emergence has been detected since December 2018
(
2
).
Horn of Africa. During July 2019–February 2020, cVDPV2 genetically related to the
previously described SOM-BAN-1 emergence, which was first detected in October 2017
in Banadir Province, Somalia (
1
–
3
), continued to circulate. During this reporting period, genetically linked virus
was detected from specimens from three AFP patients in Ethiopia and in 10 sewage samples
from Banadir. In Ethiopia, four new cVDPV2 emergences (ETH-ORO-1, ETH-ORO-2, ETH-ORO-3,
and ETH-SOM-1) were detected during this period among specimens from 15 AFP patients
and through environmental surveillance in Addis Ababa and the Somali region.
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The PAK-GB-1 emergence was the first of five total cVDPV2
emergences (PAK-GB-1, PAK-GB-2, PAK-GB-3, PAK-KOH-1, and PAK-TOR-1) detected in Pakistan
during the reporting period. PAK-GB-1 has resulted in 41 AFP cases in Pakistan and
has been isolated through environmental surveillance in Pakistan and Afghanistan as
recently as February 2020. The last detections of the PAK-GB-2 and PAK-GB-3 cVDPV2s
were in August 2019. PAK-KOH-1 and PAK-TOR-1 emergences were detected from specimens
obtained from AFP patients and through environmental surveillance during September
2019–January 2020. Current genetic evidence indicates that the 2016 mOPV2 outbreak
response SIAs in Pakistan did not initiate these cVDPV2 outbreaks. Possible origins
include international importations from areas using mOPV2 or inadvertent use of residual
tOPV or mOPV2 (
4
).
China. The CHN-XIN-1 emergence was first isolated through environmental surveillance
in Xinjiang province in April 2018; genetically linked virus was last detected in
Sichuan province in August 2019 from the stool specimen of a community contact of
an AFP patient who had paralysis onset in April 2019 (
2
).
Malaysia and the Philippines. During the reporting period, the PHL-NCR-1 emergence
was identified from a specimen obtained from an AFP patient with paralysis onset in
June 2019 in Mindanao Province, the Philippines. Subsequently, genetically linked
virus was detected among specimens from 13 additional AFP patients in the Philippines
and through environmental surveillance in both Malaysia and the Philippines during
July 2019–February 2020.
Outbreak Control
As of the end of February 2020, no transmission was detected for ≥13 months for previously
reported outbreaks related to one cVDPV1 emergence in Papua New Guinea (PNG-MOR-1),
one cVDPV3 emergence in Somalia (SOM-BAN-2), and six cVDPV2 emergences in DRC (DRC-HLO-1,
DRC-MAN-1, DRC-MON-1, and DRC-HKA-1), Mozambique (MOZ-ZAM-2), and Syria (designation
not assigned), indicating probable outbreak cessation (
1
–
3
,
5
,
7
). Emergences of cVDPV in Angola (ANG-LNO-1); CAR (CAR-BAM-2 and CAR-BIM-1); DRC (DRC-KAS-1,
DRC-KAS-2, and DRC-TPA-1); Indonesia (IDN-PAP-1); and Nigeria (NIE-SOS-3, NIE-SOS-4,
and NIE-SOS-5) have had no genetically linked isolations for 7–12 months, indicating
possible outbreak cessation (
1
,
2
,
5
,
7
).
Discussion
After outbreak detection, prompt and effective mOPV2 vaccination of children will
interrupt cVDPV2 transmission and limit emergence of new VDPV2 strains in outbreak
response zones. Although many previously identified cVDPV2 outbreaks have been interrupted
or controlled as forecasted (
1
–
4
), GPEI has been challenged by the increased number of outbreaks from newly seeded
VDPV2 emergences during January 2018–February 2020, following mOPV2 SIAs that did
not reach sufficient coverage; in addition, there are protracted cVDPV2 outbreaks
from prior emergence that have not been successfully controlled for the same reason
(
1
–
4
). In areas where no mOPV2 has yet been used, approximately four birth cohorts that
are fully susceptible to mucosal poliovirus type 2 infection have accumulated since
the April 2016 tOPV-to-bOPV switch (
1
,
2
,
4
).
The utility of environmental surveillance to complement AFP surveillance has been
demonstrated by detections of continued circulation after a long absence in detection
of confirmed AFP cases (e.g., SOM-BAN-1 in Somalia) and of circulation before detection
of confirmed AFP cases (e.g., NIE-JIS-1 in Ghana); some outbreak transmission has
been detected only through environmental surveillance (e.g., NIE-SOS-6 in Nigeria)
(
8
).
To address these challenges, GPEI adopted the 2020–2021 Strategy for the Response
to Type 2 Circulating Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus as an addendum to the Polio Endgame
Strategy 2019–2023 (
6
). The response strategy aims to improve the quality of mOPV2 SIAs through enhanced
technical support, enactment of full international health emergency procedures, and
enhanced population protection from paralysis through periodic intensification of
routine immunization with bOPV and injectable inactivated poliovirus vaccine. After
accelerated development and clinical testing of nOPV2 (
9
), which has a substantially lower risk for reversion to neurovirulence (
2
,
9
), this vaccine is expected to be available in mid-2020 for initial outbreak responses
under emergency use listing requirements (
10
). If wider outbreak response use is allowed and ample supplies are available by the
end of 2020, nOPV2 will replace Sabin mOPV2 in outbreak response to prevent new VDPV2
emergences (
6
). This time line and the course of ongoing and newly emergent cVDPV outbreaks could
be negatively affected during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic because
of changes in priorities for use of health care resources and decreased immunization
activities.
¶
Cessation of all OPV use after certification of polio eradication will eliminate the
risk of VDPV emergence (
2
,
4
).
Summary
What is already known about this topic?
Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) can emerge in settings with low
poliovirus immunity and can cause paralysis.
What is added by this report?
Thirty-one ongoing and new cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks were documented during
July 2019–February 2020; nine outbreaks spread internationally. New cVDPV2 outbreaks
were often linked to poor coverage with monovalent Sabin oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV)
type 2 during outbreak response campaigns.
What are the implications for public health practice?
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans to introduce a genetically stabilized,
novel OPV type 2 for outbreak response in mid-2020 and expand use in 2021. Cessation
of all OPV use after certification of polio eradication will eliminate the risk of
VDPV emergence.